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ABSTRACT

THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF CONVERSION

By
Paul Anthony DiGeorgio
May 2021

Dissertation supervised by James Swindal, Ph.D.
Abstract: The goal of this dissertation is to offer a systematic phenomenology of
the conversion experience based primarily on the transcendental method of Husserl.
Conversion is an empirical phenomenon that, when phenomenologically analyzed, is
revealed to have several eidetic or essential features that shape any conversion in general.
After reviewing the secondary literature on conversion, I construct a synthetic account of
the empirical experience. I then sketch the transcendental phenomenological method and
proceed to evaluate conversion as a firsthand experience in the “natural attitude” which is
necessary in order to ensure that I can exclude or bracket all of the assumptions that I
make regarding conversion in this attitude once I enter the phenomenological attitude.
Before attempting a reduction of conversion, in the phenomenological attitude I explore
the nature of self and consciousness, and I examine the nature of conversion as an
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embodied phenomenon. I also revisit the famous conversion story of Saint Paul, which I
treat as a phenomenological case study. Finally, I present an eidetic account of the
conversion experience, where my most important claim is that on the phenomenological
level all conversions require judgment, the world, the Other, and time-consciousness.
Ultimately, I conclude that conversion is a fundamental human experience for which we
appear to be phenomenologically predisposed.
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INTRODUCTION

Conversion defines our lives. It is the process through which we ourselves change over the
course of time. It is almost as hard to imagine a life without personal change as it is to imagine a
life that exists outside of time. To the extent that we live in time our existence essentially entails
the phenomenon.
Thus, it comes as no surprise that much of our art and culture focuses on conversion as a
central theme. First, conversion is often construed as an essential experience in the major
Western religions. While ordinarily it is supposed that every religious believer is not necessarily
a convert in a formal sense, a broader definition of conversion would include all of them, since
every religious person was once, at some point in time, not religious (e.g., childhood). This
universality is reflected in the preponderance of scriptural examples of the phenomenon.
Consider, from the Abrahamic religions alone, the stories of King David, Ruth, Zacchaeus,
Saul/Paul, and Cornelius. All of Christ’s Twelve Apostles are converts, with some, like St. Peter,
being converts twice over.1 Outside of scripture there are the beatified cases of Saint Augustine,
Edith Stein/Saint Teresa Benedicta of the Cross, and Saint Josephine Bakhita, as well as
instrumental proponents of the experience, like John Cotton and Jonathan Edwards.
Second, outside of the purview of religious experience, conversion occupies a status as a
common theme in art and literature. For example, conversion is a particularly popular them in
the Baroque and Renaissance periods of art history. The conversion phenomenon is the focus of
paintings by Michelangelo, Caravaggio, Bruegel the Elder, Rubens, Murillo, Reni, and Par
Myriad.

1

I refer to the Peter who emerges after the threefold denial of Christ. Luke 22:54-61 NABRE
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Numerous works of literature incorporate the thematics of conversion, which makes for a
compelling and humanized characterization, since to live is to experience personal change.
Examples include Beowulf, Goethe’s Faust (1808/1831), Shakespeare’s The Tempest (1611),
Proust’s À la recherche du temps perdu (1871-1922), and more; in fact, it can be argued that any
work of fiction which incorporates a dynamic character involves in some sense a conversion.2 By
such a definition we could include Guy Montag from Fahrenheit 451 (1953), the boys in Lord of
the Flies (1954), Raskolnikov in Crime and Punishment (1866), and even Gregor Samsa in The
Metamorphosis of Kafka (1915). More recently there are cultural giants who have converted,
like Sojourner Truth, Salvador Dalí, C.S. Lewis, Oscar Wilde, and T.S. Eliot. Some demented
individuals have also gone through conversion experiences, including Mark David Chapman,
who murdered John Lennon. It should come as no surprise that conversion has been such a
prominent theme in the history of human culture; it is universal.
But I suggest that conversion, precisely because it is so universal, can take on many
different variations. In this respect it is rather like consciousness itself. It would be an
understatement to characterize consciousness in general, in all of its variegated manifestations
across the breadth of human experience, as vast and diverse. The truth is that even these strong
words are not enough to accurately capture just how free-flowing heterogenous the phenomenon
of consciousness truly is. Consider the fact that even in our ordinary and natural modes of

The conversion that occurs in Goethe’s version of Faust resembles more closely a traditional
conversion in the sense that the conversion is associated with moral improvement. Many early
scholars of conversion presupposed that conversion always incorporates such improvement. In
this text I will argue that this is misguided. For example, consider how we can compare the
repentant Faust in Goethe to the version presented by Christopher Marlowe. In Marlowe’s
Doctor Faustus, the namesake character essentially “converts” to wickedness. See Susan
Snyder’s “Marlowe’s Doctor Faustus as an Inverted Saint’s Life,” 566. Snyder suggests that
Faustus “is ‘converted’ to the devil.”
2
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consciousness, whereby we complete activities as manifold as answering emails, running
errands, solving puzzles, reading books, exercising, and preparing meals, we are actually living
out sundry experiences. This is a bit ironic since we often approach our consciousness as if it is
a homogenous “thing.” For example, we typically assume that consciousness is stable and
consistent on the level of personal identity, missing the fact that it is constituted out of
remarkably variegated constituent parts which are, so long as we have consciousness, maintained
in a state of perpetual flux.3 Consciousness, in short, is at once both monolithic and everchanging. Conversion is analogous to consciousness in general since it marks the shift or change
from one state of existence to another.
Experiences are easy to enumerate, but they sometimes prove to be difficult to describe as
they are experienced by consciousness. Descriptions are mediated by language, after all, and
even the most rigorous description of human experience will be limited by the radical ontological
difference between explicans and explicandum, since language is attempting to describe
something that is practically ineffable. Ordinary language must reach too far as it endeavors to
grasp an object that is radically different in kind from itself.
The phenomenological approach can partly overcome the difficulties of ordinary
language. Without a doubt there persists an enigmatic remainder that eludes the analysis of even
the most practiced phenomenologist (and phenomenologists contend differently regarding the
nature of this remainder), but when considered overall, not so much as a clearly defined
discipline (which it is not), but instead, as an approximate set of methods and concepts,

Heraclitus and Friedrich Nietzsche are two of the most famous advocates of this sort of
description of the state of reality. See Heraclitus DK22B12. Nietzsche refers often to Heraclitus.
See, for example, Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks §§5-7, The Birth of Tragedy §24,
and “On the Utility and Liability of History for Life,” §1.
3
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phenomenological philosophy is more capable than any other approach at describing lived
experience as it appears before consciousness. Thus phenomenology is uniquely equipped to
objectively grasp the nature of conscious reality, despite the fact that consciousness and language
are radically different in kind; phenomenology is the best compromise that we are afforded.
To this day one of the most mysterious aspects of conscious reality—and therefore one of
the most deserving of scholarly attention— is the domain of religious, spiritual, and/or mystic
experience. William James (1842-1910) is among the first to have recognized that religious
phenomena, as objects of consciousness, were worthy of serious and careful analysis.4 Indeed his
Varieties of Religious Experience reads much like a phenomenological study, specifically
because James focuses on “subjective phenomena” and passes over questions of theological and
metaphysical significance. Thus, he was able to study religious and spiritual experiences without
worrying about the question of religious or absolute truth. In so doing he can carry out a bold and
adventurous foray into “alternative” modes of consciousness that transcend that which is
“ordinary and natural” in an empirically scientific sense. In a section of Varieties where he is
exploring mystic experience, James writes that:
Our normal waking consciousness, rational consciousness as we call it, is but one special type of
consciousness, whilst all about it, parted from it by the filmiest of screens, there lie potential forms
of consciousness entirely different. We may go through life without suspecting their existence; but
apply the requisite stimulus, and at a touch they are there in all their completeness, definite types
of mentality which probably somewhere have their field of application and adaptation. No account
of the universe in its totality can be final which leaves these other forms of consciousness quite
disregarded. How to regard them is the question—for they are so discontinuous with ordinary

It might be true that philosophers as early as Aristotle studied topics of eventual interest to
philosophers of religion, but metaphysics is not equivalent with the study of the consciousness of
religious phenomena.
4
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consciousness. Yet they may determine attitudes though they cannot furnish formulas, and open a
region though they fail to give a map. At any rate, they forbid a premature closing of our accounts
with reality.5

What James here states cannot be stressed enough—any scientific explanation of nature would
be incomplete if it did not strive to explain, or at least acknowledge, the existence of modes of
consciousness that differ from the “normal waking” version. It is William Blake (1757-1827)
who famously indicates that “[i]f the doors of perception were cleansed every thing would
appear to man as it is, infinite.”6 This quote has inspired countless musicians and recreational
drug users, but it should inspire scientists and philosophers as well, especially when the full
quote is presented: “[f]or man has closed himself up, till he sees all things thru' narrow chinks of
his cavern." Indeed this is the issue with any partial or arbitrary limitation that is imposed upon
the supposedly “proper” objects of intellectual study. The best science is the most complete
science, one which employs careful methods to the study of all aspects of nature.
And yet, not everyone is convinced that the examination of religious or spiritual
experiences should take up the time of serious scientists, philosophers, and surprisingly even
theologians. Karl Barth (1886-1968), for example, rejects the very idea of religious empiricism.7
Going further back in the western tradition, David Hume (1711-1776) concludes that religious
experience cannot serve as evidence of the divine.8 John Locke (1632-1704) does not come
down quite so hard on religious experience, and seems willing to grant that sense experience can
qualify as evidence for a belief.9 It should be clear that Hume and Locke are not quite on the

James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, 296.
Blake, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, 36.
7
Swindal, “Faith and Reason” The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
8
Ibid.
9
Ibid.
5
6
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same page, though. While Locke will grant that the experience can count as evidence for the
belief in God, Hume is saying that the experience cannot count as evidence for the existence of
God (ignoring the question of belief).
These days, with the insights of modern psychology, modern medicine, and
phenomenology, it practically goes without saying that the experiences are worthy of scientific
study regardless of their supposed objective reference.10 This is particularly obvious in clinical
cases, where, for example, a medical subject might be experiencing frightening night terrors in
which he is certain that shadowy figures congregate around his bed, despite the fact that no one
else can see them—a psychologist can benefit from the study of this experience, just as a
physician or neuroscientist can benefit from studying the events that occur in the brain as the
patient has these frightful hallucinations. Clearly the scientist or philosopher who studies the
hallucinating subject need not concern himself over the question of the objective reference of a
perception. To do otherwise would be to muddle one’s own investigation with peripheral
considerations.
As Jonna Bornemark and Hans Ruin note, phenomenological philosophy has proven to be
especially useful for problems and questions that are “religious” in nature.11 This is because
phenomenology, at least as it is commonly understood, takes as its subject matter the immediate
experience of consciousness. It is particularly useful for studying the experience of religious
phenomena because of the way in which it concerns itself only with those very phenomena.
For the phenomenological student of religion, metaphysical questions concerning the
empirical existence of God are to be “bracketed” to the side while the analytic focus is placed

By ‘modern psychology’ I mean post-Wundt scientific psychology, in contrast to the older
versions of psychological philosophy explored by Aristotle, Hume, etc.
11
Bornemark and Ruin, Phenomenology and Religion, 7.
10
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upon the mystic’s experience of God. Similarly, investigations of the so-called “real” world that
exists independent of mind, the world that is purely and only objective, cannot be taken up by a
phenomenologist. This “real” world separate from consciousness is that which Immanuel Kant
(1724-1804) would call the “noumenal” precisely to the extent that it is non-phenomenal—it
does not appear to consciousness or “mind.” We cannot be sure if such a thing exists or not since
we are limited to our own consciousness.
In any case with phenomenology new realms of philosophical inquiry are uncovered.
Even an atheistic philosopher who is positively convinced that a God does not exist now finds
herself in front of a door that was previously locked. The experience of religion and the
experience of spirituality are phenomenologically analyzable whether a God really exists or not.
The very question of whether such a God exists is one upon which the phenomenologist must
remain agnostic, at least for as long as the phenomenologist retains his method and theory.
While it is true that, at least since Plato, philosophers have concerned themselves with
questions that are of interest to theologians and spiritualists, it is also true that what is called the
“philosophy of religion” is a relatively nascent field in western philosophy, at least when we
compare it to other areas of inquiry, many of which are thousands of years old. It is already
obvious why this must be the case. The phenomenological “realization” is something of which
Plato, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), and René Descartes (1596-1650) all remain
ignorant. Indeed, we might source the historical emergence of the phenomenological realization
to Kant's first Critique, and the institution of phenomenology in a methodological sense to
G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831), who is also one of the first authors to explore phenomenological
philosophy, but not in any manner that closely resembles the phenomenological movement that
starts with Edmund Husserl (1859-1938).

19

Suffice to say that today much work is being done in religious studies on the
phenomenology of religion. It was nearly twenty-five years ago that Dominique Janicaud noted a
“theological turn” in phenomenological studies, evinced in the work of authors the likes of which
are as variegated as Jean-Luc Marion (b. 1946), Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995), and Jacques
Derrida (1930-2004).12
To be sure, phenomenology seems uniquely equipped to address religious experience. As
Husserl explains in a 1919 letter to Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911), we can understand religion if
we more fully understand “inner life.” Insofar as both the experience of the transcendental and
the doxic position of faithfulness can only be mediated phenomenologically—a basic insight
derivable from Kant's “Copernican” revolution in The Critique of Pure Reason—it is only natural
that phenomenological philosophy is a fecund environment within which one can return to
classical questions in a new light.
Thus it will here be assumed that the academic study of alternative modes of
consciousness is a worthwhile scientific and philosophical pursuit. In order to continue with the
analysis of phenomenology, it is necessary to make preliminary distinctions between different
types of experience.

The Different Types of Experience in General

At first glance it appears that any given experience is either physical, emotional, mental, or some
combination thereof.

12

Janicaud, Le tournant théologique, 17.
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If an experience is physical, it could be said to be physical in several different ways. First,
an experience could be physical in that it directly involves the organs of the body and
corresponding physiological “feeling.” According to the phenomenological view, I am my body
and I perceive with it, such as when I taste a sumptuous dessert, delight at the harmonious
melodies of live music, or run my hand across the head of a dog. There are other organs, like the
stomach or reproductive organs, the primary function of which is not the transmission of a
feeling, yet nevertheless are capable of transmitting that type of information, as when one feels
hunger, or sexual arousal. What is more, there are ambiguous types of experience where one
does use organs of sense, but not in a primary fashion, such as when one plays a video game that
simulates a visual field which in fact is not suspended in empirical, three-dimensional space-time
(in other words the sight corresponds to a simulated reference but lacks an objective, nonphenomenological reference).
Emotional experiences comprise a rich domain of the human experience. These
experiences are sometimes called “feelings” but not in the physical sense of the word. Emotional
experiences include relatively precise, culturally transmitted feelings like sadness, happiness,
anger, love, or boredom, but an emotional experience can also be less defined, especially when
one is experiencing a combination of different emotions.
Sometimes but not always an emotional experience has a correlate on the level of
physical experience, as when a stomachache accompanies nervous feelings before an important
event. Another example is the case of the experience of love, which probably has a tactic
correlate. Like religious experiences, emotional experiences have only more recently entered the
fold of serious academic study.13

13

Jaggar, “Love and Knowledge.”
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The third type of experience is mental experience, which includes the use of reason, the
holding of beliefs, all imaginative activity, and all other forms of what is ordinarily referred to as
“thought.” Often, we experience emotions corresponding to our mental life, and often we reflect
in our mentality on the experience of our emotions. Thus, these two types of experience often
comprise a sort of continuous feedback loop.
There is still scientific debate over the extent to which mental life can be causally
explained solely in physical scientific terms (like the statement “the mind is what the brain
does”). While it is presently unclear whether or not all mental experiences are ultimately caused
by physical processes, we can still determine that at least some of our mental experiences rely on
our sense organs in this way, as is the case when one calculates a sum “in one’s head,” which one
must admit would still require a brain.14 In still other cases we can have mental experience in the
style of physical sensation, but without their actual involvement, especially with respect to
situations involving vision, like when one uses their imagination to picture a magical creature, or
recalls something from the past, or even has a dream.
Mental experience would also include the consciousness of memory. To the extent that
one has a memory, one also experiences most if not all of the time something like a story of
oneself, a personal narrative. This narrative is tied to one’s sense of identity and selfhood. In part
this story is composed of big events and significant moments, but it also would not be much of a
story at all without all of the more banal and routine details that comprise the majority of a
typical life. It could be fairly stated that so long as one is living, even idly and monotonously,
this story is always being written in the “background” of one’s experience.

There are debates regarding the extent to which mathematics is mind-dependent but here I will
assume that at the very least performing a mathematical calculation is something that can only be
enacted by consciousness.
14
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The idea of a “background” of experience is intriguing but rather peculiar. Consider how,
on top of human experience as heretofore characterized, there waits at one’s recourse the human
faculty of reflection by way of which one can, in any moment, “retreat” back into the confines of
the mind to “think” and otherwise perform analysis. For this reflective retreat to be possible, the
“content” of experience has to “be” a certain way. Indeed, constituent to the human experience of
subjectivity is a linguistic and mathematical film that naturally colors, shades, and provides
depth to “bald” experience as such.15 To be sure this dynamic and generative layer of concepts
and number is not always at the fore of one’s consciousness, nor is every aspect of this layer
discursive, but, as Kant understood, the layer itself in part establishes the very possibility of
human experience.16 According to Kant, forms of intuition integral to the understanding actively
construct the foundations for experience.
Of all the variegated experiences that are possible for consciousness, from the richly
textured experience of flavor or music to the subtle numbness of a “sleeping” limb, perhaps the
experience of religious or spiritual conversion is most fascinating—and mysterious—of all.
These experiences are remarkable in that they disorient the human subject in such a way that the
end result is a reoriented being. The experience of conversion can fairly be reduced to the
experience of self-change.17
The experience—subjective phenomenon—of conversion is mysterious and therefore
especially worthy of academic interest primarily due to the way in which the experience is at

It would be reasonable to doubt the extent to which such a “bald” version of human experience
is even possible.
16
For example, Kant denies that space is simply a “discursive concept” and states rather that it is
a “pure intuition.” CPR A24/B39.
17
I will show that self-change includes changes not only in the experience of identity but also of
role.
15
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once both ordinary (in the sense of being common) but also remarkably powerful. Marie Baird
writes that it is in the “foundational capacity” for conversion that a subject confronts “an
ultimate, transcendent field of signification” and thereby self-transcends, thus “escap[ing] the
biogenetic determinism that consigns pre-human life forms to those roles dictated by the
environment in which they live.”18 If this propensity to convert is as universal as Baird suggests,
then it is practically an essential feature of our very Being. Furthermore, if Baird is right, then
not only is this experience what distinguishes our humanity from other organisms, but having the
experience is actually the (only?) means of avoiding the strictures of an existence that is
otherwise ultimately determined by outward forces rather than one’s own will.

Conversion: Psychological Mechanics

The etymology of ‘conversion’ can be traced to the Latin convertere of the 1300s, which means
only “turn altogether.”19 Later via Middle English the word picks up a specifically religious (and
Christian) connotation, when it comes to mean “turn as a sinner to God.” Here I do not
presuppose that conversion is only something that occurs in religious or spiritual contexts, and
my reasoning for this will be made clear much later. But for now, I would like to add a third sort
of conversion, the “philosophical” conversion, which need not entail a formal philosophy per se,
but can instead amount to a change in certain relevant beliefs held by the subject.
When consciousness experiences a religious, spiritual, or philosophical conversion, it is a
“turn altogether” to the extent that consciousness has identified itself on new terms. Is the subject

18
19

Baird, “Role and Dynamics of Conversion,” xxvi.
Early Modern Conversions, “OED Research Usage for Conversion.”
24

always aware of this re-identification? For starters, how can consciousness “turn altogether” if
not of its own volition? Yet, in the case of a non-denominational and non-religious spiritual
conversion, it is far from obvious that a “genuine” conversion experience would necessarily
require analytic knowledge (and awareness) thereof. Consider, for example, how a person can go
through an experience (it need not be harrowing) that has an enormous impact upon one’s
character, albeit one that is more gradual and therefore harder to notice, both for the person
herself as well as those who encompass her milieu. Without a doubt this sort of conversion
would depart significantly from the sort described by Baird, wherein one encounters a
“transcendent field of signification,” unless we are to suppose that one can encounter said field in
such a casual and nonchalant fashion over the course of time that one did not even have an
inkling that the encounter occurred at all. Devoid of reflective intentionality, can this experience
properly be called a “conversion”? Can consciousness execute a re-identification that is so
gradual that it does not rise to the “tip of the iceberg” of conscious awareness? And does the
answer to the question change if the subject herself does not believe that she has experienced a
conversion, but those who know her think otherwise? Perhaps consciousness can “turn
altogether” in the sense of a subtle series of small changes resulting in an eventual overall
evolution rather than a quick and deliberate “turn” toward something more immediate, as if to
proceed through a transformative gateway. Indeed, this is the basic schematization employed by
William James, who groups all conversion experiences into either the “gradual” or the “sudden.”
James, however, understood that the gradual conversion was deliberate and volitional.
Even if we are satisfied for the time being with the analysis of this question, there remain
other astounding facets to the mechanics of conversion experience, which I will here outline
preliminarily. A spiritual conversion is something that seems to occur in just a given instant or
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moment, while, in order to have any real meaning, it must also transcend, in the present, the
connection between the past and the new self of the future. Unlike other experiences had by
humans, spiritual conversions, when authentic, are understood to be tied to one’s essential
identity, to the real “substance” of what makes one oneself.20 Although the conversion produces
an essential change in the person, the inner workings of this process are obscure, especially if
one strives to refrain from making metaphysical assumptions.
Consider briefly how remarkable it is that in order for a conversion to be complete, it
must institute the transition and difference between two different versions of oneself (that is, of
consciousness). The result of this transition is a “fresh” conception of consciousness that selfidentifies within a new conceptual field. This new state of consciousness thus freshly defines the
essence of the identity of the person.
This experience at once both disrupts and stabilizes the consciousness of the subject.
Blaise Pascal (1623-1662) captures this idea when he writes that “true religion consists in
annihilating self before that universal Being ….”21 The experience of self-annihilation is utterly
intense; it should come as no surprise that often conversion experiences are ecstatic, euphoric,
and hallucinatory. In leaving behind the old way for the new mode of consciousness, there is a
hypothetical instant of transition where one passes from the prior identity to the new. It is in this
instant that self-transcendence occurs, and understandably this phenomenon sounds like it could
make for a frightening ordeal.
Consider the words of Alphonse Ratisbonne, whose vision of the Virgin Mary (and
consequent conversion) is recounted by William James in his Varieties: “I did not know where I
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was; I did not know whether I was Alphonse or another. I only felt myself changed and believed
myself another me; I looked for myself in myself and did not find myself.”22 Interestingly this
temporary loss of self is disorienting but not, in fact, negatively perceived; to the contrary,
Ratisbonne writes that at the bottom of his soul he “felt an explosion of the most ardent joy.”
While he describes an experience that one would think would be terrifying for its displacement
of one’s very sense of identity, to the contrary his perception of loss of self is colored with
buoyant feelings. While it must be disconcerting to experience this displacement of one’s
ordinary identity, in the moment of the experience this is not a focus at all. What is more, in the
case of conversion experiences, the subject’s disorienting intuitions are typically interpreted
optimistically.23
In fact, many “supernatural” or “paranormal” experiences have been noted to have this
effect. In a 1973 study carried out by Andrew Greely, a remarkable number of survey participants
showed a significant positive association between the experience of a “bereavement visit” and
“positive emotional health.”24 As David Hufford writes, this relationship is later observed in a
2001 study by Pim van Lommel, wherein positive psychological outcomes were the result for the
majority of near-death experiences.25 Hufford himself has observed the same pattern in his study
of sleep paralysis and other forms of “out-of-body” experience (OBE).26 In all of these types of
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experience one comes into contact with deviations from normal waking consciousness, and yet
the result is not earth-shattering.
This might be surprising, but there is a probable reason behind it. William Jame’s full
definition for ‘conversion’ is: “the process, gradual or sudden, by which a self, hitherto divided,
and consciously wrong, inferior and unhappy, becomes united and consciously right, superior
and happy, in consequence of its firmer hold upon religious realities.”27 What is significant here,
and useful for our purposes, is James’ concept of the “divided self.” In a nutshell, bereavement
visits, NDE’s, and OBE’s can afford a subject with what is required in order for one to feel whole
or complete again. For example, after the death of a loved one, a self is divided in its
consciousness of loss and absence. With an NDE one’s self has been divided through the
harrowing and traumatic ordeal of having nearly died.
It is clear that disorienting experiences of self-transcendence, including the experience of
conversion, are experienced (and interpreted optimistically) via the medium of a relative
comparison. If someone feels lost, broken, or otherwise poor prior to a disorienting experience of
self-displacement, then it reasons out that one is likely to interpret what an outsider may call a
disorienting experience as something that is in fact an orienting experience when taken firsthand.
In the case of the potent experience of “self-annihilation” described by Pascal, James’ divided
self is effectively reborn through a subtractive process the result of which is only a “good”
remainder of one’s self. While the consciousness of self-dissolution looks to be debilitating when
surveyed from the sterile vantage point of psychology or rationalist philosophy, because this selfdissolution can occur only for someone who is, as James puts it, “consciously wrong, inferior,
and unhappy,” the ultimate outcome of a frightening ordeal turns out to be positive.
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But while James’ definition allows for either a sudden or gradual conversion event, his
take on the corresponding states of self-consciousness seems to be misguided. Working off
James’ definition of conversion, it is unclear how he understands one’s self-consciousness to map
onto temporality. He seems to suggest that in the case of every conversion, he who eventually is
to convert is, prior to his conversion, aware of the fact that he is “wrong, inferior, and unhappy.”
Surely after the conversion one may experience this realization, but it seems implausible to
suppose that one’s misguided ways are the object of consciousness before every conversion, even
if sometimes this is the case, as with St. Augustine.
Perhaps James’ definition is rather too strict in its conditions. We can loosen and simplify
his take on spiritual conversion as follows: essential change in oneself or, perhaps, essential
change of self. In order to reasonably define a religious conversion, we could add more criteria:
“intentional and essential change of self in accordance with an established metaphysical belief
system.”28 In these definitions the word “essential” is used to capture the sense in which the
experience is transcendent. Baird chooses to call this essential change “an experience of
disruption in human subjects’ spontaneous self-understanding.”29 This wording helps clarify the
way in which reflection maps onto time-consciousness; this self-reflection is always in a state of
flux. Prior to a conversion event one might be unknowingly errant, or fully cognizant of the
wrongfulness of one’s ways—either can make for an authentic conversion experience.
It might be the case that the inadequacy of James’ own definition comes down to his
obscure use of the phrasing “consciously wrong” and “consciously right.” One would think that
James means by this “aware that one is wrong (or right)” but that interpretation leads to the
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ostensible dismissal of the case of every convert who did not know that his old ways were
imprudent, which is an analytic judgment that, as we have seen, seems to be in error. But what if
by “consciously wrong” James meant something more like “deliberately choosing to be wrong”
instead of “awareness that one is wrong”? Thus, the only case of conversion that need be
dismissed is the one wherein the convert’s old ways were perhaps wrong, but not as the result of
any volition or act of will on the part of the convert himself. This seems to be a much more
satisfactory account, at least for the time being.
Furthermore, this understanding of James’ thinking can help make more sense of even the
famous cases from history. Take, for example, one of the most famous conversion stories of all
time, and perhaps the single most famous example of a specifically Christian conversion.30 Saul
of Tarsus was a first-century rabbi who persecuted early Christians until he had a blinding vision
of Jesus Christ, the effects of which lasted three days before Saul could again see. One could
hardly imagine that, prior to his conversion, Saul thought that his persecution of Christian’s was
“wrong.” On the other hand, it goes without saying that Saul conscientiously chose to persecute
Christians and did not do so by any accident or coincidence. The rest of the story holds that Saul
fasted deep in prayer for three days after his magnificent vision; he was no longer the same
person: he admitted the divinity of Christ, took his new name, Paul, and spent the remainder of
his days as a missionary traveling around Europe and Asia.
To return to the conception of conversion as self-annihilation, the story of Paul is
especially interesting because of how, on a theological level, the calculus of sin and salvation
dictates that Paul’s past life as the Christian-tormenting Saul is supplanted fully by the new
individual. While it would be hamartiologically (and eschatologically) problematic to suppose,

30

Acts 9 NABRE
30

granting Paul’s remarkable conversion, that Saul and, more importantly, his actions, never
existed and never occurred, the whole point of the story is that effectively this erasure is indeed
the case. Indeed, it is something of a Christian platitude that any act, no matter how heinous, can
be forgiven. If one commits some atrocious offense but then later authentically comes to a
spiritual conversion, then it is understood that the “real” and genuine self is the reformed self,
that the person who in the past committed a horrible deed is no longer. If the old subject is still
there, after all, it is not a case of self-transcendence as Baird describes.
At the end of the day, in an ordinary and sensible way of looking at things though, the
story of Saul/Paul is unremarkable. People go through changes all the time, after all, and when
people decide to change their ways in a lasting and meaningful way, one might think that this
process should not be hard to explain. This more or less sensible view is in fact misguided—the
question of why or even how people choose to convert is not at issue; rather, what is unclear is
how it can be that deep spiritual conversion, wherein consciousness itself changes, is a possible
experience at all for consciousness, especially given the relatively stable, consistent, and
unchanging nature of consciousness as ordinarily experienced.

Overview of Chapters

In the first chapter I review much of the conversion scholarship that already exists. It should be
noted that all this scholarship belongs to the human sciences, but I have not so far found any
sustained treatment of the phenomenology of conversion. After reviewing the scholarship on
conversion, most of which comes from psychology, sociology, anthropology, and theology, I
derive a general definition of conversion according to these disciplines. In the second chapter I
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outline the specifics of my general explanatory framework and method, that of transcendental
phenomenology. I mostly follow Husserl, and this continues throughout the rest of the text. In the
third chapter I sketch the conversion phenomenon in the natural attitude. While I reviewed
scholarly research in the first chapter of the text, here I take up a first-person account of the
experience of conversion as I experience it in the natural (and theoretical) attitude. In the fourth
chapter I take up the self and consciousness in the phenomenological attitude. I present an
account of the phenomenological features of both in preparation for the eventual transcendental
reduction of the conversion phenomenon in general. In the fifth chapter I examine conversion as
a specifically embodied phenomenon; in this chapter I employ a significant number of ideas from
Merleau-Ponty here. In the sixth chapter I present a case study of Saint Paul from a
phenomenological perspective. Since this is just one particular conversion narrative, I do not
attempt an eidetic reduction of the conversion on the basis of this case. In the seventh chapter,
my conclusion, I proffer an eidetic reduction of the conversion phenomenon. I identify seven
essential features of the experience, and I ultimately conclude that there is something
fundamentally symmetrical between conversion and consciousness in general.
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Ch. 1. Types of Conversion Experiences According to the Human Sciences

Sudden “Pauline” Conversion vs. Gradual Conversion: A History of the Field

A wide range of human sciences purport to explain conversion. it may turn out that deriving my
own definition of conversion from these other accounts will prove to be challenging. In defining
conversion, it can be hard to break with the historical trends that have driven conversion
scholarship. Indeed, some scholars, like Lewis Rambo, suggest that defining conversion in fact
turns out to be a “vexing problem” due to the sheer number of ways in which it can be
interpreted.1
These historical trends are often times so implicit that even a conscious effort to avoid
bias can prove to be difficult. Historically this played out in the contest between the “gradual”
and “sudden” models of conversion. Rambo, for example, notes that for a long time, academic
studies of conversion were largely confined to a western and specifically Christian context (in
fact a “hegemony” according to Rambo) which interpreted conversion only according to the
“Pauline paradigm of sudden, dramatic change.” Hood and Chen actually go so far as to maintain
that this style of conversion “defined the emergence of an empirical psychology of religion in
America” because the phenomenon served as one of the earliest analytic foci of the fledgling
science which was “courageous enough” to try to explain such a difficult topic.2
For better or for worse Paul’s story essentially occupies the role of Christian archetype for
the conversion phenomenon. According to the Pauline model of conversion, which dominated
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early academic studies, the vast majority of which employed psychological methods, there is
nothing slow, gradual, or subtle about conversion. This type of conversion is exemplified in the
description given in a key passage of The Acts of the Apostles: “As he neared Damascus on his
journey, suddenly a light from heaven flashed around him. He fell to the ground and heard a
voice say to him, "Saul, Saul, why do you persecute me?"3 When this is your standard for
identifying instances of conversion, it is easy to see how the restrictive pacing could present a
problem. After all, our own everyday experiences most likely contradict this understanding of the
timing of conversion, especially since it is likely that we know people who have experienced
conversions that are far less tumultuous than the one had by Paul. Yet for many years, academic
studies of conversion disregarded these sorts of situations, limiting themselves to the “classical”
model epitomized by Paul, although, as we will soon see, the gradual model is proposed rather
early on (by James), although it is largely relegated to the periphery.
It should be noted that there are other important dimensions to the classic, Pauline model,
not all of which directly deal with its immediacy, although most of these are, to be sure,
correlates thereof. Rambo hits upon these other aspects of the Pauline model as he elaborates that
“[t]he Pauline model of conversion combines notions of an unexpected flash of revelation, a
radical reversal of previous beliefs and allegiances, and an underlying assumption that converts
are passive respondents to outside forces.”4 Thus his theory is that, in addition to its immediacy,
the “classical” type of conversion involves, first, the surprising and even volatile revelation,
second, the extreme renunciation of one’s old ways (in terms of the doxic as well as one’s loyalty
to something or other), and third, the notion that the convert is a vehicle for something external
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to himself, something that itself catalyzes a change of heart and mind in the convert.5 Here it is
apparent that the surprise revelation and the passivity of the convert are correlates of the rapid
pace with which this type of process occurs.
There is yet another property that is commonly attributed to the sudden Pauline model of
conversion and it is the emotional involvement of the phenomenon. Scholars backed with
contradictory data have debated the extent to which a heightened emotional state is a common
pre-condition for conversion.6 Typically the sudden map of conversion, with its corresponding
intense emotions, is understood to be diametrically opposed to any sort of rational or intellectual
conversion. The idea is that the more gradual conversion phenomenon is one which is sought on
an intellectual or rational basis. But in fact it is far from self-evident these the emotional and the
rational should be rigidly distinguished like so, despite the fact that this has been the tradition at
least since Plato.7 While it might be true that some conversions, like that of Paul, are precipitated
primarily by emotional factors, it is an error to assume that the phenomenon has no rational
component whatsoever. Phenomenologically speaking it is apparent that, in a sense, to “feel” is
(in a way) to know, and this is true whether we are talking about feeling an emotion or feeling in
a physical, tactical sense.
In any case it is with this general “Pauline” model that many early studies of conversion
were concerned, perhaps, as I have indicated, due to the way in which modern psychology was,
in its early years, guided by an implicit Christian bias, noted not only by Rambo, whom I have
already mentioned, but also Hood, Hill, and Spilka.8 This goes even for G. Stanley Hall’s famous
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1881 lectures on the topic, eventually the focus of his seminal 1904 monograph, Adolescence.9
Rambo, writing with Charles Farhadian, points out that there is something distinctively
Protestant about this “subjectivist” reading of Paul’s conversion.10 But while Miller and C’de
Baca think that this “quantum” model is far wider than religion conversion, there have long been
concerns that religious or spiritual conversion could occur in a less abrupt fashion.
This notion of a more gradual conversion is in fact present right at the start of the
approximate discipline of conversion studies, defined early on, as I indicated, by the
psychological approach. It is embodied in the work of William James, whose groundbreaking
Varieties of 1902 delineates that conversion is a process that can be “gradual or sudden.”11 James
cites Leo Tolstoy and John Bunyan as examples of gradual conversions and he repeatedly asserts
the gradual and the sudden as two different types of the conversion phenomenon, but as noted by
Hood et al., James remains more or less preoccupied with the classical and sudden model of
conversion, which takes up much more of his time and space in the text.12 In fact it should be
argued that James seems to find the gradual model of conversion to be obscure, evinced by his
statement that, “it must be confessed at the outset that it is hard to follow these windings of the
hearts of others, and one feels that their words do not reveal their total secret.”13 In other words,
James takes it that the gradual conversion is far harder to analyze psychologically.
There is also something of a gradual conversion model in the approach of George Coe,
whose 1916 monograph The Psychology of Religion enumerates six distinct types of conversion,
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although the author confesses that the term itself is best reserved for the sudden conversion.14
Really it is not until the 1920 publication of The Religious Consciousness, by James Pratt (a
student of James), that gradual conversion is given primary focus, but this text was largely
ignored since, as Anne Taves points out, its gradual model of the phenomenon did not
complement the more sudden and radical paradigm which lent itself more readily to the “revival”
mindset that defined the Third Great Awakening (1855-1930).15 More influential was
Strickland’s Psychology of Religious Experience, in which the gradual model for conversion is
taken up in a sustained manner. Strickland, like James, contrasts the gradual and sudden models
of conversion, but whereas James only briefly explores the gradual by way of a handful of
supposedly enigmatic cases, like Tolstoy, Strickland goes much further in his analysis. Most
importantly, as Hood et al. point out, Strickland understands that the gradual conversion is one
wherein the convert is an active (rather than passive) agent seeking out the transformation of
self.16
A multitude of examples confirm the aptness of this analysis. Indeed, it is surely possible
to convert in the absence of the “unexpected flash of revelation,” even in the Christian context
which has been so often confined to the Pauline model. The gradual variant is typified in the case
of Edith Stein, who would later become St. Teresa Benedicta of the Cross. Stein’s conversion
was not enacted by an unexpected flash or revelation but rather a deliberate and intentional
reading of the autobiography of St. Teresa of Avila. Similarly it must be possible to convert in an
active and volitional sense in contrast to the “passive” model established in the case of Paul;
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indeed it would seem that the vast majority of religious conversions in the United States take
place on the volitional, actively-willed basis, exemplified by various sacramental rites of
initiation which actually require the consent of the convert—like the Roman Catholic Sacrament
of Confirmation, or the Ordo Initiationis Christianae Adultorum—in order to be complete. After
all, certainly Edith Stein chose to read the Avila biography that precipitated her own change.
In short it is clear that there has been something of a controversy regarding the gradual
vs. sudden conversion dichotomy, but Hood and Farhadian point out that starting around the
1970s, psychology and its sudden, Pauline model of conversion began to be supplanted by the
gradual model that was not necessarily limited to Christianity and which was accompanied by
new methods from sociology, anthropology, and neuroscience.17
With so many disciplines vying to give their account of the phenomenon, new struggles
materialized, even after the gradual model of conversion became the standard paradigm across
the disciplines. One issue is that a diversity of approaches yields a diversity of differing
definitions. Rambo for his part suggests that defining conversion just gets in the way of
examining and analyzing the phenomenon. He suggests that instead of this more specific
account, conversion should instead be viewed as a “cluster of types of changes that have been
observed and discussed.” He furthermore adds that the more common sort of conversion is
indeed the gradual and subtle variety that occurs over a much longer duration and is less extreme
than the Pauline type.
But even today the Pauline paradigm should not be entirely disregarded in attempting to
define the phenomenon. While plenty of studies have been carried out on the Pauline model,
which obviously originates in the Christian context and has been particularly focused upon the
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evangelical strand of the religion, the general application of the Pauline figure does not have to
be limited, and in fact has not been limited, only to the analysis of Christian conversion. Indeed,
as the counterculture conversion studies of the 60s and 70s grew more popular, these studies
appropriated the same “radical” and sudden orientation model established in the case of Paul,
since the “gradual” model simply was not relevant for those cases which could be defined by
their suddenness and, often times, ephemeral nature.
In the last analysis, instead of being viewed as competing models, the sudden versus
gradual paradigms of conversion should be seen as case-specific alternatives. There is no reason
why one or the other model must be the exclusive option to which researchers and scholars refer.
A model encompassing both the sudden and the gradual process should be incorporated into the
transcendental phenomenological reduction of the phenomenon.

General Review of Definitions for Conversion as Offered by the Human Sciences

Now I will turn to the conversion definitions themselves, comment briefly on each one (and, in
some cases, review significant comments from others), and then attempt to synthesize the
different definitions into a “master” definition of the phenomenon grounded in phenomenology
which in turn can be used to establish the limits of the conversion experience, which will be
phenomenologically analyzed in the final chapter.18 In other words here I am carrying out an

Since I will here attempt to synthesize these definitions, I am following ground already
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historical overview of the different conceptions of the experience in order to sketch out the
fullest possible account of conversion prior to its phenomenological reduction.19
The definitions below come from a diverse set of disciplines, from psychology, to
sociology, to anthropology, to neuroscience, to even theology. While psychological studies of
conversion were exceedingly active for a period of time at least beginning with James up to the
1930s, eventually they were challenged by sociological and anthropological approaches, via
which there are several well-known critiques of the psychological paradigm for explaining
conversion. For example, some authors, like Beverly Gaventa, have argued that it is impossible
to draw psychological conclusions regarding conversion cases in the New Testament based on
the limitations of scriptural sources. Gaventa and Alan Segal have suggested that there is
insufficient data to psychologically analyze figures like St. Paul in particular, while others, like
Zeba Crook, point out that psychological analysis of scriptural conversion should be avoided
because the texts belong to another historical-cultural period with the result being that a modern
understanding of psychology simply isn’t pertinent to the source material.20
Note that the definitions are for the most part reproduced in their original form below,
with edits only as necessary, and they are ordered by date of publication:

1. Starbuck (1900):
Conversion is characterized by more or less sudden changes of character from evil to goodness,
from sinfulness to righteousness, and from indifference to spiritual insight and activity. The term
conversion is used . . . to stand for the whole series of manifestations just preceding, accompanying,
and immediately following the apparently sudden changes of character involved.21
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Here conversion is explicitly construed as a sudden event rather than an enduring or more
gradual process although it must be pointed out that Starbuck does situate the duration on a
continuum. It should be noted that Starbuck specifically interprets conversion as a bridge
between different moral states, and only in the one direction, from “evil to goodness.” Thus he
thereby excludes from the domain of conversion phenomena the likes of which would later take
central importance in the scholarly literature on the topic, from disaffiliation to so-called
“deconversion.”22 That said, it has to be granted that the move from evil to goodness hinges in
large part upon the perspective and perception of the converting subject, meaning that the nature
of what is “good” could be entirely subjective or relative, since what one person finds to be evil
might be what another finds to be good. Thus, while it is almost certain that this is not what
Starbuck had in mind, we could include within the limits of his conversion definition the idea of
converting from goodness to evil, with the proviso that the convert does not understand his new
worldview to be evil or otherwise inadequate—otherwise, if he “converts” to a character that he
recognizes to be evil and the antithesis of true good, then it would not count as a conversion at
all, at least not per Starbuck’s criteria.
Starbuck’s definition takes for granted that conversion involves a change of character,
which again situates his theory of conversion within moral limits, and aside from addressing
“spiritual insight” he does not seem to include “intellectual” conversion within the purview of
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the phenomenon.23 But what does it mean for a conversion to be “intellectual”? Is not even the
“moral” conversion one which has some intellectual content? It is clear that the move from evil
to goodness presumably requires some knowledge in order to be possible, although the content
of the episteme would again be moral in nature (what is good or goodness?) instead of
intellectual, at least in any pure sense, like the way in which 2+2=4. This is not to suggest that
every intellectual pursuit is conversional, such that learning new mathematics could be called a
conversion—but is it possible that every conversion has at least some “intellectual” content, if
we use this term to refer simply to knowledge? Is there any conversion that does not somehow
involve knowledge? For now I will leave this question open-ended, to be resolved after
reviewing more of the conversion models.
What Starbuck fails to recognize is the existence of conversion that some conversions are
decidedly neutral with respect to morality. Indeed many conversions lack any moral significance
whatsoever, like the transformation of an individual into a father (which can involve a moral
change, not to mention physical change, but does not have to), or the sort of change that one
takes up when transitioning from one gender to another, or even a significant career change.
Remarkably Starbuck is one of the earliest scholars to take up conversion, at least in a
sustained, full-length study, and yet he realizes that the phenomenon is not always fully
conscious. In contrast to the overwhelming popularity of the early Pauline model, which
elaborates on a passive conversion that is unexpected but conscious, Starbuck is one of the few
“early” figures who contends that conversion is not always a fully conscious phenomenon,

I take it that an intellectual conversion is one which is deliberate and almost always gradual
rather than sudden.
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devoting an entire chapter of his monograph to the “conscious and subconscious elements” of the
psychology of conversion.
Starbuck also addresses the role that volition plays in conversion, which pertains more
closely to the measure of passivity in the archetypal conversion model. In what he terms “selfsurrender” he identifies the sort of conversion in which one “gives in” to forces external.24 Even
though giving in to the forces compelling one’s conversion seems, in a way, to be a sort of
volition, Starbuck considers self-surrender to be the opposite of the voluntary conversion. Is this
right? Does St. Paul surrender himself to God? Self-surrender still seems to be a sort of volitional
conversion. In any case this supposed distinction is an idea which is picked up two years later in
the Varieties of William James.

2. James (1902):
To be converted […] denote[s] the process, gradual or sudden, by which a self hitherto divided, and
consciously wrong [and] inferior and unhappy, becomes unified and consciously right [and]
superior and happy, in consequence of its firmer hold upon religious realities.25

Unlike Starbuck, who was actually a student of James at Harvard, James encompasses the more
gradual sort of conversion in his definition, as I noted in the previous section, but he does not at
all treat it at length in his very influential monograph that defined the nascent field of conversion
studies for decades and even today retains some authority in the field. Via this theory of
conversion as the movement from division to union James, unlike Starbuck, is able to include a
far wider range of phenomena within the limits of conversion experience, including events like
disaffiliation and deconversion, so long as the state of affairs preceding the conversion was such
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that the self was in a fragmented state, although James remains obscure on the issue of whether
the subject is actually aware of its own division, despite the fact that it is clearly conscious of its
wrongness and unhappiness. For example, James could consider a Roman Catholic’s turn to
atheism to be a conversion so long as the person’s “self” was split before the unification that
atheism enacted for the subject, while it remains unclear whether the subject discerned his own
underlying division, although certainly he grasped that his ways were “wrong” and “inferior” and
“unhappy.” Assuming that it is possible that James meant to include conversions where the
divided self is not the object of conscious awareness, his theory resonates with psychoanalytic
theories regarding the status of a “subconscious” mind or unconscious. Lastly, while the James
definition concludes with the notion that the self is unified by way of a “firmer hold upon
religious realities,” James leaves these realities vague, such that I would feel comfortable
including atheism within the limits of these “realities,” although to be sure in a “negative” sense,
with a negative orientation toward those realities in question.
James also rather astoundingly distinguishes the “volitional” type of conversion from the
non-volitional, citing Starbuck as one of his influences for the idea.26 This is surprising since for
so many decades the non-volitional model dominated academic studies of conversion. James,
however, does not get the distinction quite right. This is because he establishes a tight link
between the “conscious and voluntary way” on the one hand and the “involuntary and
unconscious way” on the other. He reasons that the conscious conversion is always one which is
chosen, which seems like a fairly obvious mistake given the conversion case par excellence
typified in the case of St. Paul. Paul, after all, does not choose to convert, but nevertheless he is
most certainly aware of his own conversion. In other words, his conversion is involuntary, but he
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is aware of it. The only way to explain this apparent error is to resolve that by ‘conscious’ or
‘unconscious’ James refers only to the conscious decision to convert—the volition to do so. The
“unconscious decision” of course is not much of a “decision” at all, assuming that deciding
requires making a choice. The unconscious decision, in other words, is nothing more than the
involuntary variety of conversion, à la the Pauline model.
This charitable reading of James’s remarks renders his position far more coherent, but a
problem remains. James actually cites Starbuck for the idea that something “incubates” in the
subject unconsciously until it eventually gives way to the sudden conversion event and
consciousness thereof. This is not at all equivalent with the charitable interpretation of James that
I offer above. Specifically, James writes that Starbuck: “[s]eems right in conceiving all such
sudden changes as results of special cerebral functions unconsciously developing until they are
ready to play a controlling part, where they make irruption into the conscious life.”27Here James
very clearly suggests that every sudden conversion is in fact far more gradual than we might
believe. The crucial point to note, however, is that James is specifically referring to a specific
type of sudden conversion in the work of Starbuck: the “sudden non-religious alteration of habit
or character.” The idea is that when someone experiences a sudden reorientation of character that
is decidedly non-religious (or non-spiritual), this is in fact the product of something that has been
“stewing” for quite some time. These profound changes do not, that is, occur on a purely
spontaneous basis, although the awareness thereof often manifests in a seemingly spontaneous
instance.
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3. Nock (1933):
By conversion we mean the reorientation of the soul of an individual, his deliberate turning from
indifference or from an earlier form of piety to another, a turning which implies a consciousness
that a great change is involved, that the old was wrong and the new is right. It is seen at its fullest
in the positive response of a man to the choice set before him by the prophetic religions.28

Nock is often credited with formulating the distinction between conversion “proper”, in which
one turns from an irreligious perspective to a religious one, and the sort of religious
intensification that Nock elsewhere (but not in this particular excerpt) refers to as “adhesion.”29
Some scholars, most notably Roger Beck, have suggested that adhesion is a lesser category that
only pertains to “cults” instead of the case of Christianity, in which case true conversions occur
rather than mere adhesion.30 In other words, the idea is that a subject could never “convert” to a
cult—instead, the subject can only “adhere” to its tenets. Clearly “conversion” has a positive
connotation whereas the same is not necessarily true for adhesion. Today it is clear that this is the
obvious manifestation of bias. The Christian who intensifies in his beliefs should certainly count
as a sort of convert, even if he is different in kind from the atheist who converts to the religion,
and it is just as apparent that someone who joins a cult and adopts the corresponding set of
beliefs undergoes a significant change in identity, such that this should be considered conversion.
That said, there is an astute anthropological difference in the classical period between
adhesion and the traditional model of conversion. Zeba Crook maintains that for Nock as for
James it is emotion that is the “central and defining characteristic of conversion” and this is what
distinguishes conversion from the “lesser” phenomenon of adhesion.31 He continues, describing
Nock’s work:
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Greeks adhered to religions and cults, according to Nock, they were not emotionally or
psychologically bound to them, and for this reason one cannot talk about, nor does one find,
conversion within them.32

These cults were more like tools for the ancient Greeks, in contrast to the various “philosophies”
that transcended simple utility to the extent that they required fidelity, or as Crook puts it,
“loyalty.” He argues that in Nock’s model, the emotional dimension of conversion is a direct
result of this loyalty, and this is why philosophies and later Christianity require investment in
terms of both “body and soul.”33 Crook points out that in the case of certain philosophies and
religions one must recognize some sort of “glorious and new present reality,” directly akin to the
“transcendent field of signification” that we will see in the Baird definition of 1992. As Crook
suggests, the ascent to the surface world in Plato’s Allegory of the Cave can be read as an
example of this sort of world-shattering breakthrough.34 Platonism and Neo-Platonism would
eventually have an enormous influence on the conceptual foundations of early Christianity, and
this is why Western religions like Christianity more closely resemble the Ancient Greek
philosophies than they do the Ancient Greek religions, which were topical and ritualistic.
Furthermore Nock, like Starbuck, considers conversion only in the one “direction,” from
a more basic (“earlier”) form of piety (or lack of care, “indifference”) to a new and more
profound state of piety. Thus according to this criteria deconversion, the event of losing one’s
faith, would not count as a sort of conversion. Although Nock does not explicitly state as much,
at least not in his definition, he implies that the new state of piety is more sophisticated, or
perhaps “deeper” than the earlier form.
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It also should be noted that unlike both Starbuck and James, Nock stipulates that
conversion entails consciousness of the change that has occurred since conversion is here framed
in its “fullest” sense as manifest in a decision (we can disregard for scholarly reasons the
ethnocentric qualification he provides regarding the “prophetic religions”). In other words the
most complete form of conversion is that which follows from a rational choice, similar to the
Gelpi definition found below.

4. Lofland and Stark (1965):
For conversion a person must: 1. [e]xperience enduring, acutely felt tensions 2. [w]ithin a religious
problem-solving perspective, 3. [w]hich leads him [or her] to define himself [or herself] as a
religious seeker; 4. encountering the D.P. [Divine Precepts] at a turning point in his life, 5. [w]herein
an affective bond is formed (or pre-exists) with one or more converts; 6. [w]here extra-cult
attachments are absent or neutralized; 7. [a]nd, where, if he [or she] is to become a deployable
agent, he is exposed to intensive interaction.35

This rich and precise model is considered to be the original “process” model for conversion, and
it is one of the most frequently appearing definitions present in the secondary literature on the
topic.36 Like the conversion model offered by James, this account begins with the stipulation that
the subject who is to convert must start out in a state of pronounced tension—what James calls
the “divided self.” But for Lofland and Stark the context within which these tensions take place
is much more specific than what is proffered by James: this tension originates in a religious
perspective where the focus is on “problem-solving.” Here problem-solving may seem like an
odd choice of words but the reference is to the existential “situation” to which religion is but one
solution out of many. Depending on the religion the problematic nature of the existential
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situation may vary, but in most Christian contexts the problem would be nothing more than the
concept of sin or the wish for eternal life, etc. Because the person-in-tension wants to attain a
solution to some sort of existential (or theological) “problem,” she or he becomes—and selfidentifies—as a “religious seeker.” Of course, then, this would require consciousness of the
identification, without which no identification could occur at all. At this point the converting
subject turns to the codified propositions that the religion offers as solutions to the existential
problem (the Divine Precepts in the specific case of the Unification Church of Reverend Moon in
San Francisco). Sometimes these precepts are imperative in nature, as in the case of the Ten
Commandments of Christianity, while in other cases they are more propositional in nature, such
as the belief that the crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus Christ secured eternal life for mankind.
Whether the precepts are imperative or propositional, to the extent that they are precepts they are
instructive and regulatory. In either case the content is decidedly rational, which should not be
overlooked. No matter the presentation of this moment, when the converting subject
acknowledges and furthermore explicitly or implicitly pledges fidelity to the precepts, the result
is a rite of passage for the converting subject and this is what enables the subject to relate,
emotionally (which is, following the work of Jaggar, not necessarily devoid from rationality),
with other converts who are “going through the same thing” or at least did so in the past.37 It is
what the convert adheres to on a fundamentally rational level that establishes the basis of an
emotional connection with the Other. In the convert’s sense of identification with others in the
religious community, everything else is, to use phenomenological language, suspended or put out
of play. In other words, the sort of identification that occurs here on an intersubjective level is
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such that the only means of identification is religiously situated (or limited), to the extent that all
other defining properties of the Other are disregarded—precisely because in this instance they
are nothing short of irrelevant. It is the final step of this process that is perhaps the most obscure,
where Lofland and Stark mandate that the conversion process concludes with “intensive
interaction” if the convert is to become a “deployable agent.” Lofland and Stark actually
appropriate this concept from the work of the sociologist Philip Selznick, whose classic 1960
study of communist propaganda employs the term to simply refer to an adherent who is ready for
service, to further the larger cause.38 All this means in the context of conversion is, in the words
of Lofland and Stark, a “total convert” who is willing to “put [his life] at the disposal of the
cult.”39 Would this apply in addition to the case of the mainline convert who makes the transition
to a garden-variety denomination of Christianity? Lofland and Stark offer their definition for the
“conversion to a deviant perspective,” where a deviant perspective is one which is more or less
obscure, unusual, and/or “socially devalued,” which is to say, one which simply stands in
contradistinction to a majority group, like Catholics or Communists, and is, in turn, relatively
unknown and—to the extent that the majority is even aware of it—stigmatized as representative
of the “fringe.”40 Despite this specific focus in their study, I suggest that this seventh step of the
process is not only part of fringe conversion phenomena but fundamentally characterizes the
Christian conversion, wherein one is subject to the injunction to evangelize, as well as the
Islamic conversion, where it too is the case that adherents to the faith have a duty to seek out
converts. Often but not always when the facilitation of the conversion of others is something of a
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responsibility within a faith system, it derives from the dogmatic belief that the religion is the
“one truth faith.”41 Surely conversions to these two particular religions constitute a large number
of conversions, but this is not the case with Judaism as well as many other world religions which
do not actively seek out converts.

5. Travisano (1970): Conversion is “a radical reorgnization of identity, meaning, and life.”42 He
continues:
Conversions are transitions to identities which are proscribed within the person’s established
universe of discourse, and which exist in universes of discourse that negate these formerly
established ones. The ideal typical conversion can be thought of as the embracing of a negative
identity. The person becomes something which was specifically prohibited.43

Like the Lofland-Stark definition, the Travisano definition is something of a watershed
contribution to conversion studies and is heavily cited in the literature, particularly in the fields
of sociology and anthropology. This definition was so influential because of the way in which it
identified an important distinction between true conversion on the one hand and the distinct case
of “alternation” on the other. Whereas conversion is a is a significant and profound change,
epitomized in the transition from a total lack of religious mentality to a new religious worldview,
like converting to Islam from atheism, akin to Thomas Kuhn’s famous “paradigm shift” but on a
personal and self-perceptual level, the phenomenon of alternation is rather different.44 As David
Zehnder notes, the concept of alternation is adapted from the work of Peter Berger, a sociologist
who argues that when people are faced with an overabundance of information, much of which is
contradictory, as a result they tend to “construct several versions of themselves through which
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they alternate back and forth.”45 This is the fundamental basis for Travisano’s account of
alternation as distinct from conversion; in the case of alternation the change is less profound,
involving a shift in what is termed “role” but no significant change in underlying identity, which
is but a substrate onto which various roles are mapped. The difference between role and identity
is that the former is the product of—and manifest in—intersubjective relations which are
themselves partly determined by the identity of the subject, which itself is flexible, but generally
more consistent—according to Travisano’s theory—than the role. Without identity there could be
no roles, but for any given identity there are countless roles. While identity in a sense “grounds”
the possibility of role, significant life changes can be brought about by changes in role with no
shift in underlying identity.
The point is that these role shifts can still be profound but are different in kind from
identity changes. Within the limits of an identity there are various roles around which a subject
can rotate. These roles can vary in type; for example, a Christian can alternate from a role within
Protestantism to one situated in Roman Catholicism, or alternate from regularly attending
services to failing to do so. Even the decision to become a lector or minister of the sacrament of
Communion would classify as a change in role. Whether or not it is a “conversion,” however,
should probably be scrutinized.
While shifts like these may resemble conversions in certain respects—when a relapsed
Catholic decides after many years to return to the Church, this can look like a conversion—
ultimately these sorts of transitions are not true conversions because, according to the theory,
they do not represent the adoption of a negative identity. Thus mere denominational changes
within religious traditions are excluded from the limits of conversion. A radical subjective
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reorientation like the classic example epitomized by Paul would, by contrast, count as a
conversion on Travisano’s terms.

6. Scobie (1975):
One common [religious] experience is usually referred to as conversion. It frequently represents
the beginning of the religious life. Each conversion experience is undoubtedly unique, but we shall
subsequently suggest that they can be assigned to three broad categories: (1) sudden conversion;
(2) gradual conversion; and (3) unconscious conversion.46

This definition is not given the attention that it warrants in the secondary literature on
conversion. Of note first and foremost is the fact that this definition of conversion is very
general, construing conversion simply as “the beginning of the religious life,” and it is this
generality that enables Scobie to encompass the notion of “unconscious” conversion within his
model. Scobie’s 1973 article and subsequent 1975 monograph are two of the only contemporary
studies in which the idea of an “unconscious” conversion is postulated.47 It should come as no
surprise that mention of this sort of conversion is highly infrequent in the scholarship on the
topic. This is because the idea of an “unconscious” conversion is rather counter-intuitive, since
such a conversion, devoid of awareness, does not seem to be much of a “conversion” in any
meaningful or substantial sense. It would be very reasonable to ask how one could possibly
“convert” without realizing it. It is similarly difficult to fathom how volition or will fits into the
conception of unconscious conversion. On the basis of a cursory examination of the unconscious
conversion, it almost seems as if the idea can be dismissed outright as incoherent.
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This understandable skepticism should be measured against careful scholarly
consideration, however, and in fact the unusual and somewhat obscure case of unconscious
conversion can reveal important but easy-to-miss insights regarding all conversions.
The concept of unconscious conversion does not begin with Scobie; I have mentioned
that it is already present, albeit in kernel form, in the work of William James, and even before
that, it is found in Starbuck, who inspires James to discuss the same topic. But Scobie’s work,
dating to the 1970s, takes the idea much further than either James or Starbuck, and when he
makes reference to unconscious conversion, he does not really intend the same idea as Starbuck
and James, despite the fact that he suggests that he and James refer to the same phenomenon but
by different names; what is the “unconscious” conversion in Scobie is the “once-born”
conversion in James.48
Starbuck realized the possibility of the unconscious conversion in a latent but ultimately
functional sense. He directly associated the unconscious process of conversion with neural
events (in contrast to a more psychoanalytic conception of the unconscious). According to
Starbuck’s model, this unusual variety of conversion subsists on a subconscious level via neural
links and associations, until one day it all violently surfaces on the level of conscious awareness.
This conversion is typically non-religious, or as Starbuck calls it, an instance of “natural
experience” meaning that this experience is both “normal” as well as “common.”49
The fact that Starbuck’s theory of unconscious conversion dictates that the phenomenon
culminates with a newfound state of awareness cannot be overlooked. With his theory of the
unconscious conversion, Starbuck effectively does no more than furnish an additional condition
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that is superimposed upon the traditional “sudden” model of conversion, wherein the reoriented
individual does not apprehend the progress of his own reorientation and then eventually “passes
through” a specific threshold, wherein he grows aware of what has occurred. Thus, for Starbuck,
the unconscious progression of the conversion eventually culminates in intentionality.
Scobie, too, understands the unconscious conversion as a process that occurs on a level
below conscious awareness, but for him the process does not conclude with a violent realization
or new awareness; while converts of this sort might be made aware of their “conversion” when
prompted with the right questions by an investigator, these believers don’t really think of
themselves as converts at all, and they struggle to recall a time in their lives in which they were
not religious.
Similarly, while Starbuck conceives of the unconscious conversion as common but nonreligious, for Scobie the unconscious phenomenon is religious in nature. It must be admitted,
though, that there is nothing in Scobie’s work that suggests that the phenomenon is only
religious, despite the fact that he focuses on religious (specifically Christian) examples.
For Scobie, contra Starbuck, there is no “passageway” moment or threshold in an
unconscious conversion. Indeed, for Scobie the unconscious conversion is, in a sense, the
conversion that never occurred, at least not in any discernible manner, since the “convert” in
question cannot recall ever not being religious. It must be granted that choosing to refer to this
phenomenon as “conversion” is rather odd, to the extent that if someone always was a certain
way, then it doesn’t make much sense to talk of their conversion, which implies a change in the
way someone is, from his religious or spiritual worldview, to his political worldview, to his
conception of his own gendered identity. Due to tensions such as this one, Spilka notes that today
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psychologists are wont to classify this sort of phenomenon as “religious socialization” in contrast
to authentic conversion.50
So why do I bring the Scobie definition before consideration here? Simply put, to the
extent that, with the exception of monolithic and/or prophetic figures from the course of religious
history, no person is “born with” religion, even in the case of faith systems such as Judaism,
where a set of beliefs and practices are superimposed upon one’s Jewish ethnicity. If that is true,
then all religious believers are ultimately arguably “converted”—at least in a phenomenological
sense—and without a doubt these conversions are extremely variegated in type and kind. This is
how some people convert to religion without even realizing it, often while very young, while for
other people, it is a deliberate and fully conscious adult decision that occurs on a shorter term.
Why do I suggest that the former phenomenon is a conversion, when there are no
antecedent beliefs from which the convert has arrived? If one of the conditions of having a
conversion is converting from something, then how is Scobie’s unconscious conversion a
conversion at all? These are important questions. If this sort of gradual and subtle phenomenon is
a conversion is one which is so gradual and subtle that it can bring one out of a completely
neutral (or nonexistent) set of religious beliefs, then it does look to encompass many phenomena
that resemble traditional conversions even less, to the extent that everyone who is born will
ultimately, in becoming who they are, experience many conversions. In becoming who they are,
these people grow into their likes and dislikes, their distinct personality features and general
dispositions, their political, scientific, and religious worldviews, their philosophies of life and
living. These people “convert” once as they leave their toddler years for their childhood, then
again for their puberty, then again for adult life—perhaps with significant changes occurring in
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the early twenties, and again with middle age, and yet again in the twilight of one’s being. If I
accept Scobie’s unconscious model, am I not forced to accept all of these phenomena as
“conversions”?
I am prepared to accept this conclusion, for the following reasons. First, here I am
examining the phenomenology of conversion, meaning that the phenomenon of conversion is my
focus, conversion as it is experienced first-hand. What is the phenomenon of conversion in
general? It is the experience of a certain sort of change immanent to my “self.” Here immanent
means inherent as we understand in the natural attitude, with the proviso that for
phenomenology, the experience of that which transcendence consciousness is itself immanent to
my consciousness. Thus, both the star I see in the sky and the memory I have of my
grandfather’s face are both “immanent” to my mental experience, but I experience the sky as an
external object, whereas my retained image of the face is only “inside” my head, since my
grandfather is deceased. I point out this distinction because there are many types of changes that
I experience (and regard in the natural attitude) as if at least partly immanent to my self, but not
all of these experiences are conversional. For example these changes can occur in terms of my
intuition (like thinking something was the case but changing my mind, like thinking a color is
red but then deciding that it is purple), my beliefs about my self (thinking I am no good at tennis
but then deciding after some practice that I am), my beliefs about the world and the Other (I
thought that a place or a politician was perfect but then I decided that was not the case), my
awareness and control of my physical body (growing more skilled at one of the important
movements in a sport), and so on. Not every change in beliefs about myself counts as a
conversion, in other words—the change must be essential, part of who I am. Thus one person’s
transformation into a magnificent swimmer might amount to a conversion, while for someone
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else, this change is merely ancillary, such as the advanced dive training one might receive for a
career in the emergency rescue profession.
But can a change in beliefs concerning an external object count as a conversion? Note
that some of these experiences I encounter as if they involve an external object, such as my
judgment regarding the color of something.), and my body I experience as both object and
subject. Can the experience of change in an external object, or the change in how I judge an
external object, really be considered a conversion? If the change corresponds with some
significant change in my identity, then yes. How significant must the change be? While simply
changing one’s mind is not sufficient for experiencing a conversion, some changes of mind, if
they are essential, should be considered conversional. This is a relative matter; for example, a
change of political parties may be an essential change for one person, if he considers his
organized political ideology to be part of his personal identity, while a party change for another
person might be a matter of much less significance and commitment.
Let us not forget that even though this is the experience of an essential self-change, this is
not to suggest that the change is necessarily the object of my awareness. This is the significance
of Scobie’s innovative contribution to the study of conversion.
The model also offers a unique alternative to the logic problems raised by the traditional
models of conversion. While psychologists are keen to distinguish socialization from conversion
on the basis of temporal duration, this analysis does not fit as well when considering conversion
from the standpoint of experience. Psychologists before Scobie wanted to stipulate that an
authentic case of conversion is marked by the subject’s ability to discern the time before the
conversion as well as the time after the conversion, and according to such a criterion Starbuck’s
account of unconscious conversion would count as conversion, while Scobie’s model would not.
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But even if we permit the approximate estimation of the times in question, there are certainly
some true converts who are incapable of carrying out the requisite dating of significant
conversion events. Consider, for example, the case of the person who survives an accident in
which they sustain a traumatic brain injury. Such injuries are well-known to institute radical
changes in personality—consider Merleau-Ponty’s famous study of Schneider.51 While some
scholars are probably fine with excluding cases such as these from the purview of conversion
proper, again this raises the difficult question of whether consciousness and choice are truly
necessary conditions for conversion.
Why do we take for granted that these mental acts (namely those by which the subject is
able to identity the “before” and “after” of the conversion) are the marks that define the true or
authentic conversion? Phenomenological analysis reveals the insight that my experience is
constituted out of myriad elements which are in large part below the surface of conscious
attention. My world can change in ways subtle or drastic, as I too change with it, but these
perpetually reordered appearances of the world are not such that I am conscious of every change
which I experience. Perhaps it is the historical bias of conversion studies, which took for granted
the paradigmatic status of the Pauline case, that accounts for the difficulty in parsing the
conversion phenomenon from the conscious awareness phenomenon. But if we again return to
the early work of James, we find that he gets this point right. As Scobie himself notes, what he
refers to as “unconscious” conversion is, for James, the “once-born” conversion of the “healthy
minded.”52 This sort of conversion is not instantiated via a crisis or breakthrough realization—it
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is Pauline bias that keeps us from considering this less tumultuous phenomenon as an authentic
conversion.
For many religious believers, their relationship with religion is one which has existed as a
constituent part of their lives from a young age. These religious believers don’t necessarily think
of themselves as “converts” since their faith life has been part of their nurturing and conditioning
from very early on. Thus it seems that being introduced to religion as a child is not ordinarily
understood to fall within the purview of religious conversion, which to the contrary looks to be
an experience unique to adults and perhaps teenagers. This reflects the everyday wisdom that
converting requires a more developed and sophisticated understanding, as well as a more refined
sense of freedom and choice. While it is not forbidden to speak of the conversion of children, it
has to be granted that the way in which a child “converts” to a different religion is drastically
different from the more deliberate and conscientious conversion of a teenager or adult. It is
typically understood that it is not until a person reaches adolescence that a person is capable of
experiencing a crisis of identity.53 Erikson suggests that for the teenager this crisis comes down
to the opposition between self-sure sense of identity on the one hand and confusion regarding
social role on the other.54 But that sort of experience is not unconscious like the account given by
Scobie.
The fact that the unconscious conversion is subtly embedded in a long-term process, the
beginning of which is not necessarily clearly recalled, can make it difficult to recognize as an
authentic instance of the phenomenon. The unconscious conversion does not, however, have to

There are some exceptions to this, including Freud and Sartre.
See Identity: Youth and Crisis. For Erikson role follows from sense of identity, such that a
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be one which is mediated via a long-term process or sequence. It is a problem that Scobie
specifically conceives of unconscious conversion only as the result of a process and not an event.
This is misguided. While it may be assumed that the process-based unconscious conversion is in
fact the more common variety of unconscious conversion, I have already pointed out how some
conversion cases, as I suggest we classify Schneider, are more sudden (determined in large part
by a single event or episode) but still unconscious. Make no mistake, however, that the sudden
unconscious conversion must be the result of physical damage or trauma to the brain and central
nervous system. It is certainly at least possible that someone could experience a conversion
enacted by a singular event but could remain unconscious of the conversion change. Consider,
for example, the retrospective reflection of someone advanced in years who, in hindsight, is able
to define the specific “threshold moment” that the psychologists maintain to be a criterion for
true conversion contra mere socialization; this person might have gone decades without realizing
that he or she had changed in (or became) a specific way that previously was not their own,
while he or she is nevertheless capable, at least in theory, of identifying that singular moment
that instituted the deep and significant change in personal identity. Arriving upon the insight or
realization that one has changed is in fact an incredibly common phenomenon and it might be
part of normal human development; it may even occur several times as one progresses through
various phases or stages of life.
Lastly, I have to address the question raised by Scobie’s work regarding conversion’s
requirement of choice, and the extent to which choice is conscious. Ordinarily when we think of
choice, we assume that it is something that is deliberate and conscious, something of which we
are fully aware. To be sure many of the choices that we make on a daily basis are choices of this
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variety, and there is a common tendency to refrain from calling any action that is not deliberate
and or/conscious a “choice.”
This common tendency is likely misguided. As Elissa Asp shows, there is neuroscientific
evidence suggesting that “relatively automatized selection” should be part of any “nonreductionist account of choice.”55 Similar to what Merleau-Ponty achieves with the abnormal
case of Schneider, neuroscientists have recognized that damage to circuits in the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex or the anterior cingulate cortex correlates with the slowing of cognition, issues
paying attention and “reduced initiation.” In other words, choices that seem to be automatic are
more executive than we thought, based on measured brain activity. Asp cites the work of Michael
Halliday, who shows that linguistic choices are not carried out on the volition of the speaker (or
subject) but instead on the grammar of the language spoken. According to Asp, Halliday’s work
shows that agency does not require intentionality. She points out that other authors, like
Jackendoff, include intentionality in their requirements for agency, but there is an important
proviso that must be noted: as Asp puts it, a “doer of an action . . . has the capacity for
intention.”56 Having the capacity for intention is worlds away from actually exercising
intentionality. This is not the concept of intentionality as understood in Scholastic Philosophy,
Brentano, and eventually phenomenology; instead this is the more ordinary and non-technical
sense of the term, where ‘to intend’ means something more like “to do deliberately.” The point,
however, is that to do something deliberately one might still be acting more or less automatically
and with a negligible degree of attentiveness—Asp compares it to the morning habit of making a
coffee.
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This is not so different from certain cases of religious conversion, especially those in
which a person is raised within a faith system from a very young age. Eventually the habits of
religious practice start to produce automatized worship behaviors, exemplified in the Christian
repetition of common daily prayers like the Our Father, as well as the automatic knowledge of
when to sit and stand during a mass or service, which is sometimes executed on an almost
involuntary basis. Thus it is plainly apparent that unconscious religious conversion is indeed a
coherent and in fact very common phenomenon. But to the extent that this type of conversion is,
at least at Scobie conceives it, not the object of intentionality, it may prove to be impossible to
phenomenologically analyze it. In the third chapter I will explore what consciousness of this sort
of conversion looks like on a first-person basis, and if successful I will attempt to derive
phenomenological conclusions from the fact that unconscious experience is a real and valid, if
often largely ignored, phenomenon.

7. Snow and Machalek (1983): “[F]our key properties […] define the convert: biographical
reconstruction, adoption of a master attribution scheme, suspension of analogical reasoning, and
embracement of a master role.”57 This contribution from Snow and Machalek is contained in
their well-known essay “The Convert as a Social Type” and it is at once both similar to and
different from the earlier traditional models. To begin with, whereas James and Nock both
describe a turn or re-orientation, the present account specifically frames the change in idea as not
only a re-orientation but a hermeneutic event, a re-interpretation of one’s self. To the extent that
one can turn or undergo a shift without necessarily interpreting anew the events of one’s past, the
Snow-Machalek definition addresses the retroactive perception of personal history in a manner
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that no earlier definition could capture, despite the fact that they credit James with the term and
cite how often the general idea appears in the literature on conversion starting in the 1960s,
including the offering from Travisano, cited above.58 The second condition mandated in the
Snow-Machalek definition, calling for the “adoption of a master attribution scheme.” This
sociological jargon simply refers to the way in which a subject explains or makes sense of the
world—in other words, the interpretive framework of the convert. Here the reference is to a
framework as a general explanatory model, like a worldview.59 These frameworks are often
understood to be literal rather than metaphorical (or analogical), as the third condition suggests.
Converts turn to these sorts of frameworks because they perceive their new religious or spiritual
views as inconsistent, incompatible, or at the very least, “incomparable,” as Snow and Machalek
put it, with all alternatives. Thus to endorse an analogy between Christianity and Islam would be,
as Travisano puts it, proscribed (forbidden.) The reason for this is that the analogy is often
perceived to constitute a threat to the “authenticity and sacredness of conversion,” since the
comparison could potentially “invalidate and profane” the experience.60 Lastly when the convert
takes up a “master role” she or he adopts a new socially-mediated position or duty, facilitated by
or through the conversion process. It should be noted that embracing a master role is not, for
Snow and Machalek, the embracing of a master in one’s life, akin to the acceptance of authority.
To the contrary, the idea of the master role is the overarching “default” way in which one views
their role in life. This role, to the extent that it is one’s dominant identification, is not
compartmentalized, despite the fact that, as Gooren notes, the role is specifically situated within
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a “specific universe of discourse.”61 Thus in comparison to the account offered by Travisano, a
shift in role is not just the mark of alternation contra conversion, but instead can define a
conversion so long as the role change is significant enough—in fact, this take on the “master”
role is more like a change in identity than a change in role. It would be prudent to add to this
definition the final qualification that Snow and Machalek place upon their model for conversion:
“it is the convert’s rhetoric rather than institutional context or ideological content that denotes the
convert as a social type.”

8. Richardson (1985):
The old conversion paradigm, with its deprivation and strain assumptions about the passivity of
human beings, and its overemphasis on the individual, is giving way, at least partially, to another
view of conversion. This new view stresses humans as volitional entities who assign meaning to
their action and to the actions of others within a social context. 62

This account is pulled from Richardson’s influential article in which he identifies a “Kuhnian
crisis” manifest in the switch from the old paradigm that eventually gave way to the more
contemporary idea that conversion is something that is actively sought out, instead of something
that merely “happens” to a subject, as is the case with the classic “Pauline” model.
For Richardson conversion cannot be framed on a solely individual or personal basis.
Rather, the interpretive significance of a conversion is such that an intersubjective milieu is
required in order for the conversion to make any sense at all. Richardson underscores the extent
to which action plays a crucial role in conversion, which is not exactly a novel contribution to the
field, present in even the earliest offerings from Starbuck and James, but is nevertheless an

Gooren, Religious Conversion and Disaffiliation, 43.
Richardson, “The Active vs. Passive Convert,” 164; Gooren, Religious Conversion and
Disaffiliation, 46-47.
61
62

65

important qualification to add to clarify how conversion is not simply an intellectual change but
also a change in praxis.

9. Gaventa (1986):
There are, then, three categories of personal change of which we need to be aware in this study [of
conversion]: alternation, conversion, and transformation. Alternation is a relatively limited form of
change that develops from one’s previous behavior; conversion is a radical change in which past
affiliations are rejected for some new commitment and identity; transformation is also radical
change, but one in which an altered perception reinterprets both present and past.63

Gaventa is a Bible scholar who has significantly challenged some of the psychological
assumptions in 20th century work on conversion. As Zeba Crook points out in Reconceptualizing
Conversion, the 20th century saw an influx of psychology-based studies of New Testament
conversion.64 But according to Crook, despite the abundance of these psychological studies,
“there was a growing awareness that psychological assessments of ancient texts and characters
were problematic…”65 He credits Beverley Gaventa with challenging the notion that conversion
anecdotes in the New Testament can all be classified as one single type of event. Gaventa, like
Alan Segal, proposes a sociological reading of these conversions. She argues that there are three
distinct types of phenomena: the pendular, alternation, and transformation.66 A pendular change
is a radical movement that requires the rejection of old beliefs, whereas alternation is a more
practical change that occurs on the basis of cause and effect—like realizing that the commission
of violent crimes has resulted in one’s incarceration, which makes one unhappy, even if one does
not go so far as to reject his openness to living a violent life. Gaventa notes that switching from
one type of Christianity to another, so long as the two are reasonably different (like Mormonism
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compared with Roman Catholicism) is a pendular conversion, but not alternation, which she
suggests should not be considered a conversion at all. Alternation is just something that “grows
out of the past.”
Transformation is a third phenomenon in which one does not react pragmatically
(alternation) or negatively (pendular), but instead “reinterprets and reconstructs” the past in part
of one’s reconsideration of self and world. Gaventa suggests that this third type of conversion is
the sort that most commentators tend to focus on in their study of Christian and Hebrew
scripture.
Despite the fact that most commentators focus on transformative conversion, it is
Gaventa’s own account of transformation that is her most novel and inventive contribution to
conversion studies. First, Gaventa calls ordinary conversion a change that is “radical” in nature,
but unlike figures who share her view, namely Nock and Starbuck, Gaventa indicates that this
sort of change does not necessarily entail the rejection of one’s prior ways. In this way Gaventa’s
more open model is closer to that of James. She gravitates toward an understanding of
conversion that is couched in authentic change in identity rather than the less intense shift of
role.
The only difference between a standard conversion and a transformation is that the
converting subject reinterprets or “re-perceives” the past but also the present (as most of the
definitions allow). Unsatisfied with categorizing this sort of change under the more typical
conversion, Gaventa reserves self-reinterpretation for the special case of true transformation.
Obviously, this entails the notion that it is possible for a subject to convert without reinterpreting
everything up to that very moment, but it is rather unclear, despite Gaventa’s use of the
conjunction “and”, whether the “mere” convert can become a transformed being simply by
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reinterpreting the past in addition to the present, since, after all, it is hard to fathom how one
could convert without the simultaneous change in self-perception. It would seem that it is the
retroactive reinterpretation alone that distinguishes the transformation from the convert.

10. Gelpi (1986):
I use the word ‘conversion’ … to mean the decision to assume responsibility for a distinguishable
area of experienced growth and development. Converts turn from irresponsible to responsible
living…By ‘conversion’ I mean the double decision to repudiate irresponsible behavior and to take
responsibility for the subsequent development of some aspect of my own experience.67

While the Snow-Machalek and Gaventa definitions are in part noteworthy for their treatment of
retrospective reinterpretation, the Gelpi model is intriguing for its incorporation of premeditation
and thoughtfulness.68 This should be considered a relatively “intellectual” or “rational” model of
conversion since deciding to take on responsibility is the definite result of reflective
contemplation, especially when the responsibility is taken for a determinate zone of
improvement, again requiring careful thought.69 But the nature of this rationality is, according to
Gelpi, ethical. Like the Starbuck and James definitions, this conversion model places moral
values on the trajectory of the change, wherein one moves from the lack of responsibility to the
adoption thereof. Thus while it is true that growth and development are relatively situated,
ultimately Gelpi allows only for the conversion moving in the one (“positive”) direction, rather
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than the more fluid continuum that defines the approach of Gaventa, according to which losing
one’s religion could count as a conversion phenomenon.
This is problematic. Adding a positive value judgment to any conversion model forces us
to exclude authentic examples from our consideration. Consider, for example, how the accounts
of conversion offered by the earlier commentators (namely Starbuck, James, and Nock) force us
to confine the phenomenon to a very narrow range of experiences. While conversion ordinarily
has a positive connotation, it seems there are major risks that come with assuming that
conversion is always good. I cannot accept any metaphysical argument that conversion is always
good, nor can I definitively prove that conversion is an improvement of the individual without
taking recourse to reductive pragmatic criteria that would radically restrict the number of
scenarios that I can classify as conversion. For example, I can defend the pragmatic “goodness”
of the conversion of a violent murderer who turns to peaceful religion. St. Paul essentially fits
this mold. For a person like that, conversion is good.70 But these are rather extreme existential
examples; surely it is the case that not all conversions have to involve such complete and
sweeping change? For example is a Baptist who converts to Catholicism necessarily doing
something “good” or even definitely improving? This is an entirely relative question—we cannot
answer it here.
But why does conversion have to be good at all? Are not the adherents of worldviews like
Nazism or fascism, a bit like “converts” to evil? Not only do some conversions have neutral
value, but it also seems that others amount to the worsening of the individual. It is an utter
mistake to assume that religious or spiritual conversion always brings someone to the good, and
it is a mistake to think that conversion is always a good thing.
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But entirely or totally good? Here I hesitate to agree that these conversions are totally good.
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While it has to be admitted that “being evil” is not a religion or even (necessarily) a
spiritual worldview, we should carefully evaluate the idea of converting to evil as a valid
phenomenon. First, simply doing something wrong does not amount to a “conversion” to evil.
For a person to “convert” to evil, he or she needs to undergo a change in identity or role. This
change cannot be merely temporary.
Second it seems that when a person has an experience like this, of “converting to evil,”
the experience does not have to be interpreted as wrong or evil. Ultimately, we have to resolve
ourselves to the fact that some “evil” people will think of themselves as “good.” Many people
perform objectionable acts but never think of themselves as evil even though they regularly make
choices that most of society is prepared to agree are “evil.” As I have argued elsewhere, it is not
necessary for someone to realize that he or she has converted (to evil) in order for it to be a
conversion—all that is required are “evil” judgments, choices, or beliefs that ultimately bring an
individual to a “tipping point” where a change in identity or role is enacted. Thus it is crucial that
these judgments, choices, and beliefs exert existential influence on the individual.71
It is this existential influence, and significance, that enables us to distinguish between an
individual evil act and the essential evil of an individual. In fact physically “doing” evil is not
necessary in order for one to “be” (a convert to) evil. While it is tempting to assert that the reality
of material evil acts (like murder) is what distinguishes true evil from mere daydreaming, in fact
it is the evil idea that bears the mark of real evil, because without the idea or concept of evil, no
act could be interpreted as such. The “evil idea” is not the idea of evil as a concept, but instead
the subject’s having a belief, choice, or judgment that is “evil” (according to social consensus).

I do think that it is possible to unconsciously convert to evil, assuming that certain conditions
are met.
71
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Ultimately the subject may or may not interpret his belief, choice, or judgment to be evil. After
all a child can commit an “evil” act without understanding what he has done.
Believing one’s self to be evil is not required in order to have experienced a conversion to
evil. Just as I argued with the ordinary examples of “unconscious” conversion, it is possible for
someone to experience conversion by making judgments and choices that are not necessarily
interpreted as having to do with conversion. The same goes for evil; if someone (of sound adult
mind) makes judgments that manifest an existential difference, he does not necessarily need to
judge himself to be a convert or to have converted. Instead the sufficient condition is a judgment
or series of judgments, a choice or series or choices, or a belief or series of beliefs.
One final noteworthy aspect of the Gelpi definition is the way in which it focuses on the
resolution to change, epitomized in the choice, instead of the event or process of change itself,
which is the case with the rest of the models I survey here. In this way the Gelpi model
resembles that of Nock. Thus it is worth emphasizing that transforming into someone evil has to
come as the result of willful judgments. Becoming evil, in other words, is something that is
chosen. Here the choice does not help to explain the theology of sin or the problem of theodicy,
but instead, differentiates conversion from becoming-in-general. I will later clarify this issue and
offer an extended argument, but the conversion phenomenon has to occur on the basis of
conscious decision-making, even if, somewhat surprisingly, the conversion itself is not realized
by the subject. There are many aspects of our selves that are not necessarily the result of our own
choices, exemplified by the extreme example of a young man who is violent and abusive because
he was the victim of violent abuse as a child. Surely a situation like this requires some analytic
nuance— even if the young man has made his own poor choices, it is also true that he did not
choose parts of who he “is.” This is true to some extent for all of us. And if we do not take this
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position, consider how this multiplication of the phenomenon weakens the classic concept and
the examples of it—like the story of St. Paul which, true or false, tells a story of a determinate
and special phenomenon that should be distinguished from becoming a braggart or a talkative
person. Include too much under the heading of conversion and the phenomenon becomes
watered down and impossibly differentiated. Similarly a non-volitional model of conversion
would require us to classify the forced “conversions” of indigenous peoples as authentic
conversion experiences. If someone makes you change, this is existentially violent; the “forced”
conversion cannot be accepted here.

11. Baird (1992):
Conversion… [is] an experience of disruption in human subjects’ spontaneous self-understanding,
resulting from a confrontation with an ultimate, transcendent field of signification, which […]
invites subjects to re-identify themselves in the new context it provides.72

This definition refers to “disruption” reminiscent of the account from James and his divided self,
but there are several novel dimensions to this contribution from Baird. First, whereas James and
Lofland-Stark conceive of a self that is divided and then unified in conversion, Baird describes a
conversion that itself enacts the disruption (i.e. division in the parlance of James.) The object of
this disruption is also significant, since for Baird it is not merely self-understanding that is at
play but specifically “spontaneous self-understanding.” In the fragment excerpted above this
qualification is obscure, but elsewhere Baird makes it very clear that the disruption experienced
by the subject is precisely one which interrupts what was previously merely or only a
spontaneous understanding of self, meaning an understanding which was predicated entirely
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upon the thematics of autonomous self-actualization.73 This understanding of self is also
described as “functional.”74 Thus when conversion is here characterized as a disruption of the
spontaneous understanding it is implied that the new form of understanding is of a higher order,
more essential and of an indelible nature. This is precisely the idea behind the “transcendent field
of signification” that catalyzes the process, which is deserving of a few remarks. First the
inclusion of this aspect characterizes this account as theological in scope. This means that this
conversion model makes theological assumptions or at the very least takes a theological view of
its subject matter, which will necessarily differ from a strictly psychological or sociological view.
Second, this transcendental field makes for a highly restrictive condition imposed upon the
phenomenon of conversion, since the absence of such a field precludes any shift or change from
being classified as a conversion. To this limitation, however, one has to wonder what makes for a
“transcendent field of signification” in the first place. Without a doubt this would include the
likes of experiencing an apparition, hallucination, or vision, exemplified in the paradigmatic case
of Saint Paul. But it would seem to be an error to limit the field of transcendent signs to only
those cases manifest before visual sensation; many times the field is experienced purely through
tactile correlates of embodiment, through “feeling,” like the overwhelming physical reaction one
can feel, including but not limited to tingling, warmth, the rush of blood, chills, goosebumps. etc.
And lastly would it not be possible to encounter the transcendental field of signification through
purely discursive, intellectual means? Given the wide variety of ways in which one could
encounter the transcendent field of signification, which enacts and catalyzes the religious or

73
74

Ibid., xxvii.
Ibid., 163.
73

spiritual change, on a fundamental level the Baird definition is capable of encompassing a wide
array of conversions.
The real question, though, is whether the transcendent field is always passively
encountered. By “passive” I mean not actively pursued. Certainly St. Paul’s conversion is like
this. But it is actually very possible that someone could look for transcendent meaning. This is
exactly what institutional forms of conversion amount to, like the lesson and practices that
Catholic converts go through in order to become Catholic. The difference is that this sort of
confrontation is not abrupt and isolated. Instead, this conversion is something for which one
prepares for many weeks and sometimes years. In short it is easy to interpret Baird’s conversion
as only applying to the tumultuous, Pauline sort of cases, but in fact she provides the framework
for situating the profound transformative power of conversion beyond the limits of the passive,
adventitious conversion. She shows, in short, that the conversion that results from (or is manifest
in) a transcendent cognition can be one which is tracked, as the object of a desire or motivation.
Despite being a theological definition, this definition is not unidirectional, like some of
the older alternatives, nor, like Gaventa’s model, is it morally situated, as are the accounts from
Starbuck, James, and Nock. Thus it is becoming easier to identify definite disciplinary trends and
correlations in the conversion definitions here considered.

12. Rambo (1996):
… [C]onversion is what a group or person says it is. The process of conversion is a product of the
interactions among the convert’s aspirations, needs, and orientations, the nature of the group into
which she or he is being converted, and the particular social matrix in which these processes are
taking place.75
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In addition to this rather open take on the phenomenon Rambo also provides the following, more
restrictive set of conditions:
Conversion takes place (1) when a person or group is connected to relationships in a religious
community; (2) when rituals are enacted that foster experience and action consonant with religious
mandates and goals; (3) when the rhetoric or system of interpretation of life is transformed into a
religious frame of reference; and (4) when a person’s role or sense of place and purpose is enacted
and guided by religious sensibilities and structures.76

Ultimately Rambo’s monograph Understanding Religious Conversion identifies seven overall
stages of the conversion process and they are as follows: 1. context, 2. crisis, 3. quest, 4.
encounter, 5. interaction, 6. commitment, 7. consequences.77
The first noteworthy feature of Rambo’s well-known conversion definition is the way in
which it is restricted to conversions in a specific context: institutions and group belonging. This
is in complete contrast to the Snow-Machalek, Gelpi and Baird definitions which are framed in
far more individualistic terms. The Gaventa definition mentions affiliation but is less restrictive
than what is presented here by Rambo. According to Rambo’s criteria there is no such
phenomenon as the “private” conversion that is not tied to some specific group or institution.
This most certainly raises an interesting point that heretofore has not been addressed—should it
be called a conversion if you are experiencing something private? While the early Starbuck
definition would not allow for such an event, due to the way in which he presupposes religious
concepts values, e.g. “from sinfulness to righteousness”, which would without an established
religious worldview have no significance, the more open account of James could fully
accommodate a private conversion event since ultimately all that is required is the unification of
a divided self as facilitated through a “firmer hold upon religious realities.” While the descriptor
‘religious’ has institutional connotations, if it is expanded to include more general “spiritual
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perceptions,” then the personal conversion can occur. Nock’s model, too, would accommodate
this sort of phenomenon, even if he sees the Christian conversion as the most complete type.
Another sense in which the Rambo definition differs from its forebears is in its
identification of the importance of rituals to the conversion process, which again limits the
phenomenon to institutional, organized contexts. For Rambo these rituals are sourced in religious
communities, so the idea of a “personal” ritual is precluded from consideration.
The sequence of steps that Rambo provides near the end of his monograph are less
restrictive although their concise articulation is subject to numerous elaborations, such that, for
example, the sixth step of the sequence, wherein one becomes committed to a new worldview, is
specifically a commitment to a religious worldview. Again the more private and individual sort
of conversion is thereby excluded from this analysis. Interestingly in his enumeration of the
major steps of conversion Rambo elects to include “crisis”, which calls to mind the “divided
self” of James as well as the Nock definition from 1933. As I have indicated, this notion of crisis
and the divided self has a basis not only in emotional being and loyalty but also in Hegel’s
analysis of unhappy consciousness.

13. Marion (1997): While he does not directly define conversion per se, Marion’s ideas regarding
the “saturated phenomenon” are particularly relevant for my phenomenology of conversion, so I
would like to determine whether aspects of his concept can be incorporated into my synthetic
definition of the conversion phenomenon.
Marion characterizes the basic features of the saturated phenomenon as follows: “The
saturated phenomenon will be described as invisable according to quantity, unbearable according
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to quality, absolute according to relation, [and] irregardable according to modality.”78 Here
Marion employs the Kantian categories of understanding as the basic rubric against which he
outlines the saturated phenomenon. In short, the idea is that the saturated phenomenon is one
which surpasses or goes beyond these categories. This is because the saturated phenomenon
provides—or better yet, gives—an “intuition [that] passes beyond the concept.” For example,
when Marion indicates that the saturated phenomenon is invisable with respect to quantity, this
means that the magnitude of the phenomenon cannot be intended (by the phenomenological
subject). Here Marion is using ‘intend’ in the same sense as Brentano and Husserl—the point
being that the saturated phenomenon is a type of phenomenon that transcends the ordinary limits
of our understanding. If the magnitude or quantity of a phenomenon cannot be the object of my
intentionality, this means that I am encountering an “overflowing” phenomenon that outstrips my
ability, as a perceiver, to have perceptions “about” the magnitude or quantity of the phenomenon.
Marion provides several examples of this, from amazement to the Kantian sublime. The same
basic idea—that the saturated phenomenon exceeds the limits of my understanding—applies to
the other four features above. While phenomena of this nature cannot be understood, they
nevertheless furnish the subject with more intuition than can complete his intention; thus, these
phenomena “overflow” and are “saturated.” But the subject is incapable of determining or
identifying whether the phenomenon presents an “excess” or a “shortage” of intuition.79 But this
also raises a paradox: the givenness of the saturated phenomenon at once both intuits an excess at
the same time that it circumvents intentionality. As Marion puts it, “[t]he visibility of the
appearance thus arises against the flow of the intention” (225). This is what makes the saturated
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phenomenon so otherworldly and so unusual. If not for this paradox, the saturated phenomenon
would not be saturated at all, but would be like any other “common law” phenomenon, which
Marion stresses would in fact, rather surprisingly, be impossible if not for the saturated variety,
which offers the subject a sort of standard to which the givenness of the “common” phenomenon
can be compared.
Marion dictates that there are five types of saturated phenomenon. They are the historical
event, the idol, the flesh, the icon, and the phenomenon of revelation (228-34). This last
phenomenon, that of revelation, is the example par excellence¸ to the extent that it “concentrates
the four types of saturated phenomena and is given at once as historic event, idol, flesh, and icon
(face)” (235). Since I am dealing only with conversion it is not necessary to get into the finer
details of Marion’s argumentation in this regard, but the basic idea is that the revelation
phenomenon is similar to the four preceding types of saturated phenomena in virtue of its
aggregation of horizon and narrative (like the historical event), its continual exhortation to be
observed (like the idol), its capability to dissolve the ego pole (like the flesh), and its power to
deploy its own gaze instead of merely being seen (like the icon/face). Via its concentration of these
phenomenological features the revelation phenomenon is a “saturation of saturation” (my italics),
the very “culmination” of the saturated phenomenon.
In what way does this relate to the conversion phenomenon? It is undeniable that saturated
phenomena sometimes but not always catalyze conversion experiences. Saint Paul, for example,
indubitably encounters a saturated phenomenon on the road to Damascus. 80 During this episode
Paul’s intentionality cannot contend with the overflowing degree of intuition given during the
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revelatory encounter. The manifestation of Christ exceeds Paul’s understanding of quantity to the
extent that it is a saturation of his vision; Christ’s appearance could not have been foreseen by
Paul, in contrast to the way in which Paul’s vision can anticipate ordinary phenomena, such as the
flight of a bird or insect. The manifestation exceeds Paul’s understanding of quality insofar as Paul
cannot bear the sight of Christ; he is blinded and falls to the ground. Christ’s manifestation exceeds
Paul’s understanding of relation because of the way in which the appearance of Christ interpolates
and disrupts Paul’s phenomenological horizon as well as all possible horizons, specifically via the
way in which the manifestation violates Paul’s understanding of spatiotemporality. Lastly the
manifestation of Christ surpasses Paul’s understanding of modality through the way in which Paul
is regarded by Christ and actually constituted by Christ (in direct contradiction of the contemporary
theory that Paul was merely having an epileptic episode, such that the transcendental ego was
constituting the appearance of Christ, and not vice-versa). In other words, the manifestation of
Christ qua saturated phenomenon makes Paul its witness, instead of Paul qua witness making the
saturated phenomenon/manifestation of Christ.
While it is certainly the case that conversions often occur without some basis in an
encounter with a saturated phenomenon, Marion’s concept provides a useful phenomenological
framework for analyzing the conversion that is accompanied by any variety of spiritual or religious
ecstasis. Later I will need to determine whether the “garden variety” conversion that is gradual
and not sudden, the result of reflection and contemplation and not spontaneous insight,
nevertheless shares some of the features of the saturated phenomenon.

14. Hervieu-Léger (1999):
The first [type of conversion] is that of the individual who changes religion […] The second
modality of conversion is that of the individual who, never having belonged to any religious
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tradition, discovers, after a more or less long personal journey, that in which he recognizes
himself and to which he finally decides to enlist himself. […] The third modality of the
figure of conversion is that of the reaffiliate, of the inner conversion, the one who discovers
or rediscovers a religious identity which has remained until then formal [nominal], to lived
practice, in pure communion with the group.81
Like Gaventa, Hervieu-Léger prudently classifies several distinct types of conversion. She
incorporates into her model the person who moves from one religious paradigm to another, the
person who turns to religion after previously holding no religious worldview, and the person whose
faith is intensified or perhaps authenticated or emboldened, without any change from one religion,
or no religion, to another. Here, with respect to the last type of conversion, the idea is that one has
considered oneself to be religious but not in any meaningful sense, such that an enlightening and
new self-discovery is possible, in which one reorients one’s self toward a more orthodox sort of
religious worldview, not to mention belonging. The second type of conversion is interesting for
the way in which it factors in the idea that the convert recognizes a sense of belonging in a religious
entity. Lastly it should be added that Hervieu-Léger’s conversion model refers to ‘religion’ but
does not necessarily invoke the idea of religion in an institutional or organized sense, as is the case
with some of the other models that I have reviewed.

15. Meintel (2007):
“Conversion [is usually defined as a] ritually-marked adoption of a new religious
belonging. […] Conversion so defined normalizes exclusive identities and global (i.e.
fundamentalist) religious discourse as the “gold standard” of conversion, and, by
expansion, of religious experience.”82

Hervieu-Léger, Le Pèlerin et le converti, 121-24. This is my own translation, and it is not one
which is conducted à la lettre although it does capture the overall sense of the writing.
82
Meintel, “When There Is No Conversion,” 149, 158.
81

80

Here the point is that a conversion can occur even in the absence of distinct institutional
boundaries, as exemplified by the Spiritualist Movement in Montreal vis-à-vis the larger Catholic
demographic. Meintel argues that these Spiritualists should be considered as converts despite the
fact that they do not necessarily view themselves as such; they do not think of themselves as having
left their Catholic faith. This argument is crucial for my purposes here because this directly
addresses the question of whether a subject has to think that he or she has converted in order for a
conversion to have occurred. According to Meintel it would seem that the answer to that question
is no.

16. Gooren (2007): “Conversion . . . refers to a comprehensive personal change of worldview and
identity.”83 This concise and general definition from Gooren is the result of his attempt at a
“synthetic” account of conversion. In framing conversion in such a general and broad way, Gooren
avoids many of the restrictive limitations found in other models, although as a consequence his
definition is certainly not as rich or nuanced as some of the other offerings. In particular, this
definition is so broad that it clearly transcends the limits of spirituality and religion. This definition
could accommodate “conversions” of a political or philosophical nature so long as the conversion
in question is sufficiently “comprehensive.” Gooren’s model has rich phenomenological
implications evinced in the suggestion that identity links with worldview; as one changes, so too
does the other. Gooren contrasts conversion with what he terms “disaffiliation,” which is akin to a
sort of “negative” conversion in which one leaves a religious or spiritual worldview behind.
In his review of thirteen different conversion models, Gooren conspicuously neglects to
incorporate the unconscious variety of the phenomenon (as discussed by Scobie), probably since
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he seems to favor the active and rational model, which is of course diametrically opposed to the
unwitting conversion. Ultimately Gooren attempts his own synthetic approach to conversion,
bringing together the “basic” and “best” aspects of the historical models that he reviews. These
aspects are as follows: 1. “emphasis on subjective religious experience,” 2. “conversion in the
narrow sense should always involve a change in religious worldview and hence a change in
identity,” 3. a “spoiled identity” produces “changes in levels of religious activity,” 4. some but not
all spoiled identities embolden subjects into “religious seekers” whose “socialization” and gender
determines the limits of the “seeking quest,” 5. subjects judge the “cost-benefit” value of religious
membership before investing completely therein, 6. “religious commitment is built up through role
learning and mastering,” 7. there is an “organizational side of the conversion process,” 8. a true
case of conversion must be marked by Snow and Machalek’s “empirical indicators” such as the
master attribution scheme, 9. “social networks” have an impact on conversion (here, to be clear,
the reference is to the subject’s social milieu and not electronic social networks like Facebook,
although the website would certainly count as a digital representation of real interpersonal
relations, albeit in a possibly contrived or overly-manipulated sense, 10. religious recruitment is
distinct from but related to conversion, and religious recruitment is a competitive enterprise,
demonstrated in the concept of the “religious market,” 11. the competitive methods employed in
the religious market should be analyzed as part of the academic study of conversion, and 12.
“cultural or societal factors that influence differences in religious activities must be carefully
described and explored.”84 What Gooren accomplishes here is a significant contribution to the field
of conversion studies but it is imperative to take note of the fact that a synthetic “approach” to
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conversion is not equivalent with a synthetic “definition” of the phenomenon, which is something
that only phenomenology can accomplish.

17. Paloutzian (2014):
[Conversion is] a more distinct process by which a person goes from believing, adhering
to, and/or practicing one set of religious teachings or spiritual values to believing, adhering
to, and/or practicing a different set. The transformative process in conversion may take
variable amounts of time, ranging from a few moments to several years, but it is the
distinctiveness of change that is its central identifying element. In contrast to someone
arriving at a point of belief through the process of socialization and other developmental
mechanisms, the convert can identify a time before which the religion was not accepted
and after it was accepted.85
Somewhat problematically this model from Paloutzian is not termed in such a way as to recognize
the case of the irreligious or atheistic person who resolves to turn to religion. It is hard to fathom
why such a case would be excluded from the limits of conversion. Of course this difficulty can be
resolved, so long as one is willing to classify atheism or the lack of religious belief as a “religious
teaching or spiritual value”, which seems to be a fairly obvious category error. A related issue
would occur for the case of the religious believer who loses his or her faith; it is hard to see how
this should be considered a religious or spiritual belief in any meaningful sense of the term. While
it feels forced to construe atheism as a religious teaching, if by “religious teaching” all that is
intended is a “teaching regarding religion,” then perhaps the difficulty is not so great. While
Paloutzian allows for both quick and gradual conversions, going so far as to specify that a
conversion can take years, he indicates that, in contrast to other sorts of pathways toward epistemic
states, in the case of an authentic conversion the subject is always able to identify the threshold of
the event. Whether this has to be a specific moment or not is unclear, although that seems unlikely,
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but at the very least this suggests that the subject is able to discern the time before his conversion
and likewise distinguish the time after it. There is no indication that the subject has to be correct
in his identification of this conversion threshold, but at the very least, he is able and willing to
divide his existence into two distinct phases.

Conclusions and Classifications Pertaining to the Definitions

There are a couple of general and significant conclusions to draw from this assortment of models
and definitions before I enumerate the essential, general categories of conversion. First, out of
the samples I reviewed here, two out of the three theological definitions (Gaventa and Baird, but
not Gelpi) do not ascribe moral significance or value to the trajectory of conclusion, in contrast
to what is true for most of the contributions from disciplines like psychology or sociology, which
do not take gods or other metaphysical objects as their primary object. Gelpi’s work is an
exception to this, since in his model conversion entails the movement from irresponsibility to
responsibility. Thus his account of the directionality of conversion is more akin to what is in
James, Nock, et al., where conversion, simply put, is typically understood to leave one better off
than when he or she started. The issue with this, in an academic sense, is that this is arguably an
instance of supposedly impartial academic disciplines granting implicit favor toward one of the
primary Western religions, Christianity—but this is not something that has been overlooked in
recent literature on conversion.86
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The seventeen models of conversion that I have reviewed can be grouped into eight
approximate categories or “types.” These types are not necessarily mutually exclusive, meaning
that any given conversion model can be defined by—indeed almost always can be defined by—
more than one of these typical properties. These classifications reflect the major trends in the
history of conversion scholarship.

The Eight Categories of Conversion from the Human Sciences:

1. Character-Identity (Personal)
•

Starbuck, James, Nock, Travisano, Gaventa, Gelpi, Baird, Hervieu-Léger, Meintel,
Gooren

2. Role (Intersubjective and Social)
•

Snow-Machalek, Rambo, Meintel

3. Event (Sudden, Sometimes Unexpected, Often Emotional)
•

Starbuck, James, Gelpi, Baird

4. Process (Gradual)
•

James, Lofland-Stark, Baird, Gaventa, Rambo, Paloutzian

5. Active (Volitional and/or Rational)
•

James, Lofland-Stark, Travisano, Snow-Machalek, Gelpi, Gooren, Baird

6. Passive (Paradoxical, Seemingly Involuntary)
•

Baird, Meintel

7. Conscious
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•

Starbuck, James, Nock, Lofland-Stark, Travisano, Snow-Machalek, Gaventa, Gelpi,
Rambo

8. Unconscious
•

Starbuck, James, Scobie

My synthetic definition should take into account all of these potential features, since I am of the
opinion that no single approach can or should take on the status of the “master” approach; to the
contrary, any reasonable and rigorous synthesis of the definitions offered above will have to
incorporate all eight categories that I have discovered.
It must be noted that most of the conversion models I have here reviewed are defined by
several of these different categories, with some even being sub-types of the others (every process
conversion is also technically an event conversion, at least phenomenologically—this will be
shown in the final chapter.) Gaventa’s model, for example, includes aspects of the characteridentity type as well as the process model. Similarly, the Rambo model involves both process
and role, and the Meintel account involves both identity and role. Some of these typical
categories are correlated with one another, like the relationship between the active conversion
and the conscious conversion, but this link is not absolute; in other words, not every conscious
conversion is the result of a choice, although every active conversion is necessarily one which is
conscious. The difference between the active and conscious categories is that the former pertains
to the decision or resolution to convert, whereas the latter refers to the awareness of the
conversion. Lastly, it is crucial to avoid mistaken pseudo-distinctions from the history of
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philosophy, such as the idea that the emotional conversion has no rational component (and vice
versa).87
Just as any given definition for the conversion experience can most likely be
characterized by more than one of these typical features, so too can any given case or example of
conversion be classified across multiple categories. For example, the paradigmatic example of
Paul’s conversion on the road to Damascus is a sudden and conscious change in identity tied to a
singular, emotional event, but it occurs on the basis of a passive impetus. Paul, in other words,
did not seek out his conversion, but instead, the conversion “happened” to him.
While it is evident that not all event-based conversions have to be “passive” in this way,
exemplified by the counterpoint of the ritualistic or sacramental conversion (like Catholic
Confirmation, or the Ordo Initiationis Christianae Adultorum), it is far from clear whether the
event-based conversion must be a conscious conversion. It is at least possible that a potent event
could set off a gradual conversion without any notion of the process becoming the object of my
conscious awareness. I will return to this question in the final chapter to determine whether the
ambiguity is resolved in the phenomenological attitude.
Furthermore I can conclude from my review of these various models for conversion that
it would be a mistake to synthetically define conversion as something specific to—and therefore
confined by—the limits of religion and spirituality. While some early authors like Starbuck and
James acknowledge the supposedly “alternative” types of conversion in their work, the
conversion of religion and spirituality dominated the focus of scholarship for several decades,
and this is probably an oversight. The criteria that I have enumerated are in fact decidedly non-
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specific in terms of the general content of conversion. I hope to fill in the nature of this
apparently indeterminate content using the eidetic phenomenological method, which I will
pursue in the final chapter.
Lastly it should be noted that these categories all apply to experience and the analysis
thereof. These categories are not, in other words, abstract types that fail to consider the
experiential nature of conversion. For this reason, these categories can be called existential, and
the phenomenon of conversion in general can be labeled an existential phenomenon of
transformation.88

A Synthetic Model of Conversion for Phenomenological Analysis

After classifying the basic type or categories of conversion based on my review of some of the
common models thereof, synthesizing a general definition for the experience is relatively
straightforward. I maintain that a comprehensive, empirical definition of personal conversion can
be constructed as follows:
A conversion is an existential transformation; it is a change in self that occurs for a subject
when he or she experiences a shift or transformation in role and/or identity, either as the
result of (or culminating in) an event or as mediated via a process; this conversion can be
active or passive, and it can be conscious or unconscious. Both active and passive
conversions can be either conscious or unconscious.89 An event-based conversion is almost
always an identity conversion, but a process-based conversion can enact a conversion in
either role or identity. Event-based conversions as well as process-based conversions
Here I do not use the word “existential” to refer to a Heideggerian or Sartrean model of
phenomenology, but instead, to the more general meaning of “pertaining to human existence.”
89
While this seems counter-intuitive, it remains possible because the distinction between the
active and conscious categories is that the former pertains to the decision or resolution to
convert, whereas the latter refers to the awareness of the conversion. According to this
conceptualization it is theoretically possible for someone to actively seek out a conversion
without necessarily being aware of the eventual “flip of the switch” constituted by the conversion
itself.
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involve either an active or passive converting subject, and the subject is either conscious
or unconscious of the phenomenon. Process-based conversions can also involve either an
active or passive converting subject.90
With this definition I strive to have incorporated all of the possible features of conversion in
general.

Postscript: Badiou and Agamben on Saint Paul

Despite the fact that “Pauline” conversion has occupied the vast majority of scholarly focus in
the earliest studies of the phenomenon, here I would like to briefly review one final pair of
interpretations of St. Paul in order to determine whether these recent and influential readings of
Paul bear any insights for my phenomenological analysis of the conversion experience.
In Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism (2003), Alain Badiou characterizes Paul
as a new “formal figure” of subjectivity. In other words, Paul invents a new way of being a
subject. This happens via a change in Paul’s “being and acting,” which Badiou describes in terms
of “situation” and “event.” It is Paul’s famous move from persecutor to acolyte that Badiou refers
to to as a change in his situation.91 For Badiou situations are, in short, epistemological contexts
(or knowledge-structures). New situations are instituted by “events” which are, as Badiou
phrases it, akin to Lacanian ruptures in established systems of knowledge (viz, the previous
situation).92 The event always “erupts as singular” but in such a way that is “immediately
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universalizable.”93 In Paul’s case the event begins with him, but what happens to him is of no
significance without its adaptation to everyone; the new truth would lose its meaning.
This is why Badiou argues that events are what make possible all “truth processes” (43).
A truth, as Badiou puts it, is that which is produced by maintaining “fidelity” with respect to an
event (42). He also calls this “declaring” an event. Thus, while it is the event that makes a new
truth possible, without a subjective response to the event—specifically, sans fidelity—there is no
actual change, no production of truth.94 But according to Badiou, this subject does not exist at all
until he is “induced” via the event. This is why Badiou focuses his analysis on Paul’s reaction to
the event, evinced through his writings, and not on the antecedent incident on the road. It seems
that for Badiou, Paul’s actual conversion is enacted through his fidelity to the event, and not the
event itself. In fact, Badiou would not call the Damascus episode the event at all—Paul’s event is
Christ’s resurrection (14). Badiou writes:
What Paul must be given exclusive credit for establishing is that the fidelity to such an
event exists only through the termination of communitarian particularisms and the
determination of a subject-of-truth who indistinguishes the One and the “for-all.” [. . .] Its
bearing, in a mythological context implacably reduced to a single point, a single statement
(Christ is resurrected), pertains rather to the laws of universality in general. This is why it
can be called a theoretical break, it being understood that in this instance “theoretical” is
not being opposed to “practical,” but to real. Paul is a founder, in that he is one of the very
first theoreticians of the universal.95
Badiou is very clear that truth is subjective, but his novel argumentation suggests that this
subjective truth is only true because it can be universally applied, insofar as it is “indifferent to
the situation (15). In Paul’s case his truth is subjective to the extent that it is his own fidelity to
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the event that generates the truth—he declares the event, he validates it, he lends it credence. But
Paul could have been anyone; the truth is universalizable.
In a 2005 interview with Adam Miller, Badiou indicates that something becomes
universal when “differences become indifferent” and new truths are created.96 It is in “living the
event” of his experience and disclosing or “declaring” the event to the Other that Paul institutes a
new universal truth. This truth is one which not only transcends Jewish Law but also the
philosophy of the ancient Greeks. But here truth is not redefined in such a way that it refutes the
truths of previous situations, because truths are always specific to situations, even if they are
indifferent to their circumstances.
Badiou is careful to distinguish these truths from mere opinions; whereas opinions evoke
“multiple-being,” Badiou’s event institutes a “new way of being.”97 The difference lies in the fact
that the new way of being redefines one’s subjectivity, whereas simply taking on a new opinion
does not. The authentic event redefines the subject because the subject reinterprets himself in the
new context; it is a constitutive relation.
But for this subject to remain stable and intact it is necessary that the subject maintains a
relation with the event that reoriented or founded the new iteration of the subject. In other words,
the event requires one to be persistently faithful to it.98 Thus the event, and how one consistently
relates back to it, redefines the nature of the ethical decision. Badiou uses the expression “ethic
of truth” to refer to the idea that ethical decisions are those which can be identified by their
“fidelity” to the truth of the relevant situational event. The significance of the “event” is that the
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truth that is generated by the event “renders insignificant” the differences that characterized the
previous situation.99
For Badiou, the “event of the resurrection” refers less to a miracle story than it does to the
event’s relatability to a subject, which in this case would be Paul himself. Paul’s response to the
event is one that involves “living the event” by transforming one’s thought in such a way that the
world itself is altered and no longer looks (quite as) infinitely multiple. This is tantamount to the
annihilation of difference, exemplified by Paul’s message concerning the event that “[t]here is
neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is neither male nor female” is itself a
repetition of the event, as an establishment of universal subjective truth. 100 The dissolution of
these categories of difference yields a new identity, one that is characterized by its transcendence
beyond the provenance of the prior division. Rather than marginalizing cultural differences in the
sense of canceling them out, the event and its transmission calls out for each person to reinterpret
himself or herself qua subject specifically in relation to the transformative event. For Badiou this
activity is the closest thing we have to immortality, this ability to achieve difference-sublimating
sameness with an event.101 If every conversion can be construed as an event via which the
subject is redefined and brought into identity with some new and radical way of looking at self
and world (one which relegates the old way to a position of nullity), then it is in conversion that
we have the closest approximation of human participation in truth. I suggest that most
conversion scholars would agree that without the supersedure of the old (whether in the form of
denial or reinterpretation), conversion cannot occur.
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But is this denial actually permissible? Badiou maintains that “the Pauline break does not
base itself upon the production of a universal” but rather repeats or performs the law of universality
itself.102 In fact this supports the understanding that Badiou’s concept of truth (and by extension,
conversion) does not have to operate by way of paradoxical exclusion of one’s former self or the
Other (paradoxical because the new paradigm cannot be universal if it does not encompass the
old); rather, one must take Badiou to mean that the universal truths of subjectivity are wholly
detached from societal situations or cultural differences. In other words, the new subjectivity
opened up by the conversion has to transcend or surpass the old subjectivity. This is the precise
form of Paul’s response to the event. Paul’s message is not introduced to incite political revolt or
put individuals against one another; rather, its purpose is to create a new identity that is defined by
its relation to the universal.
Alain Badiou focuses on Paul’s experience of the “event” on the road to Damascus in a
way that can enrich my account of sudden conversion and perhaps even enhance my model of
gradual, process-based conversion. I suggest that Badiou’s reading of Paul as initiator of a new
universal, yet subjective truth can fairly be considered a theory of conversion in so far as his
account focuses on a shift in subjectivity that involves a personal reorientation with respect to
truth.
While Badiou describes Paul as a figure of universal address to others, Giorgio
Agamben’s reading of Paul is markedly different. He argues that “Paul is not an advocate of
universalism but of radical separation.”103 But in fact Badiou and Agamben are discussing
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different facets of Paul; while Badiou essentially treats Paul’s political theory, Agamben focuses
on Paul’s theology and philosophy of time.
The crux of Agamben’s argument concerns how Paul contends with the concept of
“remaining” time, also referred to as “the contraction of time.”104 Agamben writes:
In defining himself as aphōrismenos, one who is “separated,” Paul thus alludes, in an
ironic, albeit cruelly ironic fashion to his separation of times past, [to] his segregation as a
Pharisee. He refers to it and negates it in the name of another separation that is no longer
a separation according to the nomos, but a separation according to the messianic
proclamation (eis euaggelion theou). 105
While Agamben is describing Paul’s status as one who is separated, the reason Paul is separated
comes down to his relationship with two temporal modalities—then versus now. The
differentiation between the two is partly juridical. In the “then” Paul was separated for a different
reason than he is separated in the “now.” The distinction is between being separated by law,
which characterizes Paul’s old status with respect to the Judaic nomos, and being separated by
virtue of Christ’s message, which effectively supersedes the Judaic nomos. As Agamben puts it,
the proclamation of the Messiah “brings down” the old “wall of separation.”
Similar to Badiou’s account of “declaration,” Agamben maintains that Paul, as an apostle,
relays this message (regarding separation) to others. To that end he is an essentially Schmittian
figure—in separating off the past and the old law, Paul institutes what is essentially a state of
exception; the law suspends itself.106 We can assert that the law suspends itself insofar as Christ
is a Jewish figure—in other words, Christ is the law. This relates back to messianic time insofar
as it is only a sovereign—in this case a Messiah—who can activate this exceptionality. Thus it is
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Christ and not Paul who establishes this exceptional timeframe. For Agamben, again following
Schmitt, this establishment is somewhat paradoxical; it is the Messiah who renders the law
inactive and suspended at the same time that only the Messiah can serve as the telos of the
law.107 The temporal situation in which this paradox obtains is precisely “messianic time”—the
time that remains, which can be alternatively rendered as “the time of the now.” This “now” is
not the same as the ordinary present, like the present moment that defines my temporality as I
write out these words for the first time and glance at the clock on my desk. That is the
temporality of chronos, which is time in a sequential and quantitative sense. Instead, this
messianic present is formulated in terms of kairos—the “right” time.
This construal of temporality in terms of messianic kairos is readily applicable to the
phenomenon of conversion. The convert, in separating off some aspect of his old identity or even
role, suspends not his prior law (as in Badiou’s reading of Paul), but his prior subjectivity. Recall
that for Badiou there is no subject prior to the event. For Agamben, this suspension would be
necessary to the extent that if one has converted, the old identity cannot coexist with the new
precisely insofar as the conversion (and resultant identity transformation) requires the separating
off of (at least some part of) the old self. Furthermore in conversion one’s old subjectivity needs
to be made inoperative (albeit to varying degrees, as we have seen—it is certainly not the case
that the convert must change in every single way in order to be called a convert), at the same
time that it is the convert himself who is the end or telos of his own subjectivity. To put it loosely,
the convert has to step outside of his own subjectivity in order to redefine his subjectivity. Thus
this is a form of radical separation that is not self-destructive but is in fact aimed toward selfpreservation. The result is the “remaining time” which now becomes, for the subject, the “right”
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time. This does not mean that the converting subject cannot remember his own past, or has to
deny his personal history, since, as I have argued, sometimes the convert reinterprets his own
history instead of outright rejecting it. But the subject, precisely insofar as he has converted,
must inhabit the new temporality comprised by his new identity or role. This new temporality
results from the convert’s separation of himself from himself. As we have seen it is an error to
assume that this phenomenon of division is always the object of conscious awareness; that said,
in the final chapter I will show that the phenomenon does have to be the product of volition and
judgment.
The upshot of this interpretation is that every convert inhabits, on a personal level,
something analogous to messianic time and thereby adopts the figure of what Agamben refers to
as the “remnant.” He writes:
[T]he remnant is closer to being a consistency or figure that Israel assumes in relation to
election or to the messianic event. It is therefore neither the all, nor a part of the all, but
the impossibility for the part and the all to coincide with themselves or with each other.
At a decisive instant, the elected people, every people, will necessarily situate itself as a
remnant, as not-all.108
This, too, can be applied to the phenomenology of conversion. At the “decisive instant” of
conversion (the point at which the convert “passes through” from his old identity toward the
new) part of the subject is subject to division and separation. The remnant is this divided portion
of the self, which is equivalent neither with the entire self nor the undivided part or portion. It is
this remnant that helps explain how someone can change without having to change entirely.
The ultimate significance of the convert’s adoption of the remnant figure is that it is a
divisive mode that is teleologically oriented toward (self) fulfillment.109 This is why messianic
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Ibid., 54-5.
Delahaye, “About Chronos and Kairos,” 88-9.
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time can be characterized as a “threshold.” It is impossible for a subject to convert without
passing through this temporal threshold. That is not to say that the convert needs to be capable of
identifying the precise temporal limits of the conversion experience.
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Ch. 2. Transcendental Phenomenological Framework and Methodology

Transcendent Experience

This is a phenomenology of conversion, but there are several different “types” of
phenomenological investigation, each of which is associated with different figures.
Transcendental phenomenology, associated with Edmund Husserl, might seem like a natural
starting point with which to begin this study to the extent that conversion itself deals with a
subject matter that could be considered “transcendent.” In fact, however, “transcendent” and
“transcendental” are not simple equivalents and, to the contrary, the difference between the two
terms entails important distinctions. When it comes to conversion, transcendental
phenomenology can always be used to analyze the phenomenon, but the transcendent nature of
the phenomenon will vary, taking on different forms.
The linguistic congruence between ‘transcendent’ and ‘transcendental’ is somewhat
misleading; whereas religion and spirituality often deal with the transcendent in the sense of the
supernatural or mystical, this is not at all the sense in which classical phenomenology is called
transcendental, which is in fact closer to the meaning of the term in the “transcendental idealism”
exemplified by Kantian philosophy. Nevertheless it is possible to conduct a transcendental
phenomenology of a transcendent experience, namely conversion, so long as we regard
analytically (only) the “givenness” (Gegebenheit) of experience. In other words it is fully
possible to conduct a phenomenology of an experience that is transcendent, but is not possible to
conduct a phenomenology of anything that transcends the experience (like the mind-independent
existence of God).
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When it comes to transcendent experience and conversion, I suggest that there are two
types, but they are not entirely distinct. After all, if to transcend something is to surpass it, then
transcendent experience is that which surpasses something—but what? The first type of
transcendence can be reduced to the “interior” domain of identity and selfhood, while the other
type can be reduced to the “exterior” world. As I will argue, these two types of transcendence
presuppose each other.
First there is the phenomenon of interior transcendence. Conversion, even in its milder
forms, is equivalent to self-transcendence. While this phrase evokes lofty ideals reminiscent of
Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, it is important to note that much subtler forms of self-transcendence
should be included in our consideration, like switching from one Protestant denomination to
another. In short, any change in self should be considered as self-transcendence, with the proviso
that such changes can be more or less complete, and therefore more or less profound.
The second way in which experiences can be transcendent expands upon the self and
extends out to the world and “outside” reality, that part of my experience that is shared by others,
and which itself encompasses my experience of others. In the world, some experiences stand out
to me as different. These experiences transcend what is normally encountered in what James
calls “normal waking consciousness.”1 These experiences might be strange, surreal, and even
frightening. Sometimes these experiences are called supernatural, mystical, paranormal,
miraculous, or even metaphysical. This type of transcendent experience is exemplified in the
case of an apparition or the hearing of a disembodied voice.2

1
2

James, Varieties, 296.
Both pertain to the famous case of St. Paul.
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These sorts of transcendent experiences should be qualified on phenomenological terms.
Here I can take no firm position on the mind-independent reality of anything I encounter in
experience; all experiences are immanent to consciousness itself, even if the experience
“intends” toward a so-called object that consciousness can discern is not identical with itself. In
other words I can determine that the statue that is talking to me is not the same as me, since, after
all, I perceive it as an object in the world, but I am limited in the metaphysical conclusions that I
can draw from my perception. According to this view it is not possible to encounter “things-inthemselves” as they exist independent of or external to human consciousness; to the contrary, the
world of things and the Other are mediated via consciousness and it is to that domain that their
ontologies are restricted. In other words, the mind-independent objectivity of transcendent
phenomena (e.g. “Is God real?”) are of no use here. As we will see, under a classical
phenomenological paradigm the only thing that could be said to transcend the acts of
consciousness is the transcendental ego—pure consciousness—id ipsum.3
The most general and common sense of “transcendent experience” would be any
experience which surpasses or goes beyond what is standard—and not simply in the manner of
deviating from one’s normal routine, like when your car gets a flat tire on the way to work, since
deviations of that sort are trivial, lacking in deeper significance and meaning. Conversion qua
self-transcendence should also be grouped into this category of transcendent experience, since it
is itself something that deviates from a normal day. A truly transcendent experience would be
marked by a definite intensity and other-worldliness; as Baird puts it, in the conversion
experience the subject encounters a “transcendent field of signification” that reorders the

The classic method of phenomenology gives a general strategy for the “uncovering” of this
“unconstituted” pure ego, which Husserl calls “transcendence in immanence.” Ideas I §57, 133
<110>.
3
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subject’s own “self-understanding.”4 In other words, it is some new meaning that inaugurates the
potential for conversion. Thus it should be underscored that a transcendent experience can only
be categorized as part of a conversion if the effect or result of the experience is selftranscendence. This transcendence of self is an epistemologically intense experience to undergo,
to have one’s knowledge (especially self-knowledge) upended. It is tantamount to escaping from
Plato’s Cave; it is a profound human experience that stands in stark contrast to the banal events
of everyday life.5
With both forms of transcendent experience, it is the confrontation or even violation of
limits that marks the experience as transcendent. The limit might be who you think you are, or
what you think is the purpose of existence, or what you are accustomed to thinking is “real.” But
the limit, which is specific to and relative for each individual, is what defines the norm. It
follows that what might be a transcendent phenomenon for the first person (e.g. hearing a voice)
is routine for someone else.
But there is a significant problem with an account of conversion that defines the
phenomenon as self-transcendence; the requisite intensity and depth of change would seem to
preclude many experiences from being considered as authentic “conversions.” Are we ready to
dismiss these less intense, more mundane experiences from our analytic consideration? Is
conversion always a transcendent experience?

Baird, “Role and Dynamics of Conversion,” xxvi.
While it is among my aims to demonstrate here that not every conversion is at first glance as
radical as what is recounted in some of the famous conversion stories, like that of St. Paul, I also
want to suggest that even the “minor” conversion (like switching from one Protestant
denomination to another) is radical in its own way, after some analysis.
4
5
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The Transcendental Method

When Husserlian philosophy is called “transcendental” something quite different is intended.
Transcendental phenomenology purports to discover the essential properties of consciousness as
experienced on a firsthand basis. Husserl, who is often called the founder of transcendental
phenomenology, could not have taken transcendental concepts further if not for the work already
done by Kant, for whom transcendental philosophy involves the identification of the conditions
that make experience possible. Husserl’s work is similar on a basic level but instead of focusing
on the pre-conditions of experience, he proposes phenomenology as a precise “science” of
appearances the ultimate insights of which are to reveal “transcendental consciousness.”
As I have stated, his phenomenology cannot investigate anything that is transcendent
beyond experience itself, but it is a “transcendental” discipline by way of what it is to reveal.
This upshot is attained via the two-part application of what Husserl calls the “transcendental”
(sometimes “phenomenological”) reduction, whereby one first brackets out everything
extraneous to a present experience (the epoché) and then leaves behind a remnant of pure
consciousness—the “transcendental residuum.”6 It is in this residuum that the phenomenologist
is able to identify the activity of the transcendental subject that is responsible for the constitution
of all intentional objects. This residuum is not simply theoretical nor is it the result of a logical
deduction; rather it is a genuine “field” of experience. In the course of this discovery the
phenomenologist also understands that inter-subjectivity and the life-world are transcendental
phenomena. Thus the classical, Husserlian conception of phenomenology is understood to be

6

Husserl, Ideas I §33, 58.
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transcendental in part due to how it explains the very genesis of experience as encountered
firsthand.
Husserl took it that phenomenology could work only as a transcendental philosophy, and
he expresses in the Crisis that phenomenology was an “endform” thereof.7 But clearly the sense
in which Husserl understood his philosophy to be transcendental is rather anomalous when
compared with the tradition, exemplified in his famous expression “transcendence in
immanence.”8 In several respects his philosophy can be reasonably compared with earlier ideas
from Kant and Descartes, but ultimately he means something quite unique by ‘transcendental’ in
his writing. His philosophy is not simply transcendental due to his regard for the transcendental
ego, which he compares to Cartesianism, nor for his focus on the way in which the intentionality
of the transcendental ego is a condition for the possibility of experience, but in each of these
ways, and then some. While some commentators have suggested that Husserl struggled to
articulate clearly how his phenomenology was transcendental, it was not for lack of ink spilled;
he would spend much of his career elaborating and revising the methods of transcendental
phenomenology until his death in 1938.

The Transcendental Phenomenological Framework

Before proceeding to a more technical discussion of the transcendental phenomenological
method it would first be useful to situate the general framework of transcendental
phenomenology. There are three parts to this framework—there is the object of the method itself,

7
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Husserl, Crisis §14.
Husserl, CM §47.
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the method’s very way of looking at what it explains, and the way in which the method purports
to explain the object. It has already been indicated that the phenomenon to be analyzed is
conversion, but here I will explicitly identify the scope of the phenomenon, the way in which the
phenomenon is regarded, and lastly the mode of explanation that is to be employed.
As we have seen the object (objectum) of phenomenological analysis is always the
phenomenon. Here we know that the phenomenon is conversion, but the starting point should be
the way in which consciousness experiences this phenomenon. Thus the various meanings of this
term should be discussed briefly. In the Theaetetus Plato uses the term to mean “appearance” and
his connotation is certainly negative.9 For Aristotle it refers to “images apprehended by sense.”10
Both of these definitions for phenomenon are far too limiting to apply to the case of conversion,
since prima facie conversion involves some intellectual component that surpasses the merely
sensible realm.
After the phenomenological “turn” that begins with Kant and is realized by Husserl the
term ‘phenomenon’ is interpreted and defined rather differently. While some writers (like Husserl
and Merleau-Ponty) may use the term to refer only to what is “given” to or, properly speaking,
constituted by and present before, consciousness itself, like the red color of a ball that one sees in
his field of vision, others, like Heidegger, use the term in a more fundamentally ontological
fashion, whereby the meaning of the word ‘phenomenon’ is closer to “that which shows itself.”11
With this sense of the term the focus is upon ontologically-posited concepts like care, ready-

Pl. Tht. 155A, cited in Liddell and Scott.
Metaphysics 338 b23, cited in Liddell and Scott.
11
In Heidegger’s case he is using this different sense of the term in order to re-frame the
phenomenological question away from Husserl’s agenda towards his own ontological program.
The difference in language could reasonably suggest to the inexperienced reader of
phenomenology a sense of agency on the part of the phenomenon, which would be incorrect. See
Part II Chapter 1 for much more detail.
9
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handedness, and authenticity; Heidegger does not employ the term to focus on a technical
analysis of the constitutive structures of conscious experience, which is the case with Husserl’s
transcendental phenomenology.
Within the purview of the transcendental method of phenomenology, the meaning of
‘phenomenon’ is most closely traceable to Kant, as we again note that transcendental
phenomenology inherits certain aspects of its general framework from transcendental idealism.
For Kant, the term means “appearances to the extent that as objects they are thought in
accordance with the unity of the categories.”12 In other words, the phenomenon is an object that
is experienced and ordered by mind-dependent structures (through sensibility and
understanding).13 Thus for Kant, an appearance is only a phenomenon if it is delineated a priori
by the categories, or, alternatively, categorical unity. Therefore, as Nicholas Strang points out, as
far as Kant is concerned something like a “visual after-image” (such as that which one sees after
staring for too long at a bright light) is an appearance but not a phenomenon due to the lack of
congruence between the intuition manifest to sense and its object.14
What is this “intuition”? Here ‘intuition’ refers not to the “folk” sense of the word, which
is often used to refer to a feeling or even a supernatural premonition.15 In the context of
transcendental phenomenology the term is instead used in a way that relates to the technical
manner in which it features in Kant’s philosophy. While the precise meaning of the term is
somewhat controversial to Kant scholars, since we are interested here in Husserl’s reformulation
of the concept I will just reproduce Kant’s own words from the First Part of his Transcendental

Kant, CPR, A249.
Ibid., A320.
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Stang, "Kant’s Transcendental Idealism," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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E.g. “She had an intuition that they were going to win the game.”
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Aesthetic in the Critique of Pure Reason: “In whatever way and through whatever means a
cognition may relate to objects, that through which it relates immediately to them, and at which
all thought as a means is directed to an end, is intuition.”16 Clearly this could take on thorough
elaboration but what is most important for our purposes is what Kant says intuition cannot do—
by way of his distinction between “sensible intuition” on the own hand and “intellectual
intuition” on the other, he argues that we possess only the former faculty.17
As far as transcendental phenomenology is concerned, there is no such problem because
there is no such object, if what is meant by object is “thing-in-itself.” While, as we have seen,
Kant very famously contrasts the phenomenon with the noumenon or “in-itself,” the dichotomy
is utterly “out of bounds” in transcendental phenomenology, where the internal-external, subjectobject dichotomies cannot be reproduced on the grounds that they would violate the very limits
what is “given” in sense experience. This is true even if one regards the noumenon only on the
basis of a logical posit since what is posited is the status of a “thing” independent from the
human experience thereof.
Husserl himself defines ‘phenomenon’ in The Idea of Phenomenology where he writes:
“The meaning of the word “phenomenon” is twofold because of the essential correlation between
appearing and what appears. “Phainomenon” properly means “that which appears,” and yet it is
predominantly used for the appearing itself, the subjective phenomenon.”18 What he is referring
to is the double reference of the word; to be sure there is, by law, no external or material object
immanent to the immateriality of consciousness, and yet there are two distinct dimensions to the
appearance, both the cognition or conscious experience itself (cogitatio) as well as the object of

Kant, CPR, A19/B20.
Ibid., A250/B307.
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the cognition (cogitatum). Understandably it might first be hard to grasp how this isn’t a simple
reproduction of the same sort of subject-object ontology that Husserl takes pains to condemn. It
all comes down to the cogitatum, the materiality of which is manifest only in my sensation. It is
not, in other words, the external cause of the perception but rather is the thing qua perceived. As
Moran points out, what Husserl had here discovered was that “the “things themselves” manifest
themselves to us in relation to the very manner in which we are present to them.”19 Failure to
grasp this phenomenological fact is what leads one to the subject-object dichotomy; in Husserl’s
framework, the only “object” is the intentional object towards which consciousness points,
comprising the so-called “noematic” core of the perception (cogitatum). This noematic core does
not correspond to an empirical/material object with an independent ontological status; rather, this
core is nothing more than the object of intentionality strictly as it is encountered.
The object of transcendental phenomenology, the phenomenon, now clarified, it is time to
turn to the manner in which the phenomenon is regarded by the phenomenologist. Beyond taking
no position on the existence of so-called material objects that (might or might not) exist
independent of human consciousness, transcendental phenomenology calls for faithfulness to
what Husserl calls “the principle of principles.”20 This principle states that:

Moran, Dictionary, 252.
The fact that technically transcendental phenomenology takes no position on certain realistempirical problems is sometimes overlooked. Take for example Quentin Meillassoux’s wellknown and controversial After Finitude, which more or less persuasively advocates for a
mathematical ontology but does not go so far as to demonstrate the invalidity of phenomenology.
The better reading of this book is that it takes issue that phenomenology takes no position on the
existence of mind-independent objects, which is of course something that phenomenology cannot
do, for reasons already stated.
19
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[E]very originary presentive intuition is a legitimizing source of cognition, that everything
originally (so to speak, in its 'personal' actuality) offered to us in 'intuition' is to be accepted simply
as what it is presented as being, but also only within the limits in which it is presented there.21

Here Husserl simply indicates that every intuition is to be taken simply as it is given and no
more.22 These perceptions or appearances do not have to be visual but instead are constituted in
various manners of sense, from the five senses to pure intellection. According to Husserl’s
version of the phenomenological method, it is of utmost importance to avoid at all costs the
adoption, implicit or explicit, of any metaphysical presupposition that is projected onto or
supplemented into the “givenness” (Gegebenheit) of phenomena as present before consciousness
itself. In other words the content of consciousness as experienced is understood to be objective
irrespective of the allegedly concrete and external “cause” of the perception, as something
outside of consciousness itself which accounts for the appearance of the conscious quality.
Thus a perception that one is fairly sure is hallucinatory has, before consciousness as it is
experienced on a firsthand basis, a deceptive status or “reality.” This is of utmost importance
since it is easy to fall into concerns over the supposed “external cause” of religious intuition. For
example one might wonder whether St. Paul “really” hears the voice of Christ when he falls
down on the way to Damascus, or if it is all just “in Paul’s head.” For the phenomenologist, the
difference between hearing or seeing something “real” and hearing or seeing something illusory
comes down to the synthesis of fulfillment. As Jay Lampert points out in Synthesis and
Backward Reference in Husserl’s Logical Investigations, this is “the relation between intention
and fulfilment.” He writes:

Husserl, Ideas I § 24, 44 <44>.
See the work of Jean-Luc Marion for more on the concept of givenness, especially Being
Given (1997).
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An expression has an “empty” meaning-intention for an experiencing subject if it refers to an
objective state of affairs which he has not intuited; it acquires a meaning-fulfillment if the subject
has intuitively “confirmed” or “illustrated” its meaning.”23

With St. Paul, then, the problem comes down to whether the voice that he hears is supported by
his own intuition. As the story goes, Paul’s conversion event has meaning precisely because he
intuits the presence of Christ. For him this is not merely an empty intuition, but one that is
intuitively supported. Specifically, this is what Husserl refers to in the Sixth Logical
Investigation as “categorial intuition.”
This is what Lampert, following Zahavi, refers to as “imaginative fullness.”24 This is a
real problem, since a fantasy can be experienced with the sort of fullness that would suggest that
the experience has some objective reality, despite the fact that the fullness is not genuine.
Lampert reasons that the fulfillment has to be structured a certain way: with systematic and
objective syntheses.25 What this means is that the “objective reference” of an experience belongs
to a judgment regarding that experience, and not the experience itself (this will be very important
in the final chapter, where I will argue that all conversions, even those which are rather
paradoxically called “unconscious” conversions, require judgments.) Lampert points out that
what girds the synthetic objectivity of a set of judgments (in this case regarding outer sensation)
is that the constituent theses of the judgments are mutually supportive and foundational, and they
point back to nomenclature while at the same time the names presuppose the relevant
judgments.26 Thus in order to judge that an apparition has objective reference, not only do I have

Lampert, Synthesis and Backward Reference, 59.
Zahavi, “Constitution and Ontology,” 122.
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to affirm that what I am seeing is veridical, but I have to name what I am seeing, and I cannot
make the judgment without naming, nor can I name anything at all without judging.
This points to a subtle difficulty in Husserl’s conception of meaning-fulfillment: his
analysis can easily explain the hallucination or apparition that is identified as such, but it
becomes difficult to apply his ideas to the more profound and convincing sorts of illusory
experiences that are not judged. Perceiving and judging are not simple equivalents, after all.
While it is true that Husserl devotes much time and space to the elaboration of syntheses and
epistemic fulfillment, with the idea being that the unfulfilled expression is phenomenologically
distinguishable from the expression that is verified through intuition, in the lived experience of
religious and spiritual phenomena, this is overly idealistic. The person who is hallucinating is
most likely not judging what he or she sees, and if they are, then there is no reason why their
syntheses cannot corroborate what they are seeing. Husserl’s sustained interest in fulfillment as it
concerns the fleshing out or identification of intentional acts arguably falls short, even if it offers
a test that can sometimes differentiate the hallucination from the fulfilled intentional act. In short
the test will only work in relatively mild cases in which the phenomenological subject can
suspend or push back against the force of his mystical stupor, chemically-induced change in
mental state, or whatever else accounts for his “wild” perception or intuition. In other words it is
the nature of hallucination to present itself as if intuitively fulfilled, and it is overly optimistic for
the phenomenologist to suppose that in the present moment a convincing hallucination can be
identified as such on the basis of its status as unfulfilled intuition. Perhaps in retrospect the
phenomenologist is able to conclude that his perception of some voice or vision was unfulfilled,
but in the moment, this determination is highly unlikely. For the duration of the hallucinatory or
mystical episode, this rational conclusion is next to impossible. This is the significance of
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Marion’s “saturated phenomena”—the religious or spiritual experience transcends the typical
limitations of intuition and intentionality.
Indeed it is difficult to even identify any perception as hallucinatory or otherwise illusory
in the first place to the extent that in the natural attitude the criterion for distinguishing such
experiences would fall upon the presence of an external cause or stimulus. Often the ecstatic or
hallucinating individual is incapable of determining whether or not there is such a cause. But in
the phenomenological attitude, every perception is taken only as a perception instead of making
assumptions regarding the supposed physicality, materiality, or externality of the thing that is
perceived. The procedure for assessing the objective reference of an illusory experience involves,
as I have said, the enactment of judgments, and not the “real” or material external cause of the
experience (this is what Meillassoux does with the fossil).27 When we restrict ourselves to what
is “given” there is no room to posit a Kantian thing-in-itself as correlate of the thing appearing to
us in sense. In more basic terms we can capture the sentiment here with the cliché “what you see
is what you get.” It is still true that Husserl can differentiate “mere” sense experience from things
themselves (in other words I can tell the difference between looking at the sun, and the sun as the
object I am looking at), but it has to be noted that the thing itself is only known through its
manifestation in sense experience. I would not have any idea of the sun if not for its givenness to
me in sensation. There is no material thing-in-itself to which we can refer, something that is other
than the thing that appears before consciousness, the thing that is experienced (in other words the
thing itself is the object I experience, and the thing-in-itself is illicit, a countersense). In the
practice of our everyday lives, this is hard to do. We have conversations with people whom we
assume to exist independently of our own consciousness of them—to do otherwise would be to
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fall into the despairing isolation of solipsism—and yet when using phenomenological methods,
we are compelled to focus on consciousness alone. I know the Other insofar as the Other appears
to me and I have perceptions of him or her.
It is via sensible intuition that our more primitive perceptions (i.e. impressions) are
conditioned with formal aspects like space and time, without which it would be impossible to
understand phenomena at all. The point of difference in Husserl’s thought is that through
phenomenology and the reduction we are able to employ the latter type of intuition, the
intellectual. Husserl refers to this as “eidetic seeing” (Wesenserschauung).28 Whereas Kant
indicates that this type of intuition is impossible and aligns it theoretically alongside the
noumenon which we have already discussed, for Husserl it is intellectual intuition, as specifically
non-sensuous, which enables us to categorially situate our experiences, to encounter them on the
terms of their own self-evidence. Whereas for Kant intellectual intuition is creative and the
province of no less than a God, Husserl’s intellectual intuition simply grasps the categorial
features of experience. These categorial features refer to the phenomenological “structure” of an
intellectual intuition, the way in which an ordinary object is, for example, situated in a larger
contextual environment. For example, when I look at a painting that hangs on the wall, it is the
painting’s placement against the plane or background (Hintergrund) of the wall that comprises a
necessary relation for the object (i.e. the painting). The same would be true for a painting
suspended by wire with no wall immediately behind it; my categorial intuition would still
apprehend the empty background behind the object.
There is more to focusing on the givenness of the appearance as such. It has to be noted
that there is a precise focus to the manner in which perceptions are analyzed phenomenologically
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according to the transcendental model. As we will see in the next section where we explore the
specific tools of the transcendental method, the idea of radical doubt is of paramount importance.
Husserl calls for the adoption of a specifically “phenomenological” attitude that holds in
suspension our ordinary assumptions about the material and scientific world. In other words, we
are to leave behind our ordinary naiveté that defines our non-reflective way of dealing with the
world. Thus when a perception is being analyzed in the phenomenological attitude, everything
else has to be ignored. This includes the vast body of assumptions that we carry with us as we go
on living our daily lives, without which it would be difficult to operate as a member of society.
For example, I ordinarily take it for granted that my campus exists independent of my own
experience of it—I assume that it is “there” even when I am not. So too do I assume that my
students exist even when we are not together in the classroom. As we will see, focusing on the
perception and ignoring the rest is managed through what Husserl calls the epoché, which is used
to “bracket off” everything extraneous to a perception proper.
Lastly there is the overall conceptual framework via which the transcendental
phenomenologist renders an a priori explanation of an intuition. Early in his career Husserl
roughly equated his phenomenology with “descriptive psychology.”29 Husserl’s understanding of
descriptive methodology was influenced in large part by Franz Brentano and his descriptive
psychology but after the Logical Investigations Husserl moved away from this phrasing, perhaps
largely in part through his desire to distance himself from accusations of psychologism. Later on
Husserl would call transcendental phenomenology not a descriptive psychology but rather an
“eidetic science,” although certainly his method would still necessarily involve linguistic
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description.30 The difference comes down to phenomenology as Husserl conceived it prior to his
“discovery” of the reduction (first published in Ideas in 1913 although present in his notebooks
almost a decade earlier) compared with the later iteration.31 The later phenomenological model
could more properly be called transcendental, with the only real issue with the “descriptive
psychology” paradigm being that Husserl wanted to elevate his work beyond that of a “mere”
psychology. In part his attempt was to remove phenomenology from the limits of the empirical
and what he refers to as the “scientific attitude.”
Ultimately the precise way in which transcendental phenomenology describes and
explains its objects of inquiry comes down to the telos or proposita of transcendental philosophy
and phenomenology in particular, and this is why Husserl eventually preferred to use the term
“eidetic science” to describe his work—instead of aligning it with the descriptive
phenomenology of Brentano. As we have seen, the ultimate goal of transcendental
phenomenology is the elucidation of the a priori essential structures of acts of transcendental
consciousness. Here we are specifically concerned with a very specific act of consciousness: the
conversion act. The goal is to identify the essential phenomenal structures of any conversion
whatsoever, but the only route to such a conclusion is through the examination of specific
conversion cases and specific conversion models from various academic disciplines.
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Conversion and the Phenomenological Method

With my historical outline of the transcendental approach to philosophy as well as a basic sketch
of the classic phenomenological framework, I can now turn to the particulars of the
transcendental phenomenological method per se. The most important components of the method
are the phenomenological attitude, the epoché, the reduction, imaginative free variation,
intentionality, noesis and noema, constitution, and the horizon. These components all link
together to comprise the form of the transcendental phenomenological method.
The most complete examination of the transcendental phenomenological method should
begin with an overview of the various “attitudes” that Husserl identifies in his writings. These
attitudes, discussed at length by Husserl in Ideas I and the late-career “Vienna Lecture,” have a
deep influence upon a subject’s way of dealing with and experiencing the world (as well as other
egos).
Rather than referring to something like a mood or disposition on the part of one’s
personality, attitudes are here used in a technical sense, as Einstellung. This term refers to
outlook or mentality. For the Neo-Kantians and 19th century psychologists, Einstellung is used
to refer to overall dispositions of consciousness, like the different and specific ways in which one
would mentally encounter a math problem versus a beautiful sunset. Against the former I am
thinking arithmetically and in terms of reason. Perhaps I have a few formulas present before my
mind as I solve the problem. In the case of the latter I of course take no recourse to arithmetic.
Rather I am focused on the rich textures manifest in my visual field. I take note of the subtleties
of color and light. Perhaps I am contemplating the vista conceptually in terms of their beauty or
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symmetry. These different ways of “looking at” (not only visually) different things are what we
have in mind when we refer to the attitudes relevant to phenomenological inquiry.
It makes sense to begin with the most common attitude, the one that Husserl calls “the
natural attitude.” In Ideas I §27 he discusses this attitude, which serves as the normal modus
operandi of our everyday lives. In this attitude the world is “endlessly spread out in space”
despite the fact that no such indication is explicitly “given” to me in consciousness.32 It is a plain
assumption on my part that the world simply extends out indefinitely from my vantage point (in
the phenomenological attitude we can identify the reason for this—this experience is constituted
in part on the basis of sensation, Kant’s outer intuition.) Objects in the world are “there for me,”
as are other humans, and I take for granted the material status of the objects that I encounter in
sense. Husserl points out that in normal consciousness we operate like this at all times—it is our
default. It is a practical orientation without which we would struggle to live modern lives.
In this natural attitude I also carry out what Husserl calls “the general positing” (also
referred to as the “general thesis” that is posited).33 This is the consistently held presumption that
the world and everything in it is “factually existing” and actual. To question any of it would not
occur to me, and even if I did doubt some specific bit of “data belonging to the natural world,” it
wouldn’t change the fact that I already naively suppose the world to exist in the first place.34
Thus even if I am faced with a fantastic mirage as I wander about a barren desert, my doubt
regarding the veracity of my vision does not preclude my normal assumption that the world itself
is actually “real” in a material sense.
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While the natural attitude is our most frequent disposition with respect to the world, it is
not our only one. Husserl also describes a “theoretical attitude.”35 Scientific knowledge is
pursued in this non-practical attitude, which involves self-aware detachment from the object of
study. Here one takes on a position of disinterest and looks at the world as if an onlooker instead
of an active participant. Even if we are not carrying out scientific experiments in a laboratory we
still might be in the theoretical attitude, so long as we are seeking out knowledge and doing so by
objectifying some aspect of our experience instead of “living in” the experience in a primary and
unreflective sense. Mathematics, science, and philosophy would all, prior to phenomenology, be
conducted in this theoretical attitude. Without this theoretical attitude there could be no
phenomenological attitude.
Indeed lastly, we must examine the “phenomenological attitude.” Contra the theoretical
attitude which requires one to view an object of knowledge as if from the vantage point of an
outside observer, the phenomenological attitude requires the strict adoption of, and confinement
to, a first-person perspective. All descriptions which are rendered in this attitude must be faithful
to the experience at hand. In practice this is extraordinarily difficult to do because of how easily
we dwell in the natural attitude for most of the time. Indeed it is in the natural attitude that
conversion is experienced. How can we use the phenomenological method to analyze a
phenomenon that occurs in the natural attitude?
The way around this is through the deployment of what is called the epoché. Inspired as
we have seen by the Meditations of Descartes, in the phenomenological attitude we use the broad
application of the epoché to bracket off everything that we ordinarily assume about the world
when we are in the natural attitude. Husserl lifts the term epoché not from the Meditations, where
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it does not appear, but rather from Ancient Greek, where the word refers to “suspension of
judgment.”36 The founder of transcendental phenomenology is quick to point out that this
classical sense of epoché is markedly different from the procedure employed by Descartes,
where beliefs are explicitly doubted and are the object of skepticism, instead of just being out of
consideration.37 Husserl claims regarding Descartes that “his attempt to doubt universally is
properly an attempt to negate universally.”38 To the extent that Descartes entertains the
possibility of an evil demon who would be tempted to deceive him into believing in the existence
of things that did not really exist, this seems like a fair assessment on Husserl’s part.39
This isn’t at all what Husserl does with his epoché, which is instead a variety of
“neutrality modification.”40 Most generally what is excluded from judgment (but not outright
denied) on the basis of the epoché is the general positing of the world that normally defines our
disposition in the so-called natural attitude. This is to place on hold the “thetic” nature of the
natural world whereby that which is presented in consciousness is specifically presented as
“factually existing actuality.”41 Earlier in the Logical Investigations Husserl had referred to this
same property of normal consciousness as “belief-character.”42 The idea here is that things
present themselves to us via our perception in such a way that the very presentation (illicitly) of
things implies to us their mind-independent existence. The world itself presents itself to us in this
way. When we perform the epoché we make the conscious and deliberate decision to no longer
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permit ourselves to be “seduced” by the perception. We bracket the imagined indication that the
thing presents itself to us as “external” and independent of sense.
As far as some commentators are concerned, the epoché is essentially equivalent with the
phenomenological reduction. But later in his career Husserl would begin to distinguish between
the two terms more clearly. Indeed this is why the phenomenological reduction is typically
characterized as a two-step process that begins with the application of the epoché to the general
positing of the natural attitude and culminates with the eidetic reduction.43
It is the eidetic reduction which, as “an inquiring back into consciousness,” uncovers the
transcendental conclusion(s) regarding the phenomenon. As Husserl puts it in Cartesian
Meditations, by the method of transcendental reduction each of us […] was led back to his
transcendental ego.”44 We have seen that in order to isolate the universal theoretical conditions of
an experience, any subjective aspect of the experience has to be ruled out. The experience has to
be taken at face value as it appears to one’s own consciousness but also to any given
consciousness. In contrast to the metaphysical speculations from the history of philosophy, the
avenue to this transcendental knowledge lies in a methodological move that Husserl understood
to be thoroughly scientific.
Since it is impossible to transcend one’s own point of view, the way in which the
phenomenon appears has to be “imaginatively varied” in order to grasp something that isn’t
simply individual or particular. When the phenomenon is encountered in experience it naturally
does not present itself eidetically, in term of its essence or its form. So in order to arrive upon the
eidos—what is necessary and essential—for the phenomenon, this variation has to be performed.
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Thus this procedure is also often referred to in Husserl’s writings as the “eidetic variation.”
Occasionally it is referred to as the “free variation” because of the way in which it is “pure”—it
fully disregards the notion of existence and the “real” or “actual” object.
“Free variation” is an essential component of the transcendental method because it is the
operational tool that carries the phenomenologist from a singular iteration of the phenomenon to
its form, and yet despite the selection of terms that are used for this activity, Husserl in fact only
infrequently discusses the technical points of the matter at length in his writings.
There may not be much detail in print regarding the variation, but thankfully Husserl
provides a couple of clear examples of the procedure involved, which is not always the case with
his other concepts. The easiest way to explain how the variation works is by using the example
that Husserl provides in Phenomenological Psychology.45 In this text Husserl explains how to
move from seeing one single hue of red to the eidos of red, i.e., red in general. As one cycles
through the numerous varieties of red that can be imagined before sense, that which is invariant
is equivalent with the essential properties of red. It is of course impossible to imagine every
single red color, and impractical to even garner an attempt, but doing so is in fact not necessary
in order to grasp the essence of red. I can conceive of a red that is more orange, or a red that is
more yellow, or a red that is rather dark like garnet or mahogany, or one which is light, like
scarlet or even salmon. All of these colors are differentiable before my imagination, and yet each
partakes in that quality that makes it a hue of red. Once I have entertained a sufficient number of
examples such that I can discern the essence of the color in general, there is no need to continue.
The form in virtue of which the various hues all appear to me as red is a transcendental insight
manifest to me via intuition.
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In his Cartesian Meditations Husserl furnishes another example of eidetic variation,
where he explains the process using the perception of an ordinary table:
Starting from this table perception as an example, we vary the perceptual object, table, with a
completely free optionalness, yet in such a manner that we keep perception fixed as perception of
something, no matter what. Perhaps we begin by fictionally changing the shape or the color of the
object quite arbitrarily, keeping identical only its perceptual appearing. In other words: Abstaining
from acceptance of its being, we change the fact of this perception into a pure possibility, one among
other quite ‘optional’ pure possibilities—but possibilities that are possible perceptions. We so to
speak, shift the actual perception into the realm of non-actualities, the realm of the as-if.46

Here we can see how it all comes together, how the free variation begins with what is established
by a specific perceptual object but moves to the very essence of the perceptual object in general.
It is important to note that here when Husserl refers to “[a]bstaining from acceptance” of a
perceptual object’s “being” he refers to withholding ontological judgment of the object’s
existence, not its essence—the latter is determined, necessarily, via application of the classical
method. Husserl points out that the perceptual object with which we begin need not even exist de
facto in order for this procedure to yield transcendental findings. In other words starting with an
imagined fantasy object like a hippogriff would not be a problem for the method despite the fact
that no “real” ontological correlate of the perception “exists.”47 The same goes for the acts of
wishing or daydreaming, each of which can be eidetically varied. Ultimately even the perception
of a “factual” or “posited” object involves free variation that is employed entirely on the basis of
an imaginative act, so the concern over “fantasy objects” is easily resolved.
None of this would be possible without the phenomenological concept of intentionality,
without which consciousness itself would be unthinkable. “Intentionality” refers to what a state
of consciousness is about; “all consciousness is consciousness of something” is the most famous
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formulation, although it is Sartre’s wording rather than Husserl’s.48 Here when we use the word
“about” in the first definition, it is quite broad in its reference; consciousness might be of
something in the visual field, or a number before one’s mind, or the sensation of pain.
Husserl encounters the term in the work of Brentano, who develops the concept after
encountering it in Scholastic philosophy.49 But Brentano remains limited to an understanding of
“intentionality” that construes the term in an implicitly “representationalist” manner, such that
“[e]very mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself.”50 By contrast, for
Husserl intentionality is an “objectifying act” that is neither subject nor object. Instead of a split
between subject and object, according to Husserl’s understanding of the objectifying act,
subjectivity and objectify are intrinsically “tied up” with one another. In other words an object of
experience is only an “object” at all insofar as it is an object phenomenally experienced by a
constituting subject. This is far different from the notion of an “external” object that exists
independent of a perception thereof; rather, this object is inherent to the act of perception itself,
and its only existence of which we validly speak is the existence that is mediated in the
perception.
In his Fifth Logical Investigation Husserl identifies two different modes of this
intentional object manifest in perception: “the object as it is intended” and “the object which is
intended.”51 According to the example he gives in the text, the object which is intended may be
the Emperor of Germany but this object might be intended as “the grandson of Queen Victoria”
etc. While it may be assumed that here the Emperor of Germany qua object is mind-independent,
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this is in fact not the case; Husserl is referring not to the emperor in a material or external sense,
since that sorts of consideration defines the natural attitude that has been left behind. The object
instead refers to a presentation, the object of the reference. This analysis will later be revised into
the noesis-noema characterization that first appears in print with the first volume of Ideas.
In the Logical Investigations Husserl goes so far as to say, “each intentional experience is
either an objectifying act or has its basis in such an act.”52 This is to say that not every directed
experience is one which refers to an object; in the case of feelings and volition, for example,
reference is not made to the object but the very presentation of the object is mediated by the
feeling. Here Husserl is trying to clarify what Brentano refers to as “presentation” (Vorstellung),
which Husserl found to be obscure, and eventually critiqued in the Logical Investigations.
Contrary to Brentano’s formulation, for Husserl “objectifying act” replaces Brentano’s
“presentation” to refer to the act of consciousness whereby the intentional object is made present.
Not every state of consciousness is one through which the intentional object is made present,
however. For example, if I experience an emotion respective to the intentional object, like feeling
happy when I see a shark tooth which reminds me of a childhood family vacation, then in the
consciousness of the emotion the shark tooth itself is not made present, but the way in which I
interpreted the shark tooth is.
Late in his career Husserl states that intentionality is the correlation a priori between
subject and world53. Here his wording may be new, but the underlying idea has been present in
his work for several decades; instead of the modern subject-object split that is instituted in the
work of Descartes, Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology calls for a conception of subject-
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object wherein the two are not distinct but are rather different inherent aspects of consciousness.
When it comes to conversion this schema “self-contains” the transformation in the mental
experience of the individual.

Preliminary Analysis of the Conversion Noema

Starting with Ideas I Husserl uses a different term to refer to the object of consciousness: the
noema.54 This is a term in Ancient Greek used to refer to what a thought is about. The noema,
simply put, is the object as experienced by consciousness, and Husserl employs this term as a
replacement for what Brentano would refer to as “content” or “object.” In Ideas I Husserl calls it
“the perceived as perceived.”55
Here we should prepare an advance account of the noema of conversion. First, perhaps
we imagine that conversion itself is the noema of conversion. But we already saw in the last
chapter that some empirical researchers do not think that a conversion has to occur on a
conscious basis. Furthermore breaking down a conversion into a converting act (noesis) and
conversion (noema) is not particularly helpful because these specific terms need to be
phenomenologically generalized. What specific type of mental act does conversion involve? The
second answer to this issue is that the noema of conversion is the self, insofar as conversion
involves some sort of change in selfhood (this account will be much further refined in the next
chapter). But in fact the idea that the noema of a conversion experience is always the self is
mistaken, too hasty; it is not actually necessary to have a perception of the self when converting,
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so long as one understands that ‘self’ refers to the object of deliberate reflection. As I will
elaborate later on, following the work of Dan Zahavi, it cannot be the case that the reflective self
is the only phenomenological self. After all, I do not necessarily have to reflect upon the self in
order to have an “experience” of my self if by ‘experience’ I am willing to allow pre-reflective
and non-reflective types of consciousness. While I can deliberately and explicitly think about my
self and my own identity, I also have experiences of self that are not necessarily the object of my
conscious awareness. For example, as I sit here and type out these words, this, too, is an
experience of self, even if I do not think about my own self as I am typing. I cannot, after all,
imagine sitting here typing these words without it being an experience for myself, so my self
appears to be an irreducible component in the experiential situation.
There are certainly some conversions that involve conscious reflection (see Gelpi) and socalled “intellectual” consideration of spiritual/religious change and transformation, but plainly it
is not the case that every convert has his or her self “in mind” (i.e. in a reflective sense)
throughout the duration of his conversion experience. Even a convert who is required to attend
classes before his conversion is commemorated in a ceremony as someone who is caught up in a
longer-term process, even if it lasts only a few weeks or months. He will spend time learning
about the religion or spiritual worldview (or even philosophy?) for quite some time without
necessarily reflecting upon his own self, even if those considerations of self are in the
“background” of whatever he may be learning. Consider also the so-called “spontaneous”
convert like St. Paul, to whom we will return in depth in the third chapter, whose conversion is
instituted by an event from without. When Paul falls to the ground, blinded, the noema of his
experience is not his selfhood. To the contrary Paul is focused at one moment on his lack of
vision, on the unembodied voice that he hears in another moment. After the episode when Paul is
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led by his colleagues to his destination of Damascus, he reflects on his own identity and the
transformation that he has been compelled to make by the miraculous incident. At this time the
noema of Paul’s experience is the thought of his own self, from his beliefs to his past to his
personal worldview. Thus I argue that this transformation is still volitional and judgmental, not
just something that “happens” to Paul as if he is a passive vessel, which is to this day one of the
dominant interpretations of Paul’s story.
While properly understood this phenomenological self can take on several different
manifestations, like self-consciousness or self-experience (Selbsterfahrung) or even simple,
cognition-free activities like breathing or becoming immersed in music. That said, we have to
exclude any sort of self that is subtracted out of or removed from my own lived experience. Thus
we cannot construe the conversion self in a biological or material sense. In Ideas I Husserl
indicates that:
The tree simpliciter, the physical thing belonging to nature, is nothing less than this perceived tree
as perceived which, as perceptual sense, inseparably belongs to the perception. The tree simpliciter
can burn up, be resolved into its chemical elements, etc. But the sense—the sense of this perception,
something belonging necessarily to its essence—cannot burn up; it has no chemical elements, no
forces, no real properties.56

Here Husserl is not endorsing a physicalist or externalist metaphysics, but instead is doing
precisely the opposite; he is pointing out that the tree could be damaged or destroyed by fire, and
of course it would be possible to have perceptions of this damaging process, but those
perceptions themselves are not subject to the laws of physical nature that lend themselves to fire,
etc. The object of the perception instead has an immaterial status that cannot be influenced in the
same way that the tree can be influenced by fire.
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It is important, however, that we carefully distinguish the self as intended from the self
as object of sensation. Sokolowski points out that the object as intended is not necessarily
equivalent with the object as perceived.57 While at first it might seem as if there is no difference
between the two, in fact there is a significant point of contrast, and it is already evident in one of
the examples that Husserl himself provides: the same object, Emperor of Germany, can be
intended through various references, from “grandson of Queen Victoria” to “son of the Emperor
Frederick III” to any of the other “properties neither named nor described.”58 Here the noema is
the object phenomenologically considered, in other words, the emperor. It is the emperor to
whom I refer with my proposition “grandson of Queen Victoria.” To relate this back to the self at
the center of the conversion experience, the intentionality of my mental act is just the reference
or aboutness of the act, in other words, my self, whereas the self as noema can be details from
my own past, or specifics regarding my beliefs, character, and personality, with the acts
themselves taking on the status of noesis.
In his Cartesian Meditations Husserl indicates that the noema is a “transcendental clue”
to the range of experiences.59He echoes his earlier remarks as he points out the correlation a
priori between noema and noesis, which is close to his earlier conception of intentionality as the
correlation a priori between subject and object. It is in grasping, via the reduction, this a priori
relationship between the noema and noesis that makes possible, via intuition, knowledge of the
eidos or essence of the appearance.
We can take the schema of noesis and noema and use the previous phenomenological
example to elaborate. With the shark tooth that we analyzed, the sharktooth as meant object is
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our noema, whereas the perception of the tooth is the noesis of the perception. Thus the noesis is
situated with respect to its correlative noema (meaning there can be no noesis without
corresponding noema). Since the noesis is the intending act, it is the noesis that contributes to
sense-bestowal; in other words, the noesis constitutes the meaning of that which is apprehended
in intentionality. Without this noesis nothing would have meaning since devoid of consciousness
there would be no meaning of which to speak. As Sokolowski points out, we can thank Descartes
for the ready confidence that we place in our noeses, the underlying implication of which is the
ready distrust that we place in the corresponding noemas, whereby we doubt that we directly
engage or know the world, insisting that “an intermediary, a representation” be interpolated
between ourselves and the “things outside.”60
Now we can “zoom out” from the analysis of the phenomenon at the noesis/noema level
and consider the presentation of the object (the self) in light of the phenomenological concept of
constitution as it pertains to the transcendental method. In other words, how is the self
constituted? There are two distinct approaches via which transcendental phenomenology takes up
constitution, referred to by Husserl as the static and the genetic.
Static phenomenology is the term used to refer to the phenomenological study of objects
as experienced, with no special regard taken to the temporal constitution of meaning, although
this is not to exclude experiences that occur in time, like watching a football match. This method
of transcendental phenomenology is the first type that Husserl developed out of the two
approaches, exemplified in texts like the Logical Investigations and Ideas Pertaining to a Pure
Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy.61 In these texts Husserl’s goal is the
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phenomenological apprehension of constitution, achieved via the adoption of the correct
philosophical disposition (the phenomenological attitude) and through the implementation of
certain phenomenological tools (the epoché, eidetic variation, etc.) These tools, employed in the
phenomenological attitude after or concomitant with the reduction, enable the transcendental
phenomenologist to “pin down” essential insights regarding the constitution of objects as they
are constituted in a single “snapshot” of experience.
A brief discussion of the mechanics of constitution is warranted. The constitution of the
appearance is facilitated in part by the subject, that is, by and through consciousness, and it is
only through this involvement on the part of the subject that objects can be encountered as
phenomena. The specific way in which an object appears to consciousness, for example, the way
in which one regards a tree from a specific perspective and therefore from a certain optical angle,
is intelligibly determined by the subject herself, since, after all, aspects of the subject, like where
she is standing, influence the very appearance of the tree qua object. In this particular example, if
you notice, the simple physical positioning of the perceiving subject takes a role in the overall
appearance of the tree, which cannot in one instance be seen from every possible point of view.
Husserl calls this property of the phenomenal object its “adumbration” (Abschattung).62 Here the
subject is not constituting the tree by doing something akin to actively creating or constructing
the tree as object.63 Rather, the vantage of the subject is playing a small part in the composition
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of the appearance, since the object could not appear before consciousness without some specific
orientation of view.
But what is here true regarding the way in which an optic orientation can determine the
appearance of a phenomenal object before consciousness is applicable to numerous different
aspects of subjective constitution. The constitution of a phenomenon is not the result of some
sort of “construction” ex nihilo on the part of consciousness, but rather, it is the givenness of
meaning. No matter what is given in experience, consciousness itself plays a part in the
structuration of that which is given. This disclosure not only requires a subject for whom the
meaning is constituted but requires the object to permit its own significant appearance, hence any
interpretation of constitution as enacted solely on the part of the subject is misguided. For
example, the appearance of the aforementioned tree is such that the tree “brings to the table”
certain material aspects to its profile (qua adumbrations) that allow for the phenomenological
subject to view the tree, in contrast to the immaterial aspects of a geometric shape, namely its
purely formal properties, which permit one to mathematically intuit the figure.
Yet it is imperative to note that the objects that appear before consciousness are not
simply constituted in one fell swoop, but instead are often the product of stratified levels of
constitution. The “achievement” of constitution, as Husserl likes to call it, is a complex process
that often times is passive instead of active. Husserl stipulates that the experience of the world is
the product of intersubjective constitution, comprised of layers, that is responsible for
establishing meaning (Sinn) before the subject even enters the scene. Consider, for example, the
way in which my experience of the world is of an “object” that has been historically constituted,
molded on a diachronic level. In the present this same world is synchronically maintained insofar
as I can have a sensible conversation about current events with another mind, not to mention
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observe the same event together in real-time. Later in his career, when he turns to wider
considerations regarding phenomenology, Husserl begins to focus on how various dimensions of
phenomenal constitution are composed via “sources” which are “exterior” to the individual.
Indeed if static phenomenology is the analysis of the final constituted object, then genetic
phenomenology is the analysis of constitution in an active and dynamic sense, typically over the
course of time and in such a manner that transcends individual solipsistic consciousness. In the
CM and the Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, Husserl uses the term “genetic
phenomenology” to refer to the transcendental ego’s constituted experience of the world and
intersubjectivity.64 Whereas static phenomenology studies the constitution of intentional objects,
genetic phenomenology treats objects as we encounter them in the natural attitude, as wholes, but
wholes which are in flux and subject to time. Genetic phenomenology defines the approach of
the later Husserl and takes to task historical and time-oriented dimensions of phenomenology,
like the experience of intersubjectivity and the “lifeworld.” These domains of experience are
never exclusive products of the individual subject but instead are cooperatively constituted in the
stream of time.
No phenomenology of conversion can be complete without incorporating the approach of
the genetic method, since change and transformation on a personal level is subject to the passage
of time and the individual’s active involvement in a lifeworld. In other words there is no
possibility for conversion without, first, temporality, but second, the phenomenon of the world.
But in fact the experience of temporality is intersubjective, emphatically so. As Lanei
Rodemeyer puts it:
Intersubjective temporality maintains my own self-experience alongside my experiences of
intersubjective horizons, and it projects beyond my “presencing” of consciousness toward other
consciousnesses in my experience. It enables my fluid constitution of other subjects, and my
64
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experience of the world as shared, co-constituted, and mutually experienced in one temporality
called world-time. It does not cause my own ego to self-destruct, nor does it disable my ability to
reflect or carry out the phenomenological reduction. Instead, intersubjective temporality explains
phenomenologically most of my experiences of the world and any experiences of other subjects.65

Indeed the experience of conversion is one such experience that would not be possible without
the experience of intersubjective temporality. Rodemeyer’s argument, following Husserl, is that
consciousness, on a primitive level, is what constitutes time, personal identity (the self), and all
other experiences, but that consciousness cannot perform such accomplishments without the
Other. It is the intersubjective aspect of my experience that grounds many meanings, the result of
my identified association with the Other and the world, which occurs on the level of passive
synthesis. In a study of conversion this distinction should not be glossed over. Without the coconstituted world, the individual cannot convert in any meaningful sense.
I will conclude with the phenomenological concept of the horizon (Horizont), which
could have just as easily begun the present exploration of the transcendental method. Indeed the
horizon is referenced in the very first section of Ideas I where Husserl uses the word to refer to
the idea of a general limit encompassing the possible.66 There the term is employed with
reference to all possible areas of inquiry within the natural (theoretical) attitude but more
generally Husserl uses the term to refer to the limits of experience.
But the phenomenological horizon is also akin to the background of the specific object,
where the background refers not only to the “surround world” (Umwelt) within which the object
is encountered, but also the myriad other ways in which the object could be encountered. Put
differently, we could state that any given experience implies other possible ways of experiencing
the same thing. Consider perception proper, like simple vision. As we saw in our example of
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static constitution (seeing a tree), whenever you see something in your field of vision, you see it
in such a way that other ways of seeing it would be possible, whether from another angle or
perspective, or in different lighting, or at a different time of day. You might recognize that your
own neighborhood is like this, where it will appear to you in drastically different fashions on the
basis of only a minor change in weather or light or even mood.
This open-endedness is a necessary possibility for the very appearance of the object in
general. In APS Husserl describes how the horizon is integral to consciousness:
[E]verything that genuinely appears is an appearing thing only by virtue of being intertwined and
permeated with an intentional empty horizon, that is, by virtue of being surrounded by a halo of
emptiness with respect to appearance. It is an emptiness that is not a nothingness, but an emptiness
to be filled out, it is a determinable indeterminacy.67

This emptiness is akin to a lack or privation; it is to be completed. But the point here is that its
manner of completion is infinitely variable. It follows that there is no object,
phenomenologically speaking, which could be experienced in just one way. Thus this openendedness is essential to the appearing object and with every experience of consciousness comes
other possible mods of givenness.
Just as experiences are not only perceptual, so too do horizons surpass that single
category; a horizon can be historical, linguistic, cultural, individual, shared, etc. Late in his
career these types of horizons would occupy much of Husserl’s attention, exemplified in texts
like the Crisis.68 These are the phenomenological horizons that are most relevant for my
purposes here, as no conversion can occur without some fundamental reference to the context of
the world. In contrast to what is present or immediately given, this horizon determines the scope
of possibility. This referential milieu is what makes every conversion possible specifically to the
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extent that it was also possible not to convert, not to transform, not to change. But even the
conversion that is pursued and experienced is one which occurs on the basis of an infinite
number of other ways the conversion could have occurred. Similarly the “empty” possibilities of
a conversion, which regard that which is not perceived, play a role in the experience of what is
perceived. If we consider the case of St. Paul, for example, we find that these empty possibilities
take on an especially significant role, since it is Paul’s temporary lack of vision and audition of a
disembodied voice that take on central importance in his conversion story. Paul has to synthesize
his experience in order for him to make the judgment that he is experiencing a Christ
phenomenon. But even in more mundane cases of conversion, such as the decision to move from
atheism to Catholicism or vice versa, the emptiness of experiential horizons are what ground the
actual experience as lived; the experience of converting recedes into the hazy and undefined
horizon of the past, not to mention the future.

Merleau-Ponty and the Transcendental Method

It is important to supplement Husserl’s conception of transcendental phenomenology with the
ideas of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. That said, commentators disagree regarding the extent to which
Merleau-Ponty can be properly said to have a “transcendental” phenomenological method. He
was instrumental in bringing Husserl’s work to the French language and he is often grouped in
with the “classical” school of phenomenologists. While he does significantly diverge from
Husserl’s framework and method, as we shall see, his “existential” revision of phenomenology
retains aspects of Husserl’s model while at other times his thinking is closer to Heidegger. Thus
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there is some debate over how to classify his work, although here I will endorse the
transcendental reading of his phenomenology.
Merleau-Ponty’s treatment of the transcendental is the subject of debate because, to begin
with, he understood phenomenology to be “transcendental” in a different manner than did
Husserl. While each phenomenologist is inquiring about the subjective transcendental
preconditions of phenomena, for Merleau-Ponty the culmination of the phenomenological
reduction is not a transcendental ego, but the manifestation of consciousness as deeply and
complexly entangled with the world of the “natural attitude” (wherein Merleau-Ponty locates
naturalistic thinking, which for him, contra Husserl, has its virtues). The conclusions of
phenomenology are therefore qualified in Merleau-Ponty when compared to Husserl, as the
former would argue that his own philosophy does not resolve into the underlying contradictions
that define Husserl’s transcendental approach.
There are myriad methodological differences between the two philosophers but here we
will focus on three primary points. First of all, and in continuation of the point regarding
transcendental thinking, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological reduction is not identical with the
version that is employed in Husserl. Second, he emphasizes the embodied, “lived” dimension of
phenomenology—one of the most basic and fundamental dimensions of our experience—to a
degree not present in Husserl. Third, Merleau-Ponty incorporates the findings of empirical
science into his phenomenology, which Husserl, as a matter of principle, does not do.
To begin, Merleau-Ponty is generally opposed to the idea of “reductive” science and
ultimately, he does not use the phenomenological reduction like Husserl, whose version he
critiques in his Phenomenology of Perception. Merleau-Ponty uses his own reduction to try “to
rediscover, along with structure and the understanding of structure, a dimension of being and a
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type of knowledge which man forgets in his natural attitude.”69 This is not exactly the research
agenda of Husserl, for whom the reduction constitutes a path to the domain of pure
transcendental experience. Merleau-Ponty is intrigued by that which is prior even to this
transcendental subjectivity, which he contrasts with what he calls “the idealist return to
consciousness,” itself producing a transcendental subject that is the result of analysis rather than
true experience70 As he puts it in the Phenomenology of Perception:
To return to the things themselves is to return to that world which precedes knowledge, of which
knowledge always speaks, and in relation to which every scientific schematization is an abstract
and derivative sign-language, as is geography in relation to the country-side in which we have learnt
beforehand what a forest, a prairie or a river is.71

Here he is of course repeating Husserl’s slogan, “to the things themselves.”72 But for the
Merleau-Ponty these in fact are not the same “things themselves” at all, although each writer is
using the same expression and a phenomenological method. The two writers understand the
object of phenomenology rather differently, both in a teleological sense (propositum), in terms of
its goals or ends, as well as the object to be studied (objectum).
It would be instructive to follow Merleau-Ponty’s line of thinking here. In the sustained
critique of the Husserlian model of phenomenology in the preface to Phenomenogy of
Perception, he stresses that:
The world is there before any possible analysis of mine, and it would be artificial to make it the
outcome of a series of syntheses which link, in the first place sensations, then aspects of the object
corresponding to different perspectives, when both are nothing but products of analysis, with no
sort of prior reality. Analytical reflection believes that it can trace back the course followed by a
prior constituting act and arrive, in the ‘inner man’—to use Saint Augustine’s expression—at a
constituting power which has always been identical with that inner self.73
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Indeed it could be fairly argued that for Husserl phenomenology, in both its genetic and static
iterations, is conducted upon the world posterior and not prior to analysis, despite Husserl’s best
attempts to refrain from supplementing what is purely given. Here the problem is not simply that
Husserl employs language as part of his descriptive method, since, as Merleau-Ponty recognizes,
working around language itself would be impossible. “The real,” Merleau-Ponty writes, “has to
be described, not constructed or formed. Which means that I cannot put perception into the same
category as the syntheses represented by judgments, acts or predications.”74 Husserl regards
perceptions, judgments, memories, and so on, as different types of intentional acts, but in his
analysis of perceptions he does not treat them so differently from the more complex case of
judgment, which involves volition and reason in a way that pure perception does not.
According to Merleau-Ponty’s view, our perceptions of the things themselves are not as
equivalent with the analysis of the things, as he suggests is the case in Husserl’s thinking. Instead
of describing the perception precisely as it is given, which is his goal, Husserl elects to analyze
the givenness of the perception, which is of course not the same thing. Merleau-Ponty points out
that the result is that, added to the perception itself (qua sensation), there is a link that is
established to “aspects of the object corresponding to different perspectives, when both are
nothing but products of analysis, with no sort of prior reality.”75 But the issue is that this link is
not itself part of givenness. Here Merleau-Ponty is referring to the free variation of an object,
whereby, as we saw, the phenomenologist uses her imagination to catalog other possible ways of
appearing for the object. This is truly one of the cruxes upholding Husserl’s entire method, but
Merleau-Ponty takes issue with it.
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Consider this example that we have already considered from Husserl, where he suggests,
“Perhaps we begin by fictionally changing the shape or the color of the object quite arbitrarily,
keeping identical only its perceptual appearing. […] We so to speak, shift the actual perception
into the realm of non-actualities, the realm of the as-if.”76 On Merleau-Ponty’s understanding it is
unclear why the phenomenologist would go through this procedure; what is revealed in so doing?
As we know, Husserl was trying to pin down the very essence of the appearance/appearing, but
the critique focuses on how the essence of the appearing is the result of “synthesis” rather than
the description of what is in fact given. He accuses Husserl of trying to find the essence of the
world by “looking for what it is as an idea once it has been reduced to a theme or discourse”
when what should be done is looking at it “as a fact for us, before any thematization.”77 This
simple reduction as utilized by Husserl effectively “kills” or flattens the world rather than
illuminating it.
As Merleau-Ponty puts it himself, “When I begin to reflect my reflection bears upon an
unreflective experience…”78 He is implying a distinction between describing and reflecting,
where the former is good and is the proper goal, since the latter distorts the phenomenon from
the form in which it is purely given. Hence the charge is that Husserl approaches the first
moment of reflection in such a way that the pure, unreflective experience is betrayed. Consider
for example the place of such concepts as the horizon, adumbration, etc., which are products of
analytic reflection rather than pure givens. According to Merleau-Ponty it is undeniable that an
object might appear before consciousness in such a way that implies other views thereof, as
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depicted via these Husserlian concepts, akin to other ways of experiencing whatever it is, but we
have to note that the “other” view is in fact synthetic and not itself given and hence it violates the
guiding principles of the Husserlian method. As Merleau-Ponty reminds us in “The Metaphysical
in Man,” phenomenological philosophy should describe experience as it is present prior to the
wide-ranging and deep-reaching (over)-conceptualization of the philosopher, for whom the
temptation to add to the given is too great, all the while he reminds himself that no assumptions
are to be made according to the principles of his method.79
Rather than take up perception in Husserl’s own sense and use what are understood to be
overly discursive methods, Merleau-Ponty relocates perception within a different
phenomenological milieu. He takes perception from the narrow technical sense in which it is
used in Husserl’s work and expands its limits in every direction. He writes that “perception is not
a science of the world, it is not even an act, a deliberate taking up of a position; it is the
background from which all acts stand out and is in fact presupposed by them.”80 In other words
perception is like a context within which experience can be possible. While this at first sounds
less technical than the presentation of perception in Husserl’s writing, and perhaps closer to what
Heidegger formulates in Being and Time, in fact Merleau-Ponty will proceed from these
preliminary considerations toward a thoroughly empirical and scientific approach to perception,
phenomenologically considered. Thus while it may be true that, as he says, “perception is not a
science of the world,” scientific claims concerning perception, especially at the physiological
level, are vital to his program. But as Jack Reynolds notes, the meaning of “perception” in The
Phenomenology of Perception and The Primacy of Perception is actually fairly nuanced and even
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technical, since here perception is not simple vision or even intellection, but instead is an
intertwined complex of body and world.81 It is by dint of this definition of perception that
Merleau-Ponty can redefine intentionality from the Husserlian formulation of “consciousness is
consciousness of something” into “all consciousness is perceptual.”82 Rather than being limited
to a conception of perception in a narrow sense, including the likes of the faculty of vision,
physical sensation, and mental intuition, Merleau-Ponty expands perception to encompass all
fields of experience.
Indeed this is because for Merleau-Ponty our experience of the world is mediated
primarily through our embodiment, which serves as the very source of our perception. MerleauPonty suggests that it is through our physical embodiment, our “flesh,” that we are inserted into a
world whose “closely woven fabric” predates us.83 This world of which we are just a part, he
notes, does not await our rationalization before it presents us with phenomena; the “truth”
inhabits the world and not the isolated cogito, the “purity” of which he will deny.
In question of the cogito, the transcendental subject itself, Merleau-Ponty asserts that,
“[t]here is no inner man, man is in the world, and only in the world does he know himself” (xii).
This brings us back to the question of the transcendental reduction in his own phenomenology. It
is readily apparent that he critiques the transcendental basis of Husserl’s phenomenology, and we
have already shown how he questions the validity of eidetic variation. Furthermore he seems to
question the idea of any phenomenological reduction whatsoever when he makes statements like
“[t]he most important lesson which the reduction teaches us is the impossibility of a complete
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reduction” (xv). He goes on to point that because we are not “absolute mind,” the reduction
cannot work; we are “in the world,” caught up in “temporal flux” in such a way that inquiring
into the flux is impossible if the goal is to find a “thought which embraces all our thought” (xv).
He concludes with a succinct qualification: that the reduction is not a method of idealism but
instead of existentialism.
This does not mean that he does not employ the reduction in his own phenomenology.
Rather it could be said that he preserves the reduction within specific limits. Indeed the version
of the reduction which he uses in his own philosophy is one which re-situates phenomenology in
what could be called an existential context. In his famous discussion of the pathology of the
medical patient Schneider he actually refers to his descriptions as “existential analysis” (157).
The term “existential” is fitting to characterize his work since his phenomenology takes to task
experience as bound up with the world itself, rather than the crown achievement of pure
transcendental subjectivity, closer to genetic phenomenology than the early-period “static”
method that defines the approach in texts like Ideas.
Despite this fact Merleau-Ponty is presented here along with Husserl because, while his
work treats “existence” more fully than Husserl’s, there remains a transcendental side to his
thinking, albeit one that is different. Sebastian Gardner has argued that Merleau-Ponty’s
philosophy should be seen as a “contribution to a transcendental theory with metaphysical
implications.”84 In short this argument claims that the method discovers transcendental (“a priori
and necessary”) conditions, namely the “pre-objectivity of perception” that makes possible
experience’s “objectual character.”85 Thus while the transcendental upshot of his reduction is not
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a pure constituting ego, instead he argues that our “pre-objective perspective” itself takes on this
role.86
Ultimately Merleau-Ponty suggests that for all of his measures to avoid the isolated
cogito of Descartes’ philosophy, Husserl himself winds up dividing subject and world, thereby
parking transcendental subjectivity in that same problematic view from nowhere which he
critiques in the Cartesian philosophy. So too does he fail to avoid the subject-object dichotomy,
evinced by his own phenomenology’s replication of the Cartesian split between mind and body.
It is contrary to this contradictory schema that Merleau-Ponty first analyzes the body, in The
Structure of Behavior, and ultimately declares in his own phenomenology “I am my body.”87
Citing Gabriel Marcel’s inverted analysis of being versus having, Merleau-Ponty arrives upon
this locution after revising the normal expression “I have a body.” Marcel famously maintains
that the difference between “being” and “having” can be demonstrated via the exceptional
example of the body as something that I both have as well as something that I am.88 Instead of
extracting a pure subject from the body, a subject that is in possession of the body qua object,
Merleau-Ponty collapses the two sides into one dimension. In his philosophy, simply put, our
experience makes it abundantly clear that our minds do not “rule” our bodies. Furthermore it is
not, contra the rationalist tradition (or intellectualist, as he puts it), via the mind that we come to
more fully know the body.
Analyzing the body specifically as we know it through living, rather than as a removed
object “out there” in an external world, in his Phenomenology he writes that “[o]ne’s own body
is in the world just as the heart is in the organism: it continuously breathes life into the visible
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spectacle, animates it and nourishes it from within, and forms a system with it.”89 In The
Structure of Behavior this is the distinction between the so-called objective body as known by
science, and the phenomenal body as known through experience.90 Hence he manages to avoid
the subject-object dichotomy by way of this notion of the lived body which subverts the very
opposition of mind versus body, subject versus object, and inside versus outside.
Lastly Merleau-Ponty differs from Husserl in his implementation of the findings of
empirical science. His orientation toward science is both critical and conflicted, exemplified in
his critique of naive ontological assumptions that are carried out on the part of science,
especially, as Landes notes, during the “classical” period, in contrast to his general trust of more
modern forms.91 Merleau-Ponty is particularly intrigued, for example, by the findings of
neuropsychology.
The most famous example of scientific work included in Merleau-Ponty’s writing would
be the case of Schneider that is sourced in the work of Gelb and Goldstein. Schneider was a
German soldier who received a significant traumatic brain injury. What interests Merleau-Ponty
about Schneider is how he serves as an atypical case of lived experience via his injury; his
difficulty with respect to sensorimotor control demonstrates how the control of the body is
mediated via consciousness, thus clarifying “motor intentionality.” Merleau-Ponty’s conclusion,
in short, is that when I want to move my arm, I move it without first necessarily thinking about
doing so, although I am able to “virtually” imagine such a movement; his empirical examination
of Schneider’s consciousness indicates that his inability to take up a virtual orientation with

Ibid., 209 (Landes).
Merleau-Ponty, Structure of Behavior, 157.
91
Landes, Merleau-Ponty Dictionary, 202.
89
90

143

respect to his own embodiment correlates with his inability to perform certain movements in the
“typical” fashion.
But it has to be noted in closing that for Merleau-Ponty modern science is not in itself a
sufficient source of truth. Irrespective of the historical periods in which various forms of science
have developed, he questions “the dogmatism of a science that thinks itself capable of absolute
and complete knowledge.92 Like Husserl, he suggests that the scientific outlook on nature is still
just a mode of consciousness, situating the discipline of phenomenology in a more primordial
“space” than the scientific perspective that can only arrive later on.
Eventually I will argue, following Merleau-Ponty, that the body plays an indispensable
role in the experience of conversion, and is no less crucial and necessary for conversion than the
experience of temporality and the lifeworld.
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Ch. 3. The Phenomenon of Conversion in the Natural Attitude

The Synthetic Definition Considered in the Natural Attitude

In the first chapter I reviewed a diverse set of definitions for conversion and offered a new,
general definition of conversion of my own. The general definition I compiled is the synthetic
result of different perspectives on conversion in the human sciences, with disciplines ranging
from psychology, to theology, to sociology.1 While these fields all belong to the human sciences
and therefore belong also to the natural attitude, we have not yet considered my holistic
definition of conversion in the natural attitude, which is only necessary insofar as all relevant
assumptions and presuppositions need to be identified on a preliminary basis so that they can be
excluded in the phenomenological attitude. Thus in this chapter I will consider in the natural
attitude the ordinary assumptions of my synthetic account of conversion, in preparation for the
phenomenological reduction of the phenomenon.

Consciousness in the Natural Attitude

In order to determine the eidetic form of conversion, it will first be necessary to prepare a sketch
of conversion as I encounter it in the “natural attitude.”2 This is required so that we can be sure to
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exclude all of the particular and empirical features of conversion experience in the natural
attitude in the interest of securing valid phenomenological conclusions regarding the invariant
essence of conversion.
I will begin in the natural attitude not with conversion but with consciousness, because
the phenomenon of conversion is a modality of consciousness, the empirical nature of which will
dictate the specific shape taken by my synthetic conversion model. Insofar as conversion is
something that happens for consciousness, an empirical explanation of conversion should include
a natural, empirical explanation of consciousness. What is the empirical ego that lives conversion
as a concrete experience?
In order to answer this, first let us characterize the natural attitude itself.3 In the first
volume of Ideas Husserl characterizes the natural attitude as the mindset within which the world
is “simply there” for me, whether I pay attention to it or not. In the natural attitude my
experience of consciousness is as follows:
I am conscious of a world endlessly spread out in space, endlessly becoming and having endlessly
become in time. I am conscious of it: that signifies, above, that intuitively I find it immediately, that
I experience it. By my seeing, touching, hearing, and so forth, and in the different modes of
sensuous perception, corporeal physical things with some spatial distribution or other are simply
there for me, “on hand” in the literal or the figurative sense, whether or not I am particularly heedful
of them and busied with them in my considering, thinking, feeling, or willing.4

This is the world that I intuitively encounter as I go about my daily life, “living naturally,” as
Husserl puts it, but also “naively.”5 In this more or less default attitude I take for granted the
objective existence of the world and everything in it. Husserl calls this a naive approach to
reality specifically because it is pre-phenomenological; I do not realize that upon closer
(phenomenological) inspection, the world is not in fact as simple as it appears to be. I essentially
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just go along with things without questioning what I am experiencing. If I do question things, I
do so in such a way that befits the orientation of the natural attitude. In other words if I do
question anything, I only question it on a superficial or topic level; I do not question the
existence of any of the objects of my experience, even those I “question” (e.g. is the distant
shape on the horizon a ship or a landmass?)
Later on Husserl distinguishes this type of thinking as belonging to the “theoretical
attitude.”6 In the theoretical attitude my experience is “performed or carried out in the function of
knowledge.”7 In this attitude I might question why someone does something, or ask someone to
explain something to me because I am not convinced (e.g. some cutting-edge scientific theory),
but these concerns are critical only on a topical level that does not call into question the
underlying basis of my own consciousness. Husserl takes the scientific orientation of this attitude
as his model for the orientation of the phenomenological attitude, but the natural scientific
attitude (within the theoretical attitude) ultimately attempts to eliminate or at least downplay the
effects of empirical results deriving from consciousness, namely from the perspective of the
perceiver or observer, which is of course impossible, whereas in the phenomenological attitude it
is precisely consciousness that is taken up as scientific object.
In fact in the natural attitude and even the natural-scientific attitude (a specific mode of
the theoretical attitude) my naive assumptions about the “external” world are accompanied by
similar assumptions that regard my own consciousness. When I regard my consciousness in the
natural attitude in particular, Husserl says I encounter the cogito, which is my default state of
consciousness in this attitude whether I reflect upon it or not. Husserl writes in Ideas that:8
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Living along naturally, I live continually in this fundamental form of “active” [aktuellen] living
whether, while so living, I state the cogito, whether I am directed “reflectively” to the Ego and the
cogitare. If I am directed to them, a new cogito is alive, one that, for its part, is not reflected on and
thus is not objective for me.9

The cogito, or “I think” is whatever my natural consciousness is presently occupied with as I go
about living. This ordinary, natural consciousness is capable of reflection, as Husserl points out,
but it is not phenomenological reflection (which involves the eidetic, transcendental tools of the
phenomenological method). Most of the time this natural consciousness just occupies itself with
experiencing the world through various different sorts of experience, from “outer” senses to
“inner” thoughts. As these various experiences are given to me, I accept them at face value.
When I do reflect on my “self” in the natural attitude, typically I reflect on my self as an
object.10 As I continue my sketch of consciousness in the natural attitude, I take note of the fact
that there are many ways in which I encounter this “objective” or “objectified” self in reflection.
For example I can reflect upon my material appearance in a mirror, or I can reflect on my own
personality or the “way I am like” in the present moment, or I can reflect on the idea of who I
“was” in the past. Notice that all of these considerations are concerned with things that I assume
to exist. In all of these cases my intentionality is focused upon my self as if it is an object, whether
I regard my self in an embodied material sense or in a more abstract, propositional sense,
exemplified in something like the thought that “I am a good friend.” In all of these examples I am
experiencing myself as I am some sort of separate “thing.”
I also observe even in the natural attitude that I understand my experience to be distinct
from the world—but not in a phenomenological sense. In fact in the natural attitude my essential
error is precisely the fact that I regard my consciousness as too distinct and divorced from the
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“external” world of objects. Indeed in the natural attitude I take the world to be a totally separate
“thing” from my own consciousness, something that my consciousness encounters in a truly
objective, mind-independent sense.
In short, the world is just “there” for me as I go about living my daily life. In this attitude
I take it that the world is there whether I am or not, or s Husserl puts it, I take the “factual”
existence of the world for granted.11 This is what he refers to as the “general positing” of the
world. I ordinarily posit the matter-of-fact existence of the world as I go about living in the
natural mindset. The fact that Husserl terms this a “positing” cannot be glossed over; my general,
uncritical sense that the world “exists” is nothing more than an ordinary assumption. Without this
assumption it would be difficult to participate in human life. I do not doubt the real existence of
the things that I encounter in the world, and I do not view my own mental life with a critical
orientation. It is hard to imagine how I might ever experience a conversion if not for the
assumption that the world exists!
Just as my natural consciousness conceives of the “external” world at its face value,
which is to say, as a mind-independent thing, the same consciousness does not critically regard
its own analytic structure. Without a doubt I can think about thinking, but this does not
necessarily involve the phenomenological method; after all, nearly every philosopher from the
course of history will examine thought in some way, shape, or form, but until the work of Kant,
Husserl, and a few others, critically assessing consciousness as “phenomenon” was an unknown
path. This does not mean that all of these philosophers looked at consciousness with the
transcendental framework of Husserl, Kant, and others. Indeed in the natural attitude my
experience of consciousness is such that it I am capable of reflecting upon my own experience
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but without transcending my own perspective and determining the essence and limits of that
conscious perspective. The deeper regard that I can take up in the natural attitude is certainly not
equivalent with the phenomenological perspective. As Husserl puts it in Ideas, this deeper regard
qua “self-observation” is not the same as phenomenological reflection. The former belongs to
psychology and inquires into the “range and the essentially necessary cognitive value of
existential findings which give expression to the givenness of our (human) experiences of the
internal—we therefore ask about psychological method.”12 In other words the psychologist
concerns himself with the assessment and evaluation of actual mental phenomena. Thus this
particular sort of analytic approach will always confine itself to the concrete. Phenomenology, by
contrast, inquires into the “essentially necessary possibility and range of essential findings
which, on the ground of pure reflection, should concern mental processes as mental processes
with respect to their own being free from natural apperception.”13 Husserl is pointing out that the
difference between the psychological method and the phenomenological method is that the latter
transcends the concrete and existential and focuses to the contrary on that which is essential,
necessary, and possible.
Therefore we can see how it is that when I consider my “self” as an abstraction of deeper
regard in the natural or theoretical attitudes, this abstracted self is not my “self” as conscious
phenomenon per se, nor my self as the stream of my mental life eo ipso; these considerations
belong to the phenomenological attitude. Instead the “deeper” self in these attitudes is the self
that I am always “living,” not only in terms of “sensuous perception” but also the field of
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intuition.14 This is the experience of self that is simply “given” to me, “prior to any ‘theory.’”15
This self, like the larger world, belongs to the general positing associated with the natural attitude
and encompasses not only the so-called external world but also the very stream of my own
consciousness; I do not critically approach either phenomenon. Certainly the failure to regard
consciousness as origin of knowledge is epistemologically problematic, and the end result of
such a failure is a system of scientific knowing that rests on a fundamentally insecure foundation.
As I go about my everyday life, though, this is not a problem, nor is this a problem for the
experience of conversion.

Conversion in the Natural Attitude

In the natural attitude I understand that conversion is always something that happens for the self,
whether on the basis of a change in my identity or a shift in my role.16 In this attitude I take for
granted various aspects of my selfhood the likes of which include my individual and family
history, my personality, my mannerisms, my temperament, my drives, my hopes and desires, my
sense of personal purpose, my way of speaking, my way of acting, my idea of my self, my
philosophical beliefs, my spiritual beliefs, my political beliefs, my body, and my general
understanding of my appearance to myself and to the Other. I can experience a meaningful
conversion in any number of these “categories” of selfhood, but in the natural attitude I

Husserl, Ideas I §27, 51 <48>.
Ibid., §30, 56 <52>.
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To experience a change in identity is not to annul every previous aspect of identity. Here I am
using the concept of “identity” to refer to an existentially significant idea of one’s self. An idea is
existentially significant if it contributes to the subject’s sense of who they “are.” It is clear that an
idea like this can only belong to the natural attitude.
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presuppose that all of these ideas and beliefs correspond to concrete actualities in the “real” and
“external” world.
This is because my natural, empirical experience of conversion is probably predicated on
at least a few metaphysical and ontological assumptions. First, I assume that I exist. Whether I
am someone who is pursuing a conversion with intent, or someone who is subject to an event
that brings about a conversion, I make the assumption that I exist, since if I did not, then there
would be no one to convert. Second, I assume that the world exists. This is the world within
which I convert. Whether my conversion is something that occurs on the basis of a choice or a
spontaneous event, the resulting change in my identity or role can only make sense if there is a
world as a “backdrop” against which my sense of identity or role is given sense. As we have
seen, I do not have to be consciously aware of the fact that I have converted, but in order for a
conversion to have occurred (whether I know it or not), I have to be living naturally in the world.
If my conversion is one involving organized religion, then the experience likely involves
explicit beliefs about the underlying “nature” of the world. These beliefs obviously presuppose
the existence of the world. Often these beliefs entail metaphysical or ontological positions about
the way things really are. But the same is true for many other types of conversions. A
philosophical or political conversion (which is a change in identity or role on the basis of a shift
in philosophical or political beliefs, meaning that it is not a conversion every time I change my
mind about some little issue here or there, but that it is a conversion if I “become” a Marxist or a
Platonist or even a nihilist) would by definition include essential beliefs about the world, beliefs
which would require (i.e. presuppose) that the world exists in the first place. What we mean
when we say the world “exists” might take on different manifestations, epitomized by the very
different perspectives of a Thomist and a Kantian.
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What about more general “moral” conversions, such as the archetypal “change of heart”
from a life of wickedness to a life of righteousness and justice? A conversion such as this may
lack a formal belief system (whether religious, spiritual, philosophical, or political) but it still
hinges upon a specific ontological orientation: the world exists, and so do I.
Thus, it is apparent that the experience of conversion is something that I regard with no
real phenomenological scrutiny in the natural attitude, since such scrutiny would compel me to
reconsider my naive assumptions about the world and the ‘I.’ That said, this does not mean that I
cannot have beliefs about the value of conversion; the point is that these potential beliefs do not
critically concern the conversion phenomenon at the level of consciousness. If I have any beliefs
about the value of conversion, they most likely regard metaphysical claims that a personal
conversion may (or may not) entail. For example, I may be of the mind that converting to
Christianity is a “waste of time,” because the religion requires one to hold beliefs that I myself
cannot personally hold (i.e., ‘God exists and has certain knowable properties.’) A similar
situation could hold for political and philosophical ideologies that offer essential explanations for
matters in the natural world.
It seems that the experience of conversion must occur in the natural attitude, because it
entails a change in an individual’s identity or role, which are concepts that belong to the natural
(or scientific) attitude and not the phenomenological attitude. How can I have an idea of my own
identity without naively presupposing that “I” exist? How can I defend any account of role
without the concept of the world? If I take up the imaginative perspective of St. Paul as he drops
to the ground, it seems that the moment I bracket the “universal thesis” that holds that the world
and the things in it exist, myself included, I disrupt the continuation of the conversion
experience. In short, I can discern that because conversion is experienced in the natural attitude, I
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cannot concomitantly experience a conversion as I employ the phenomenological method.
Critically I note that phenomenology forces me to bracket off aspects of the world that
conversion seems to require.
For example, my decision to convert from Judaism to Catholicism entails numerous
existential and ontological presuppositions, not only about the way the world “is,” but also that
the world “is.” Would it even be possible for me to experience the conversion phenomenon
without holding at least some naive metaphysical assumptions about the existence of a so-called
“objective” world? Perhaps the one sort of conversion that would seem to operate sans such
assumptions would be a “conversion” to strict solipsism, and it must be admitted that calling
such a change in belief a “conversion” would be strange indeed. But even a strange “conversion”
like that does not require the phenomenological method—the solipsist, after all, is still making
assumptions about the nature of his own perspective. In the phenomenological method he would
be afforded no such move.
When we consider conversions as events in the third person, we sometimes think of them
as disruptive or disorienting; in such cases the conversion “shatters” the subject’s very Being and
replaces it with something “new.” Without a doubt this can feel like a crisis. But on the
phenomenological level a conversion does not have to be so dramatic, and in fact it seems likely
that most conversions are of a milder variety. What is surprising is that the change, irrespective
of its intensity, can occur without the subject’s awareness that a life-altering change occurred. In
the case of the gradual, continuous conversion, I may not realize that my self has changed until
late in my experience of the process; indeed I am not always aware of this change until later in
time. This can also occur when an abrupt event has an impact on me, but not in such a way that I
realize the significance of the effect. It may be the case that I only realize retrospectively that the

154

change occurred. If I am raised to be religious or spiritual from a very young age, then I may
never notice my own conversion without being prompted to reflect on the specific subject.
While it is my self that changes and is changed, I do not always directly “choose” this
change. Indeed I can experience conversion without actively seeking out such a phenomenon
This means that sometimes, causes external to my self are what bring about changes internal to
my self. I can choose to convert in the world, or the world can affect me in such a way that I am
converted by the world. When my conversion is enacted through the occurrence of an event,
sometimes I seek out this event deliberately, while at other times, the event is extemporaneous,
and it spontaneously enters the trajectory of my existence.
When my self shifts or changes, sometimes it is because I am grasping a new personal
identity. I am redefining for myself that person whom I consider myself to be. Other times I can
experience this shift without a change in my underlying identity. In these cases what shifts is my
sense of role. While I can experience a conversion in my understanding of my role without a
corresponding conversion of identity, typically when I do convert in identity, a change in role
follows. In other words a shift in identity entails a shift in role, but the converse is not true; a role
change does not necessarily include a change in identity, as the concept was formulated
specifically in order to identify instances of self-understanding which are procedural and
occupational but not reflective of any identity change.
In sum in the natural attitude the experience of conversion is a non-critical phenomenon
that I (can) encounter as I go about the “active living” of my life. Identity and role are concepts
that belong to the empirical world; therefore conversion is something that occurs for the
empirical ego (although, once again, this does not mean that the subject is aware of the change to
the empirical ego). While I do not (and cannot) consider the conversion at its most essential
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phenomenological level when (or as) I experience a conversion firsthand, because conversion
requires either identity or role (each of which require empirical self and world), it is in
considering the phenomenon of conversion at the phenomenological level that its essential and
necessary possibilities actually come to light.

Three Modalities of Conscious Experience in the Natural Attitude

We can see that there are three different classes or modalities of experience in the consciousness
of the natural attitude as conceived by Husserl. If we consider this natural consciousness
phenomenologically, we can discern significant differences among these three modalities, despite
the fact that Husserl presents the natural attitude as somewhat homogeneous in constitution, at
least in the first two books of Ideas, insofar as the variegated experiences that belong to the
natural attitude can all be grouped under that single heading. While he has reasons for this, he
actually does identify several important key distinctions regarding natural consciousness. Here I
want to phenomenologically thematize these distinctions because they hold significant
implications with respect to the consciousness of conversion.
Husserl’s clearest account of these differences in the natural attitude is articulated in the
first book of Ideas:
I can let my attention wander away from the writing table which was just now seen and noticed,
out through the unseen parts of the room which are behind my back, to the verandah, into the
garden, to the children in the arbor, etc., to all the Objects I directly “know of” as being there and
here in the surroundings of which there is also consciousness—a “knowing of them” which involves
no conceptual thinking, and which changes into a clear intuiting only with the advertence of
attention, and even then only partially and for the most part very imperfectly.17
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Notice how Husserl describes three distinct conscious modalities here. The most basic and
essential modality is my “baseline” consciousness, which is flowing so long as I am awake (and,
it seems, as I dream.) According to Husserl this is a sort of consciousness that does not involve
thinking with concepts (but can involve other sorts of “thinking” along the lines of a rationalist
definition of the activity) nor is this consciousness marked by clear intuiting via my attention.
Clearly this is related to the consciousness that Husserl describes as “simply there” or
“immediately there.”18 At the most fundamental level, this is a pre-reflective modality of
consciousness, although, as we shall see, there are at least two different types of pre-reflective
consciousness. This is the domain to which the transcendental ego belongs, which cannot be
determined in the natural attitude, but is made clear via the reduction of the phenomenological
method. This domain of consciousness, as the manifold stream of “things” that are “present as
actualities in my field of intuition even when I do not heed them,” is arguably undifferentiated
because the constituent structures of the experience are not individually acknowledged by me.19
Husserl even goes so far as to state that this phenomenal field includes that which is “co-present”
Consider, for example, how I might “mindlessly” gaze out the window of a train as I ride inside
of it. This example works particularly well because even if I did make the effort to “process” the
appearances in my sensory field, I would struggle to do so, due to the velocity differential—I am
traveling quickly and everything in the world outside of the train is standing still. This backdrop
factors into every experience that I have and is given to me in the background even when I am
focused in a reflective act. Furthermore, without this background I would have nothing to
intentionally attend to in the first place; this phenomenological background is a supportive
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stratum that makes possible the other sorts of experience. Nevertheless this background aspect of
consciousness must be considered to be a sort of “experience” despite the fact that I am not
directly “conscious” of it in a reflective sense. Here it is useful to again bring in the concept of
intentionality: in the first modality of conscious experience in the natural attitude, I do not reflect
on the contents of my experience, but the experience still has the requisite “aboutness” of
intentionality, although in such a way that is devoid of my attention, which would furnish the
experience with “clear intuiting.”
The second phenomenological modality is also pre-reflective, but in this modality, I am
more engaged with and occupied by the “world”—I give the phenomenon my attention.” In short
this is the level of consciousness that involves a more focused and attentive perceiver, but no
reflection. For example, if I am a spectator at an automobile race, as I watch the vehicles
navigate through the twists and turns of the circuit, I am actively perceiving events (as object) as
they unfold in time. Perhaps I focus upon a single car and follow it along with my eyes. In the
background of this experience is the same undifferentiated background from the first modality.
Even as I watch the race there are what Husserl calls co-present phenomenal features in my
sensory field that come and go, entering the horizon of my experience at one moment, and then
dropping out of my experience the next. The clouds that float by in the sky are an example of
that sort of background, as well as what is likely only a vague awareness of the outdoor
temperature (unless it is very cold or very hot). This modality is also (phenomenologically) prereflective despite the fact that it differs markedly from the baseline modality of consciousness.
Many conversions that occur within the limits of established, organized religion occur with
significant activity in this modality of consciousness. These conversions often involve important
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events that are the object of conscious awareness and mindfulness, although they are not
necessarily fully reflective.
The third type of experience is reflective. When I reflect, I am conscious not of a certain
sensuous object or even abstract proposition but rather via my reflection I focus my experience
on experience of the object itself, whether it is a material object that I see or a proposition that I
am believing or considering. Thus essentially superimposed upon the first two strata of my
experience to the extent that reflection takes as its object the objectified consciousness of the
second modality which is itself only possible by way of the non-objectified primary modality. At
the automobile race I enter this modality of consciousness when my conscious intention is itself
directed in a self-conscious way toward the experience of being at the race, of following a
vehicle with my eyes, of the various sounds and smells which are phenomenologically given to
me as I sit and watch the event unfold. In contradistinction to the first two modalities of
conscious experience, this modality requires mindful volition from me. I do not accidentally
reflect upon something, although it might be possible that I can enter the reflective mindset
without realizing it, as when my mind “drifts off” in its own direction. In the case of conversion,
that which occurs on the reflective level is perhaps the most meaningful to the extent that it is the
most volitional and contemplative. That said, there is an argument to be made for the opposite
end of the spectrum, where a conversion occurs so subtly in the background of consciousness
that one does not even notice that it has occurred until after the fact. After all, this conversion
occurs so automatically and smoothly so as to be fairly construed as simply natural. It is the more
intellectual sort of conversion that is perhaps more tenuous since it follows the essentially
arbitrary meanderings of the conscious mind.
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Two phenomenological modalities lie beyond these three modalities of the natural
attitude. Beyond the third, reflective modality of consciousness lies the domain of free
imaginative variation, which Husserl also refers to as “eidetic variation.” If reflective
consciousness involves the consideration of some specific mental act as it is concretely
experienced, then it is limited de jure to the sphere of empirical consciousness, whereas eidetic
consciousness entails the expanded consciousness of the act’s essence or form (eidos) as it
surpasses the empirical and encompasses all of its fundamental possibilities. In other words, the
reflection inherent in eidetic variation takes a specific conscious experience and delineates all of
its possible but necessary appearances or manifestations.
We cannot stop there. Beyond even eidetic consciousness there is the domain of scientific
inquiry the object of which is the eidetic essence of experience. If the eidetic variation can afford
us the opportunity to determine the essential features of any given conscious act, then it is
phenomenology that can offer to us a critical discipline that is equipped to assess scientifically
the eidetic endeavor in the first place. The questions that phenomenology can pose for
conversion in general are not oriented towards the empirical corroboration of religious, spiritual,
or metaphysical claims about the underlying nature of self and reality, but instead, they inquire
into the experiential validity of the conversion experience in the first place. Therefore, even if
conversion ultimately belongs to the empirical ego, as I have argued, a phenomenological model
of conversion has to analyze this empirical transformation at the level of its constitution.
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Ch. 4. Self and Consciousness in the Phenomenological Attitude

What Is the Self? A Phenomenological Account

In the natural attitude I understand that when I say that I have converted, this means that my
“self” is changed, or has changed.1 In the last chapter I showed that this change in self occurs for
the empirical ego. But how is the empirical ego constituted?
Essentially the question regards the nature of the “self,” and as we know, there are many
answers to this question since it is one of the oldest and most basic—but also most perplexing—
philosophical questions. Here, though, I am interested in a phenomenological answer to the
“self” question, meaning that I will focus on the eidetic aspects of the self instead of the abstract
theoretical consideration thereof. A phenomenological account of selfhood can offer something
that cannot be matched by any of the above examples from the history of western philosophy: it
refocuses the inquiry upon the essential features of the lived experience of the self-phenomenon.2
It is indubitable that an analysis of the actual lived experience of selfhood can answer the
selfhood question on a surer, more “scientific” foundation than what can be offered by traditional
pre-phenomenological approaches.3
As we have seen, Husserl holds that the phenomenon of consciousness takes on many
different manifestations in the natural attitude, the “actual living” that Husserl references in Ideas

A change in self that occurs at various levels of awareness.
As we have noted, this self (or ego) cannot be confused with the empirical ego.
3
Here I suggest that both metaphysics and ontology are “traditional” pre-phenomenological
approaches. By metaphysics I refer to the speculative mode of inquiry As Husserl maintains in
“Philosophy as Rigorous Science,” by situating its basis in “consciousness itself” any science can
secure its own phenomenological validity on the most “scientific” of grounds. See p. 259 <301>.
1
2
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§28. But in addition to my propositional thoughts my consciousness also encompasses many
different types of experience, including sense perception, memory, fantasy, emotion,
embodiment, willing, desire, and so on. Husserl makes it very clear that all of these “complexes
of my manifoldly changing spontaneities of consciousness” can and should be grouped under the
heading of cogitare.4 We need to determine what it is that these various cogitationes have in
common, looking beyond their empirical specificity. As Husserl poses the question in Ideas,
“What can remain, if the whole world, including ourselves with all our cogitare, is excluded?”5 If
there is some “thing” that remains, then it surely is of a different status than the empirical
contents of my experience.
In order to answer this question and determine the eidetic structure of consciousness it is
first necessary to radically alter my perspective and enter the phenomenological attitude. I have
to leave behind the natural attitude and all of the ordinary assumptions that the attitude involves.
The “thing that converts, the “self,” now has to be considered as a phenomenological structure.
Thus all aspects of the empirical self (or ego) immediately fall away. A new, phenomenological
“self” (if by ‘self’ we mean pure consciousness) is revealed in the phenomenological attitude; it
is the very givenness of consciousness itself. Thus, the remainder that persists after we bracket
off the various empirical cogitare is the general presence or givenness of consciousness:
“consciousness has, in itself, a being of its own which in its own absolute essence, is not touched
by the phenomenological exclusion.”6 This means that there is an aspect of my consciousness

Husserl, Ideas I §28, 53 <50>.
Ibid., §33, 63 <58>. In the Copy A version of Ideas I, Husserl puts it thus: “What can still be
posited as being if the worldly All, the All of reality, remains parenthesized?” Here it is most
obvious that the phenomenological method is a method that operates by way of a procedure that
is partly “negative,” at least in the sense that its conclusions are ultimately ascertained via the
sustained suspension of the majority of the empirical beliefs that I entertain in the natural attitude.
6
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that endures even after I bracket the existence of every correlate of my conscious acts. This
enduring aspect has a certain sensuousness in and of itself; there is a qualitative “way” that my
consciousness is. This is the immediate givenness of consciousness as a general phenomenon.
This givenness is the constituted product of what Husserl terms “pure” or
“transcendental” consciousness starting with his Ideas. We can see that this is what remains and
therefore is “revealed” as “phenomenological residuum” after the enactment of the epoché.7 As
something that is “revealed” this transcendental ego is technically a sort of phenomenon, but it is
very different from other phenomena insofar as it is not directly “given” but instead the very
presupposition of givenness.8 Here we will take it that this is the most primitive stratum of the
“self,” phenomenologically understood, which is to say, non-empirically. Husserl writes:
The epoché can also be said to be the radical and universal method by which I apprehend myself
purely: as Ego, and with my own pure conscious life, in and by which the entire Objective world
exists for me and is precisely as it is for me. Anything belonging to the world, any spatiotemporal
being, exists for me—that is to say, is accepted by me—in that I experience it, perceive it, remember
it, think of it somehow, judge about it, value it, desire it, or the like.9

My experience of the “I am” is a transcendental experience of self, and it is this self that makes
possible my experience of the world. It is this self that is oriented with objects and things
according to the law of intentionality. This is the phenomenological self, a consciousness that
grounds my experience of the world in addition to my experience of self.
While in the passage quoted above it may seem as if Husserl is situating empirical
consciousness in the phenomenological stratum of experience, that would be a misreading based
on what we know distinguishes phenomenological consciousness from psychological “selfobservation” and ordinary “actual living” as an empirical ego; in the phenomenological attitude
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what is significant is the mineness of the perceptions and experiences through which I encounter
the supposedly “objective” world, such that this world really is not so objective after all.10 Recall
that the significance of this is that in the natural attitude the world is naively understood to be
simply “there” but I do not view it as an “achievement” of my own consciousness. It is the
apodictic and immediate givenness of this self, as phenomenological Ego, that makes it possible
for phenomena to appear for me. As we have seen already, some commentators have suggested
that this forces Husserl to deny outright the existence of a “natural” mind independent world (cf
Meillassoux), but this sort of critique misinterprets the fundamental orientation of classical
phenomenology: the world as phenomenon originates, by definition, in consciousness—without
consciousness, there is no phenomenon as such. Is there a non-phenomenal world? Husserl’s
phenomenology will not and cannot answer that question.11
To the contrary what we can be quite sure of is that, in the phenomenological attitude, this
pure consciousness that I apprehend, through which the world is constituted for me, is marked by
what appears to be a dual nature. Husserl indicates that:
If we retain a pure Ego as residuum after our phenomenological exclusion of the world and of the
empirical subjectivity included in it (and an essentially different pure Ego for each stream of mental
processes), then there is presented in the case of that Ego a transcendency of a peculiar kind—one
which is not constituted—a transcendency within immanency.12

What Husserl is saying is that the pure ego is “alive” in every immanent conscious moment. But
all of these conscious moments are part of a larger, single “stream of mental processes” that is
itself constituted by the very same ego. This is why the ego transcends the individual, immanent
moments of conscious subjectivity.

Husserl’s critics challenged him to consider the phenomenon of the world more fully after Ideas
I was interpreted to be an account of an isolating idealism. Heidegger is perhaps the best example
of such a challenger.
11
Strictly speaking the question seems to invoke a pseudo-problem in Wittgenstein’s sense.
12
Husserl, Ideas I §57, 133 <109>.
10

164

Thus we can see how on the phenomenological level an entirely new terrain emerges. I
note that all of the myriad experiences that I consider to be part of my essential selfhood,
whether as identity or role, are mapped upon the more fundamental aspect of my Being that is
my transcendental ego’s unification of experience. This transcendental self is non-objectified and
non-reflective and therefore becomes something different as soon as it is considered as if it is an
“object.” Like Kant’s conditional transcendental ego, it seems to me that this self qua ego is also
a necessary thing for experience, but via the phenomenological reduction I am afforded an
analytic “view” of the phenomenon the likes of which Kant could not have imagined. There is no
experience that I can have that lacks this essential component of experience; this ego is the
ubiquitous feature of every possible consciousness.
It could be objected that this ego is in fact only a modality that consciousness deceptively
hoists up as a stable omnipresent feature of experience. For example, what can we say about the
phenomenon of deep dreamless sleep? While I am not consciously aware during this experience,
it is still an experience, is it not? The truth is that while we must grant that this sort of sleep is an
experience, it is only retroactively identified as such. I can only infer indirectly that I have had
this experience after it has occurred. It is countersensical to speculate that the deep sleep is
experienced as it occurs, since deep sleep is by definition a state of rest that involves no
experience, no appearance of consciousness whatsoever. It is only the transcendental ego that is
able to make the inference that what must have occurred during the episode of dreamless sleep
was dreamless sleep in the first place. Thus a closer inspection of this sort of objection reveals
that it ultimately only serves to reinforce the point that it purported to contest.
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But one problem is that beyond grasping the givenness of its appearance subsequent to
the reduction, it is difficult to say much more about this ego. It is on the subjective end of my
experience, but it is not itself an experience per se, despite the fact that it appears:
After carrying out this reduction we shall not encounter the pure Ego anywhere in the flux of
manifold mental process which remains as a transcendental residuum—neither as one mental
process among others, nor as strictly a par of a mental process, arising and then disappearing with
the mental process of which it is a part. The Ego seems to be there continually, indeed, necessarily,
and this continualness is obviously not that of a stupidly persistent mental process, a “fixed idea.”
Instead, the Ego belongs to each coming and going mental process; its “regard” is directed
“through” each actional cogito to the objective something. This ray of regard changes from one
cogito to the next, shooting forth anew with each new cogito and vanishing with it. The Ego,
however, is something identical. [. . .] [I]t [the ego] cannot in any sense be a really inherent part or
moment of the mental processes themselves.13

Thus the ego occupies a rather unique place in Husserl’s phenomenology. It is, after all, what is
left behind qua “phenomenological residuum” is what essentially makes the entire
phenomenological method possible; it is via the epoche and the resulting residuum that “ ‘pure’
consciousness, and subsequently the whole phenomenological region” are made accessible.14
Despite the fact that the transcendental ego cannot be directly experienced in isolation, it is
sedimented in every possible experience and it appears to me. It is at once the foundation of
subject as well as object. Indeed this is one of the reasons why Husserl elects to describe it as at
once both immanent and transcendent.
It is the transcendental ego that carries out the objectifying act in virtue of which
consciousness can move from one cogito to another. This transcendental ego always appears to
me as inextricably bound to some mental process. It is the transcendental ego’s status as linked
to, but not identical with, mental processes that compels Husserl to relate the ego itself to a larger
structure that he refers to as the “ego pole.”15 We can see Husserl elaborate on this concept,
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absent from the earlier Ideas, in his Cartesian Meditations, where he indicates that it is the ego
pole that is executor of intentionality:
The ego is himself existent for himself in continuous evidence; thus, in himself, he is continuously
constituting himself as existing. Heretofore we have touched on only one side of this selfconstitution, we have looked at only the flowing cogito. The ego grasps himself not only as a
flowing life but also as I, who live this and that subjective process, who live through this and that
cogito, as the same. Since we were busied up to now with the intentional relation of consciousness
to object, cogito to cogitatum, only that syntheses stood out for us which “polarizes” the
multiplicities of actual and possible consciousness toward identical objects, according in relation
to objects as poles, synthetic unities. Now we encounter a second polarization, a second kind of
synthesis, which embraces all the particular multiplicities of cogitationes collectively and in its own
manner, namely as belonging to the identical Ego, who, as the active and affected subject of
consciousness, lives in all processes of consciousness and is related, through them, to all objectpoles.16

Here Husserl again describes the ‘I’ that maintains a sense of identity through the flow of time.
But this time Husserl elaborates more completely on the nature of this temporal ‘I.’ All relations
to given objects are linked to this ego pole, which Husserl points out is itself never empty (as in
Kant) but is to the contrary always marked by content, as Husserl puts it, “determined by. . . [its]
abiding habitus or state.”17 The ‘I’ has a personal identity, in other words. The identity is
constituted by the various actions and beliefs of the ‘I’. These actions and beliefs leave behind a
trace or “sedimentation” the result of which is the ongoing development of the transcendental
ego. The habitus or state is the transcendental generation that results from my acts and behaviors,
via which I take on “abiding propert[ies]” that leave their mark behind18 But it is certainly not
the case that I have to constantly and continuously “fill” immanent time with mental processes
that maintain or even just reinforce my habitus. This is why the term “sedimentation” is used by
Husserl to describe the way in which bits of “knowledge stemming from previous thought-
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activity adhere to what is in each case actually experienced.” 19 The transcendental ego is thus
determined by the effects of sedimentation with no conscious involvement from me.20 In other
words, I do not have to resolve to keep existing in order for my transcendental ego to carry on.
Husserl indicates that the ego itself works the same way—it is related to the “stream of
subjective processes” but not equivalent therewith.21 It is apparent how such a situation lends
itself to the conceptualization of a “transcendency within immanency.” At once the
transcendental ego surpasses the immanent experience of consciousness, at the same time that it
is manifest, in a limited sense, in those same immanent moments. Therefore, for Husserl, the
transcendental ego is, rather paradoxically, what grounds my concrete existence.22 In the next
section I will examine more closely the technical details concerning the constitution of
consciousness on the basis of one interpretation of synthesis.

The “Backward Reference” Interpretation of the Synthesis of Consciousness

All of this is relevant for our present purpose to the extent that we have examined conversion as
a phenomenon that occurs at the level of the empirical ego. Until now we have not been able to
link the general conversion experience, which occurs on an empirical basis, to the essential
phenomenological processes that actually make possible the empirical transformation. The
relationship between these two levels of experience is starting to become clearer; while
conversion occurs at the level of the empirical ego, it can only do so on the basis of the ongoing
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interpretive nature of consciousness at the transcendental level.23 This “interpretive
consciousness” is self-constituting over the course of time, and without this constitutive role
played by the transcendental ego, there could be no conversion.
So how exactly does this interpretive consciousness operate? Or rather, how does it
sustain itself? Husserl was exploring this aspect of consciousness even in his earliest published
writings, including the Logical Investigations.24 There and elsewhere the term that Husserl users
for this activity is “synthesis.” Lampert calls Husserl’s synthesis a “self-propelling dynamic of
interpretive consciousness dominated by systems of forward and backward reference.”25 This is
an essentially logical endeavor; in short consciousness constitutes and sustains itself by way of
relating its meanings and intuitions, qua individuals or particulars, to universals.26 Without such
objects that hold intuited meanings that surpass the limits of their own concrete presentation,
consciousness would not be able to make much sense of the world.
On the empirical level there are several distinct ways in which this reference can occur,
although I will not take up their exegesis here. On the phenomenological level though, Husserl
stipulates that the reference occurs on an ideal (therefore not concrete) basis:
[W]e are dealing with the acts in which general names achieve their direct relation to specific
unities, and also with the acts which belong with these names in their attributive or predicative
function, in which, therefore, forms like an A, all A, some A, S which is A etc., are constituted; and
lastly with the acts in which the objects apprehended in these manifold forms of thought are selfevidently ‘given,’ with the acts, in other words, in which our conceptual intuitions are fulfilled,
achieve self-evidence and clarity. Thus we directly apprehend the Specific Unity Redness on the
basis of a singular intuition of something red. We look to its moment of red, but we perform a
peculiar act, whose intention is directed to the ‘Idea,’ the ‘universal.’ 27

To be clear, the transcendental ego does not itself “interpret” anything; it temporally grounds
the continuity of conscious experience by “referring backward” to its own source as if given
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It is apparent that this explanation is supposed to encompass all the different empirical references
to universals. But unlike empirical reference (which is really empirical apprehension of a
universal), which holds that the universal is not a universal at all but rather a distinctive
particular which is concrete and in the world, and therefore (at least according to logic)
encounterable via sense, for Husserl the presentation of red is not grounded on some curious
particular, but instead, an ideal universal.
To the extent that consciousness grasps meaning, Lampert is right that (logical) reference
in both directions makes these meanings possible, although it would seem that backward
reference is far more instrumental in the constitution of the majority of the meanings that we
encounter as given in the present.28 If this is what makes meaning possible, then it follows that
this is also the way in which consciousness is able to relate to itself, since without so doing it
would not be much of anything at all, since the very idea of meaning (and other types of
conscious content) require such inter-referentiality.29 But furthermore this is what enables
consciousness to have experiences of consciousness in its own past, as well as to anticipated,
“futural” experiences of consciousness in the future.
As Lampert puts it, synthesis is ultimately “the combination of one experience with
another” and he explores the way in which this activity raises certain problems regarding
possibility, necessity, and limitation (35). He suggests out that some of these problems eventually
only raise other problems, such as the way in which the positing embodied in backward reference
posits as possible a meaning or intuition that is not present. How are these meanings “stored” by

This is why it is odd that more attention has not been given to this topic in the LI; without
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consciousness? In Logical Investigations Husserl offers no answer to this, as the model of
consciousness that he offers is one that is comprised of a countless number of conscious instants,
the unification of which is left unresolved. But Lampert points out that Husserl manages to solve
this problem with the account of pure consciousness that he presents in Ideas. This pure
consciousness is the unity that results “as synthetic interpretations “draw back” or “withdraw” to
the ground of their own self-articulation (viii). But the ground of this synthesis is intriguing: I am
able to apprehend the universal, Lampert argues, via my synthesis of acts of apprehension of
individuals (62). Eventually my “synthetic combinations” start to take on certain patterns which
eventually start to operate like universal laws. But crucially it is the backward, “reflective
reference” to the syntheses of my individual apprehensions that makes it possible to refer to a
universal as such (63). Effectively the ground of the universal category is the framework of the
individual (67).
Ultimately Lampert contends that for Husserl synthesis is “cognition’s [own] selfcritique” (194). That is just the thing, really: consciousness is not just the product of logical
reference, but it is actually conditioning its own possibilities on the basis of these references
(accordingly it is a kind of “critique” in the Kantian sense.) Indeed without this internally
referential nature, consciousness would not be able to undergo a conversion, because it would
lack the mechanics via which conversion could occur. But the “backward reference” reading of
synthesis itself is not enough for us to experience consciousness as we do, even if it does explain
how we encounter a world with logical meaning. How do I track these meanings throughout time
and make them part of my own personal history? And while backward reference can explain the
typification of one conscious act into a category of meaning, how is it that all of these meanings
are brought together under the concern of a unified phenomenological subject? As we continue
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on in our examination of consciousness in the phenomenological attitude, we find that there are
two distinct phenomenological aspects of the transcendental ego that really explain how we are
able to have rich and complex experiences like conversions: absolute time consciousness and the
unity of the ego.

Absolute Time Consciousness and the Unity of the Ego: Toward the Reduction of Conversion

We can isolate the transcendent immanence of the pure ego in the very constitution of time
consciousness. Furthermore we can see that the transcendental ego is not manifest in any one
moment of reflection despite the fact that the stream of the (empirical) ego’s experience requires
the succession of moments. It is through this succession of moments that the transcendental ego
is solidified as an identity which maintains a sense of unity throughout time.
This unity is partly captured in my own experience of having a personal history. Husserl
writes:
The ego constitutes himself for himself in, so to speak, the unity of a “history.” We said that the
constitution of the ego contains all the constitutions of all the objectivities existing for him, whether
these be immanent or transcendent, ideal or real. It should now be added that the constitutive
systems (systems actualizable by the Ego), by virtue of such and such objects and categories of
objects exist for him, are themselves possible only within the frame of a genesis in conformity with
laws. At the same time they are bound, in their constituting, by the universal genetic form that
makes the concrete ego (the monad) possible as a unity, as having particular constituents of his
being that are compossible. That a Nature, a cultural world, a world of men with their social forms,
and so forth, exist for me signifies that possibilities of corresponding experiences exist for me, as
experiences I can at any time bring into play and continue in a certain synthetic style, whether or
not I am at present actually experiencing objects belonging to the realm in question. It signifies
furthermore that other modes of consciousness corresponding to them—vague intendings and the
like—exist as possibilities for me, and also that these other modes of consciousness have
possibilities of being fulfilled or disappointed by experiences of predelineated types. This involves
a firmly developed habituality, acquired by a certain genesis in conformity with eidetic laws.30
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This ego endures through time irrespective of my attention or my oblivion. It should be noted
that the ego subsists on an entirely involuntary basis; it requires no volition from me in order to
continue on. As we have seen, even if I am to attempt to focus on the transcendental ego, I can
note its experience but only as it is mediated by some object pole, even if the object pole
corresponds only with the momentary presence that I can seemingly isolate in the stream of my
conscious flow. When I focus on this phenomenon, I am not grasping the transcendental ego
directly and in itself, otherwise it would not be transcendental at all. When Husserl references the
“new” cogito that is “alive” when the intentional object of my reflection is the ego or the “I
think” and notes that this cogito is “is not reflected on and thus is not objective for me” he is
pointing toward the constitutive work of the transcendental ego.31 This is not to suggest that the
transcendental ego and the cogito are the same thing (in fact they are not), but instead, to point
out that it is the activity of the transcendental ego that makes possible the reflection of reflection.
The transcendental ego is related to (but not quite equivalent with) what is, in classical
phenomenology, referred to as “pre-reflective self-awareness.” Pre-reflective self-awareness has
actually occupied a somewhat controversial position in the secondary literature on Husserl.
Many commentators have suggested that Husserl lacks any theory of such a self-awareness prior
to reflection. These commentators essentially have argued that there is no non-objective
consciousness according to Husserl’s philosophy, and that therefore the only consciousness for
which he can account is that which is objective, which is to say, reflective. The issue that these
commentators take with what they allege to be Husserl’s stance (which I will contest) is that they
take for granted the phenomenon of pre-reflective consciousness. Thus they construe a
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deficiency in Husserl’s thought on the basis of his supposed failure to account for such a
phenomenon.
The issue here is that Husserl does not in fact deny the existence of the variety of
consciousness that these commentators describe, although it should be noted that pre-reflective
consciousness should probably not be considered to be an ego.32 David Carr attempts to show
that the transcendental ego is the “intentional ego” that guides the direction of our acts of
consciousness; indeed I do not have to reflect on my intentionality in order to constitute the
intentionality of my consciousness.33
Consider, for example, how the awareness of self manifest in the experience of certain
affective phenomena, including anxiety and fear. The appearance of these phenomena are not
subject to reflection because they are examples of phenomena that are “felt” rather than thought.
Certainly, it is possible to think about or reflect upon one’s anxiety or fear, but it would be a
mistake to forget that anxiety and fear, as affects, precede their contemplative objectification.
They do not have to be thought about in order to be felt. But here the distinction between that
which is thought and that which is felt hits precisely upon the actual problem: what is being
contested is what can be called “consciousness” in the first place.
Dan Zahavi is one of the most prominent defenders of pre-reflective consciousness in
Husserl’s work. Zahavi points out that many commentators, including Heidegger, Tugendhat,
Heinrich, Frank, and Gloy have suggested that Husserl does not conceive of a non-objective
variety of consciousness, a sort of consciousness that subsists outside of reflective
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intentionality.34 But as Zahavi shows, this is far from a reasonable interpretation of Husserl. Take
the following quote, for example, wherein Husserl writes:
The lawfulness with which we have become acquainted in the structure of perceptions easily reveals
its universal significance as a primordial lawfulness of the life of consciousness in general. For the
latter is not only a lived-experiencing continually streaming along; at the same time, as it streams
along it is also immediately the consciousness of this streaming. This consciousness is selfperceiving, although it is a thematically executed awareness on the part of the ego only in
exceptional circumstances. Belonging to the latter is a reflection that is possible at any time. This
perceiving that presents all lived-experiencing to consciousness is the so-called inner consciousness
or inner perceiving.35

It is apparent that the inner consciousness that is immanent to all lived experience is only
occasionally reflective, and thus only occasionally thematic. Alas as far as we know it is the
potential for thematization that makes our experience “consciousness” in virtue of which we
distinguish ourselves from other animals.36 But insofar as consciousness is able to thematize any
strand of experience, it is the temporal flow of experience itself that makes it possible to perform
this thematization in the first place. Indeed without this inner consciousness no self-reflection
would be possible at all.
Because my sense of inner time is not thematized until my consciousness intends toward
it, it can be easy to misinterpret Husserl to mean that internal time consciousness endures outside
of the limits of self-awareness. I think that this is precisely the view that leads some
commentators to charge Husserl with failing to recognize the stratum of pre-reflective
experience. But as the above quote shows, Husserl takes it that inner consciousness (of time) is
still “self-perceiving,” just not in the reflective sense. What he means is that lived experience is
fundamentally self-perception even when the self is not being mindfully perceived. We can
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corroborate this intuitively; it surely is not the case that we no longer continue to be ourselves
during the intermittent episodes in which we do not consciously think about or reflect upon
ourselves.
This latent sense of background, primitive “awareness,” epitomized in the flux of
temporal consciousness, is one of the phenomenological features that renders possible the
experience of subjectivity. On the most basic level, this is the self, stripped down with8 neither
description nor consideration. In his early philosophy Husserl conceives of this self as the source
of conscious acts, but later in his career Husserl pivots away from acts and focuses instead on
how the ‘I’ is, as Elisabeth Ströker puts it, “a field of experience … that by means of its senseconstituting achievements . . . gains its own characteristics, thus revealing itself as a concrete
ego.”37 To be “self-perceiving,” then, is (at least in part) to constitute self-characteristics
throughout time. As I have indicated, the transcendental ego is determined by the sedimentations
of conscious experience; it is what Zahavi calls a “developing structure.”38 This is not at all an
entirely conscious process; to the contrary, it is mostly outside of our conscious awareness.
Admittedly, it is a slight issue that Husserl’s remarks in this text are, by design, not really
focused on the objective side of intentional acts. The result is that the way in which Husserl
describes subjective phenomena takes on a different framing. Thus one could fairly object that
the present characterization of subjectivity is not necessarily indicative of the more general
thought of Husserl. Even if this is true, however, there is nothing that outright contradicts in a
logical sense Husserl’s other writing from the same period. We cannot look at the different
perspective from which subjectivity is here approached, namely, that of foundational
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consciousness of inner time, as less authoritative or important than his remarks elsewhere. These
remarks are as significant for phenomenological subjectivity as the rest, but in a different way,
due to the difference in what is actually being explained.
In any case the living present is the ego’s experience of time; it is the ego’s “internal”
perception of time as synthesizer of experience. In other words the ego experiences the “present”
as a continuous stream of time that includes the protention of the future in addition to the
retention of the past. Without this dual nature that involves the anticipatory nature of protention
in addition to the “slipping away” of the present by way of retention, I could have no experience
of the present “moment.” While the living present can be seized upon momentarily in such a way
that it appears to be standing still, it is also always in a state of flux whereby it continuously slips
away.
Husserl concludes that the experience of a unified living present is made possible by
“absolute time consciousness,” which constitutes the ego’s very experience of temporality.
In other words, absolute time consciousness is self-securing. But in order to perform this
accomplishment, absolute time consciousness has to itself be atemporal, otherwise
consciousness would not be capable of grounding itself. This is because it would always be
subject to the same temporal laws that define the constitution of its objects. In order to serve as
the foundation for temporal consciousness, absolute time consciousness has to transcend the
temporal limits of its presentation.
Husserl writes:
There is one, unique flow of consciousness in which both the unity of the tone in immanent time
and the unity of the flow of consciousness itself become constituted at once. As shocking (when
not initially even absurd) as it may seem to say that the flow of consciousness constitutes its own
unity, it is nonetheless the case that it does. And this can be made intelligible on the basis of the
flow’s essential constitution.39
39
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Here Husserl describes the way in which the stream of consciousness is experienced as a unity at
the same time that consciousness guarantees this very same unity. We experience the temporal
unity of consciousness in such a way that we can “track” its constitutive role as it unfolds for
itself. This is epitomized in Husserl’s example of the consciousness of a (musical) tone. I
experience this tone via a temporal succession of conscious moments. This is the “flow” of my
conscious stream. One of Husserl’s most important breakthroughs is the realization that the flow
itself, and not merely the object of consciousness (of a tone or whatever else), can be rigorously
analyzed. Not only does the perceptual object straddle the “flow” of conscious duration, but the
flow itself follows the same rule of presentation. It is arguably retention that performs the most
work here since it is the retention of consciousness-just-past that enables the ego to synthesize
the experience of itself as a unity instead of just a series of unrelated conscious “snapshots.”
While we could not experience consciousness without the protention of the future to come,
retention is especially vital since it is what enables consciousness to enjoy the relative stability
(in unity) that originates in the identification of some prior conscious moment with the present
conscious moment.
In fact the idea that consciousness is a unity is a matter of much debate. As I have
indicated already this is something that I intuitively understand even in the natural attitude.
Indeed several writers have challenged the extent to which this level of consciousness could be a
unity, with some going so far as to call it a “myth.”40 I have noted that the essential nature of
consciousness determines the essential nature of conversion, since conversion is a specific
modality of consciousness, so I am obligated to determine whether consciousness is in essence a

40

Evans, “Myth of Absolute Consciousness.”
178

unity or not before I can proceed. Thus let us consider the argument that consciousness it not a
unity.
Sartre is one figure who advances such an argument. He contends in The Transcendence
of the Ego that the transcendental ‘I’ is in fact temporally divided because his interpretation of
Husserl’s model of the ‘I’ is such that the ‘I’ cannot be the unifier of all consciousness because,
in short, it is consciousness that unifies the ‘I’ and not the ‘I’ that unifies consciousness. Sartre
maintains (perhaps misguidedly) that the transcendental ego performs no such function if it is as
Husserl and his followers describe, and that it is actually consciousness itself that performs the
unifying role for the ‘I.’ Here he presupposes (as does Husserl) that consciousness is
consciousness of something, in other words, of an object. Sartre’s alternative explanation for the
unification of consciousness suggests that it is in fact the achievement of consciousness’s
relational nature, namely with respect to the object, like the subway I pursue as I run late, that
unifies my temporal consciousness, and therefore my subjectivity is grounded by objectivity, and
not my subjectivity qua transcendental ego, manifest in the absolute living-present.41
Whether Sartre misunderstands Husserl or not, this dispute forces us to confront the
difficult problem of resolving the issue of whether consciousness, without anything of which to
be conscious, would be consciousness at all. For Husserl, the answer would be yes, because on
his account the transcendental ‘I’ makes possible the phenomenon of consciousness. It follows
that consciousness is an effect of temporal subjectivity. But isn’t it true that by definition
consciousness can always at the very least take itself up as object? If so, then for Sartre the
answer is no, that this sort of consciousness is logically problematic and impossible. For a
moment it almost seems as if Sartre could be right, since he raises what appear to be pertinent

41

Sartre, “Transcendence of the Ego,” 3-4.
179

mereological problems regarding how consciousness could grasp itself by itself, without in fact
being non-equivalent with whatever it is that it manages to grasp as itself.
But the problem is that Sartre is not really referring to the same level of consciousness as
Husserl. It is true that the object of his critique is clearly the multiplication of conscious states,
but in the phenomenological attitude these states are not multiplied, nor are they divided—indeed
this is Husserl’s point. For Husserl it is the ego itself that constitutes time, and the differentiation
between retention, protention, and the “now” are not multiplications of consciousness itself (as
per Sartre) but are to the contrary the eidetic features of the flow of absolute time. Indeed to say
this is to admit that the pure ego is itself also a unity that is produced via synthesis. With his
alternative, Sartre elaborates on the mechanics of the process via which consciousness qua living
present is given depth, but his approach simply cannot unify the subject. Sartre does not seem to
totally accept that consciousness is fundamentally in flux; if we are to grant that he does accept
this, then we must insist that he does not reasonably discern the consequence of this flux.
While Sartre is prepared to argue that it is the object of consciousness that gives
consciousness its depth, for Husserl it is the dynamic constitution of the living present that
performs this function, and in so doing, unifies my conscious life. Lanei Rodemeyer explains in
Intersubjective Temporality that for Husserl it is the unity that is partly constituted through
retention that gives “depth” to consciousness.42 In other words a consciousness “reborn” in every
moment, with no possible recourse to the consciousness of the past, would be a strange
experience; indeed, we would resist the impulse to identify such a strange, perpetually-new
mental life as “consciousness” of any sort recognizable to us. Curiously, this is precisely the sort
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of model that Sartre claims to plague Husserl’s work, despite the fact that it is his own alternative
theory that seems far more likely to raise the concern.
But one issue with Husserl’s account is that retention is not something that is indefinitely
“held” by consciousness. Eventually what is retained falls away and has to be recollected.
Husserl is not wrong about that. But Rodemeyer addresses the concern, articulated by David
Carr, that Husserl likely interprets retention too strictly to the exclusion of phenomena that are
retained but are not as temporally proximate to the present as Husserl suggests.43 In a nutshell
Carr is of the opinion that Husserl fails to realize the variability of retention and mistakenly
overemphasizes, as Rodemeyer puts it, the “more immediate, lived aspect of retention.” Thus,
Carr suggests, Husserl fails to account for consciousness’s retention of that which is more distant
from the immediate present, supposing instead that these intuitions must be recalled. Rodemeyer
suggests that this more inclusive model of retention is reasonable, but comes at the cost of a
“trivialize[d” account of retention in the more immediate, “just-past” sense. Rodemeyer argues
that: [T]here must be some “in-between” that exists between immediate retention and
recollection, an “in-between” whose activity makes possible my comfortable, and usually
effortless, dealings with common and familiar objects.44 The point here is that my relatively
adroit dealings with the world of things is accomplished in part via the retained “presence” of
certain “habitual objects.” Thus Rodemeyer ultimately distinguishes two varieties of retention in
Husserl’s phenomenology, “near” and “far,” with Husserl actually using this terminology in his
own APS. There are several important things to note here with respect to the present
phenomenology of conversion. First, it is undeniable that without retention, there can be no
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conversion. But our specific experience of consciousness is such that retention requires
protention, and vice-versa. Second, insofar as retention and protention belong to the domain of
“passive” experience, there can be no conversion phenomenon without passive synthesis. As of
yet it remains to be seen whether the same is true of active synthesis, but I will return to this
question in the final chapter.
Recall that we were originally lead down this path in the pursuit of an answer to the
question: is consciousness a unity? Put differently, the question is: how is consciousness
constituted for me—as a unity, or not? Presently, though, these questions are framed in an even
more specific context, namely, is the phenomenon of conversion something that occurs for a
unified consciousness, or not? At first glance we were tempted by this question insofar as the
very existence of “conversion” seems to imply that consciousness is not a unity, or at least, not
an inviolable unity insofar as the occurrence of conversion seems to problematize the idea of a
rigid and homogeneous consciousness. Furthermore we have already seen that some of the
earliest conversion studies presupposed that some sort of divided or split consciousness defines
the pre-convert.
Sartre merely offers his own account of how consciousness is afforded with depth—but
not self-constituted. His notion of consciousness as “being-for-itself” is not equivalent with the
consciousness to which Husserl refers, which is, at least in his early work, a consciousness that
for better or for worse is situated in a domain that is essentially compartmentalized from the
Sartrean (and Heidegerrean) phenomenon of the “world.” This early conception of pure
consciousness has no technical need for the world, which Husserl determines to be just a
“correlate of consciousness.”45 He even goes so far as to famously declare in Ideas that
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consciousness would endure even after the “annihilation of the world,” by which he refers to the
reduction of the world to a “mere” thought thereof.46 While his wording here may be a bit too
strong (and he later considers the world to be much more important in his later phenomenology),
his point is that transcendental consciousness has no need for the empirical consciousness of the
world. Technically, he is correct.
When Husserl later incorporates the phenomenon of the world more fully into his
thinking, he indicates that the transcendental ‘I’ always appears in the world. Thus according to
this later model of phenomenology, the possibility remains that in some cases my experience of
consciousness is unified (at least in part) by phenomena on the side of the world.47 It has to be
admitted that when this unification occurs, it is not explaining the same phenomenon as
Husserl’s account in Ideas or The Phenomenology of Consciousness of Internal Time; it is in the
latter text that Husserl indicates that “absolute time consciousness” is “not an object.”48 Sartre
himself admits that consciousness cannot be its own object.49 After all, there can be no doubt that
without the pre-reflective temporal flow of my consciousness, it is far from clear how I could
ever pursue any train of thought at all. The transcendental ‘I’ makes possible this experience; it is
obscure how (my consciousness of) the object could produce the ‘I’ when consciousness is a
power of the ‘I’ and not of the object. In short, Sartre’s critique of Husserl seems to miss its
target.

“[W]hile the being of consciousness, of any stream of mental processes whatever, would indeed
be necessarily modified by an annihilation of the world of physical things its own existence would
not be touched.” Husserl, Ideas I §49, 110 <92>.
47
Sartre claims that even in CM Husserl still holds the view that temporal consciousness is selfunifying.
48
Husserl, PITC Appendix 5, 117 <112>.
49
Sartre, Transcendence of the Ego, 5.
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That said, it is not completely unreasonable to question the extent to which my
consciousness is a unified whole. After all, my “stream” of consciousness is constituted out of
flux and change on a temporal level; I am conscious, in other words, in and through time. We
have already examined how it is temporality that contributes to the unity of consciousness, but
my present concern is to show how the phenomenon of conversion suggests that the unity of
consciousness is a qualified sort of unity the integrity of which has to be essentially fluid in order
for the unity to undergo what can reasonably be called an existential change.
Husserl writes in his Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis that:
Perception is a process of streaming from phase to phase; in its own way each of the phases is a
perception, but these phases are continuously harmonized in the unity of a synthesis, in the unity
of a consciousness of one and the same perceptual object that is constituted here originally. In each
phase we have primordial impression, retention, and protention.50

It is the impression of the “now” moment along with the corresponding phenomena of retention
and protention that structure my experience of the flow of time. At a fundamental level retention
and protention are the two functions that constitute this flow for me. When I direct my
intentionality toward my own experience of experience (i.e. conscious sentience), I become
aware of the manner in which the phenomenon of consciousness flows through time itself, but
not like water through a pipe, but instead as a flame consumes its fuel. Intentionality itself is
circumscribed within temporal limits. I note that, somewhat paradoxically, this phenomenon of
the present moment does not persist simply on the basis of that which is immediate and imminent
for consciousness, since protention and retention continually rotate in and out every single
passing instant.
Husserl indicates that:
[T]he most general aspect of the ego’s form … [is] the peculiar temporalization by which it becomes
an enduring ego, constituting itself in its time-modalities: the same ego, now actually present, is in
50
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a sense, in every past that belongs to it, another—i.e., as that which was and thus is not now—and
yet, in the continuity of its time it is one and the same, which is and was and has its future before
it.51

It is true that I cannot experience absolute time “directly.” I can only manage a sort of snapshot
moment that is singular and fixed, despite the fact that to the contrary I experience conscious life
in a much more fluid and continuous manner. But regardless of the fact that the snapshots on
their own are not consciousness but instead require succession via the temporal flow, I am
nevertheless able to isolate any given instant when I seize upon the immediately present moment.
As “ego pole” I am “sovereign” over that instant to the extent that I can momentarily pick it out
as an instant, but my momentary grasp of it evinces what is ultimately my utter lack of control
over the onset of time. Indeed as I experience consciousness through an infinite series of “now”
moments that proceed from the imminent, each moment passes away as it gives rise to the next
one, which, if I focus on nothing but my own consciousness and awareness of the flow of time, I
am unable to differentiate, formally, from any other.52 To describe this phenomenon Husserl uses
the terms “retention” and “protention.”
Thus while I experience, typically, a stable and unified conception of my own ego as
present to my consciousness, it is apparent in the phenomenological attitude that this presence of
my self to my self is, in fact, not a solid whole, but to the contrary, the result of a succession of
intentional moments. In other words, as we have already seen, pure consciousness is the product
of synthesis.
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Ch. 5. Conversion as Embodied Phenomenon

Realism, Material Science, and the Mind-Independent World

There is an ostensible problem for Husserl’s “grounded” view of scientific philosophical
analysis, despite the fact that his phenomenology does manage to avoid some of the errors of the
older philosophies. While Hallward is astute to point out that many scientific claims arguably fail
to reach objective status due to the fact that they are based on arbitrary measurements that make
sense to human consciousness, there are at least some scientific claims, mostly in the realm of
material science, that seem to be of a more fundamental type.1 These claims are still claims made
by consciousness, but they are significantly different in kind from many other scientific claims,
and therefore present a conspicuous problem for Husserl’s ideas. This is essentially the critique
of Quentin Meillassoux.2 Consider, for example, that archaeological science suggests that there
are trees which pre-existed humans and therefore human intelligence, consciousness, by many
years, dating as old as 385,000,000 years ago.3 It would certainly appear that this sort of ancient
archaeological object is mind-independent. Alas even this it not true without major qualification.
This approximated dating is only realized within the continuum of consciousness. As Husserl
puts it, “Objects exist for me, and are for me what they are, only as objects of actual and possible
consciousness.”4 Furthermore this fact can only be uttered, as a true proposition, by

Hallward, “Review of After Finitude.”
Meillassoux, After Finitude.
3
Stein et al., “Giant Cladoxylopsid Trees Resolve Enigma,” 904–907.
4
Husserl CM §30, 65 <99>.
1
2

186

consciousness in the present. It is a deeply-ingrained fidelity to the ontological assumptions of
the natural attitude that makes it so hard to grasp this actuality.
We have to be careful to avoid interpreting this phenomenological view as one which
holds that the world is entirely constructed or constituted by consciousness.5 This is not at all
what Husserl intends. As J. Leavitt Pearl notes, for Husserl it is not that givenness is created from
consciousness, but rather that givenness is presented to it.6 To take the former position is to
maintain that consciousness itself “makes” the world. By way of intersubjective verification we
can determine very easily that that is false, though. I do not seem to craft the world ex nihilo, but
it can be difficult to see how this is not tantamount to the admission of a material, mindindependent world. But aside from ostensibly existing in a material sense, these ancient trees had
no real “properties” but instead just a primitive and intrinsic “nature,” since no consciousness
existed at this time to afford the tree with properties. Consciousness cannot be conflated with
Nature, which itself knows no concepts and no divisions.7 When consciousness makes claims
regarding pre-conscious objects, it still does so on the basis of mind. Thus radiocarbon dating
discloses approximate dates that do not prove the material existence of an arche-object that
predates conscious humanity, but to the contrary, become valid and universal perceptions as soon
as they are manifested by consciousness. It is the difference, in short, between the bald existence
of the natural object and the “dating” that does not “exist” until consciousness employs its
methods of dating.

I will elaborate on this issue when I present my eidetic conclusions in the seventh and final
chapter.
6
Pear, “After Finitude and Phenomenological Givenness,” 14.
7
Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense.”
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What is most noteworthy is that these epistemological restrictions and qualifications
apply not only to the world of so-called external objects but also to my self. Givenness can be
thought like a shadow, which requires something to cast the shadow as well as someone to see it.
While it is tempting to post the existence of the shadow as seen by no one, this must be avoided
at all costs. Givenness is always framed against the backdrop of a horizon, meaning that to
follow through with the same metaphor, givenness takes upon a specific silhouette depending
upon the perspective of the person who beholds it, since horizons shift with vantage.
This of course also goes for the phenomenon of self. Indeed my “self” is given to me, as
are all phenomena; the self “appears” to consciousness. Despite the fact that my self is given in a
rather unique way to me when compared to other phenomena, it nevertheless remains true that I
am not “given” to myself beyond the way in which my “self” appears before consciousness. The
sole “exception” to this would be phenomenal features of my self-givenness itself, like the
horizon, which is itself still intuited and therefore “appears.” But contra Kant’s indication, there
is no “way I really am” that occupies some more fundamental and absolute epistemic level. Thus
to conceive of the way in which I “am” irrespective of consciousness is, in other words,
incomprehensible. This is difficult for consciousness to grasp since, confined within its own
limits, the tendency of consciousness is to deny the existence of its parameters. It is tempted, for
example, regarding that which transcends itself, despite the fact that it can have no access to such
a realm. Phenomenology wards off this temptation by examining only that which is
phenomenologically “given.” In fact it is the misinterpretation of this position that yields
incoherent conclusions the likes of which are shown in Meillassoux’s After Finitude. Simply put,
I am the way in which I appear to myself, because the transcendental ego constitutes that
phenomenon for me.
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Realism and materialism are still important topics to address phenomenologically. In the
next section I analyze how my embodied, material existence informs my conscious experience
and how this in turn plays a role in phenomenology of conversion.

Embodied Conversion and the Conscious-Body: Matter, Habit, Space

It is possible to incorporate material considerations into this analytical phenomenology of
conversion from another angle, inspired by the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, as the intertwined
complex of body and world. According to this view consciousness can only be approached as
embodied and intrinsically worldly. I designate the term “conscious-body” to refer to this
embodied analog to consciousness.8 In this section I will examine some of the ways in which the
experience of conversion can be phenomenologically manifest in embodiment. The primary
point that I wish to demonstrate is that, in short, when ‘I’ convert, my body converts, necessarily.
This conversion plays out in different ways. There is the material and physiological dimension to
embodied conversion, which encompasses my body’s psychophysical relation to my
consciousness, but there are also the aspects of embodied conversion that come down to my
body’s habits as well as my body’s orientation and/or relationship with respect to worldly space.
There are many ways in which conversion is mediated through my body, or otherwise has
some physical correlate on the level of my material organism. First and foremost there is the way
in which my body places a vital role in the constitution of consciousness. Not only do my five

It should be noted that the conscious-body is not always conscious in the sense of awareness,
but is at least capable of focusing on its own bodily consciousness, like the way something feels.
This is not an instinct, as it might be in other types of animals, which is why I suggest that we
conclude that the conscious-body is a human phenomenon. This phenomenon may exist in other
animals with “higher-intelligence.”
8
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senses require their corresponding organs, but even my purely intellectual experiences, are
correlated with observable cerebral events. While I do not want to go so far as to maintain that
conscious experience (i.e. having a “mind”) requires a brain, my specific way of experiencing
consciousness is ostensibly the result of various physical processes. I cannot know whether other
types of consciousness could be possible without such a basis in physical matter. At the very
least as an embodied conscious being, I find it impossible to conceive of consciousness without
my extension. Even accounts of out-of-body experiences, wherein a subject experiences
consciousness as if detached from his usual sense of physical existence, are correlated with
specific neural events. Furthermore the person who encounters this phenomenon still lives out an
experience of embodiment, only as if the conscious-body is outside of itself.
So I can take my personal account of what experience is like and examine it in terms of
the physical phenomena that are involved, although it goes without saying that I am not
consciously aware of the vast majority of the physical events correlated with my consciousness.
There is an empirical-scientific approach to this area of inquiry, and it can be used to supplement
my phenomenological analysis of embodied conversion. Indeed Merleau-Ponty is particularly
well-known for his implementation of scientific and medical research into his phenomenology.
Using a transcranial magnetic stimulator (TMS), researchers are able to inject electrical current
into a waking brain to observe its reaction, as well as into a sleeping brain—without waking it
up. They do this to observe the way in which the cerebral cortex reacts to the input, the hope
being that the cortex will be observably “different” in states of consciousness and
unconsciousness.9

Extensive damage to the cerebral cortex permanently renders a person unconscious
(vegetative), whereas the complete removal of the cerebellum, which has even more neurons,
9
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Electrodes on the TMS measure activity changes in the brain. A pulse of magnetism
(researchers call it the “ringing of a bell”) lasting 100ms causes neurons in a small section of the
cerebral cortex to “fire.” When the TMS is fitted to someone who is awake, this “firing” is
signaled to other neurons, which proceed to fire as well. The resultant complex pattern of neural
activity fans out to cover around about 1/3 of the cerebral cortex, and the signaling (“firing”)
endures for around 330ms. When the TMS is fitted to someone who is in unconscious deep
sleep, there is no reverberation after the initial signaling of the first neuron that fires. Lastly and
most importantly, when the TMS is fitted to someone who is in an REM dream state, the
reverberation and primary “firing” return—as does a form of consciousness, experienced in
dream form by the sleeping subject.
Giulio Tononi and others have inferred that while the brain in deep, unconscious sleep
may be “active” to some extent (demonstrated by the presence of the initial “firing” even when
no reverberation/echo occurs), it has ostensibly lost the ability to share information between its
parts. This is why there is no observable reverberation.
There are several important conclusions that should be made from the experiment. First,
conscious experience is correlated with physical events in the body, specifically the brain.
Therefore mental life (as I experience it) is associated with physical correlates in my organism.
Second, when there is no physical event observed in the brain/body, there is no report of
consciousness or experience in the sleeping subject. It follows that without a body, a
phenomenological subject will not have experience—at least not any sort of experience that
would closely resemble what I enjoy today. Tononi’s experiment suggests that the sharing of

does not have much effect upon consciousness at all. See Tononi, “Consciousness as Integrated
Information: A Provisional Manifesto.”
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neural information is a key ingredient for the appearance of consciousness. When the sharing
occurs, consciousness occurs, and when the sharing does not occur, as is the case in deep sleep or
after extensive damage to the cortex, then there is no occurrence of consciousness. The idea that
a phenomenological entity could have an experience separate from its body is thus refuted. It
would be utterly impossible for phenomena to “appear” to that which is not predisposed to
experience phenomena.10
This “Information Integration Model” shows the intrinsic link between conscious events
and physical events, although of course it cannot offer any description of what these experiences
are like for the subjects who live them. Only a descriptive phenomenological method can give an
account of consciousness as lived experience. But in looking at the conscious-body as a scientific
object, we can uncover import insights regarding embodied conversion. If there are physical
processes that correlate with conscious experience, then my experience of a phenomenon like
conversion can be phenomenologically analyzed in light of scientific research. For example, in
2011 a group of researchers discovered that certain “religious factors” correlated with atrophy of
the hippocampus.11 One of the religious factors with the single biggest impact on hippocampal
size was “life-changing religious experience.” The authors suggest that this might be the result of
stress. The hippocampus, situated in the temporal lobe’s inner medial region, plays a crucial role
in the limbic system, assisting in the regulation of emotional responses.12 In 1953 Henry
Molaison’s hippocampus was removed in a surgical procedure the result of which was

Here it should be noted that experience is not equivalent with observation; scientific
instruments are capable of “observation” evinced by the factor that electronic sensors play in
contributing to the so-called “observer effect” exemplified in the famous “double-slit”
experiments.
11
Owen et al., “Religious Factors and Hippocampal Atrophy in Late Life.”
12
Yassa, “Hippocampus.”
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anterograde amnesia.13 This means that he was no longer able to create new memories. Despite
this, most of his mental operations were unharmed. Depression and stress have been correlated
with hippocampal decline. All of this research seems to suggest that religious experience can
correlate with stress, the effect of which is essentially diminishment of the physical organ that,
among other things, helps to found memories and control emotion. I will leave aside the question
of whether religious/spiritual conversion is inherently stressful, but prima facie a shift as
significant as phenomenological conversion would seem to require, for many if not all of the
types I have delineated, at least some degree of stress (if not outright crisis, as in the case of the
sudden and unexpected conversion.)
Suffice to say that in at least some cases, the experience of a religious phenomenon such
as conversion can actually make present life events harder to remember and can make it more
difficult to moderate emotional impulses. It should be noted that this is not something peculiar to
religious experience or even necessary across all subjects; to the contrary, the reduced volume of
the hippocampus is ultimately correlated with high stress levels. Nevertheless the fact remains
that a stressful experience like conversion can have a physical impact on the brain’s structure. To
the extent that one could be aware of the reduced ability to form new memories, it can be said
that the phenomenon of conversion can produce a neurophysical change that itself carries
phenomenological consequences.
But the authors of this same paper suggest that this insight should be carefully
considered; they point out that “some religious variables have been found to be associated with
positive mental health” citing a 2001 paper from Koenig and Larson.”14 Belief in God has
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actually been correlated with reduced anxiety and stress, in contrast to the findings we just
examined.15 More recently the neuroscientist Andrew Newberg has shown how certain religious
practices like meditation can correlate with physical changes in the brain, often associated with
an increased ability to focus.16 So while some religious variables like conversion or minority
status correlate with stress and therefore correlate with hippocampal decline, some religious
beliefs and religious practices correlate with reduced stress or increased focus. The latter case,
like the former, is another example of an experience producing a neurophysical change with
phenomenological consequences. After all, going about in the world with less stress or more
focus is certainly tantamount to a change in one’s very subjectivity.
In both of these types of cases, the one which can be reduced to improvement and the
other to decline, we observe the sort of effects that my consciousness, my experience, can
produce on the very materiality of my existence, especially the structure of the brain. The
changes to the material basis of my consciousness themselves correlate with shifts in my
subjective orientation, like my mood or disposition, or even my mental functions, like focus.
Consequently there is an apparent feedback loop between my conscious experiences and
my physiology, where mental events produce physical effects that in turn influence the events
that constitute my experience. This is in fact a very common and general phenomenon, not just
limited to religious or spiritual experience. I can discern many hypothetical situations in which I
am first aware of some sort of physical experience that tends toward a mental effect. For example
I might feel an eerie physical sensation that prompts me to recall a traumatic event from my past.
After lounging on the couch for too long I may find it difficult to think in a clear and efficient

15
16

Inzlicht et al. “Neural Markers of Religious Conviction.”
Newberg, Principles of Neurotheology; Newberg, How God Changes Your Brain.
194

fashion. After drinking alcohol my sense of inner time consciousness may slow down, and the
rate of my thoughts slows down in consequence. If I sit with better posture, then I may have
more positive ideas about my health and image, etc. In all of these examples my physical
experience is associated with a mental result in such a way that the “mental” experience almost
seems to follow from what at first appears to me as physical, through my body.
At other times my physical experience appears to follow from what begins as mental. If I
am thinking about a traumatic event from the past, I may shudder. If I am feeling lazy, I find it
not only difficult to think but difficult to get up off the couch. If I decide to ingest alcohol, then
my perception of time may slow down. If I consider myself to be in good physical shape, then I
am more confident in my body and carry myself differently, walking differently and so on. In all
of these examples we can observe a changing perception of my body that is the result of a mental
process. Even this mental process has a physical correlate, but it is not one that I can sensuously
feel, like I can feel heat or something soft, or feel what it is like to touch my own two hands
against each other. The fact that we can observe these relations in both directions indicates
something important. Namely, the question of cause and effect is of no use in this particular case
since my experience suggests that mental and physical processes often occur in simultaneous
concert.
As Ted Toadvine indicates in reference to the thought of Merleau-Ponty, what I have
termed a “feedback loop” inherent in and intrinsic to the conscious-body can be aptly
characterized as a dialectic relation, between “the present body (characterized, after Husserl, as
an “I can”) and the habit body, the sedimentations of past activities that take on a general,
anonymous, and autonomous character.”17 This is essentially analogous to the passive synthesis
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that Husserl describes, although there is no indication that he really had embodiment in mind in
his discussions of the topic, since his commentary regarding passive synthesis is limited to the
more traditional model of “mental” consciousness, which has, in Western philosophy, tended to
take on a privileged position at the cost of the marginalization of the philosophy of the body.
But to the opposite extreme it cannot be the case that physical conditions alone suffice to
establish the experience of conversion. A medical patient who has inflicted a traumatic brain
injury resulting in a major personality change is not someone who has “converted” according to
the criteria presently under consideration. The difference between a case such as this and an
authentic conversion, broadly construed, is that an actual conversion has to be an existential
transformation, meaning that it has some basis in experience, even fantastic and hallucinatory,
and cannot be the pure result of a physical process. Even cases that may have some medical
explanation, like those regarding the potential epilepsy of Saint Paul, involve significant and
profound experiential correlates that carry much meaning for the subject. This does not mean that
the change is one of which the individual is aware, although in Paul’s case it certainly is the case
that it is. The point is that a traumatic injury or disease that “flips a switch” in the subjective
constitution of an ego cannot itself serve as the singular cause of conversion. Even if Paul’s story
can be reduced to a neurological account, such a simplification that dispenses with the
experiential content and significance for Paul is nothing short of an absurd interpretation.
Badiou’s atheistic reading of Paul serves as an excellent counterpoint to the idea that the
profound lived experience can be distilled into a “scientific” account like cognitive science,
neurology, or psychiatry. Even the unconscious conversion of the lifelong religious believer is
the result of experience.
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In any case the “habit body” is such an important concept because it captures how
sedimented meanings do not just map onto mental consciousness but in fact apply to my physical
experience as well. This habit body is a vital aspect of what I have been referring to as the
conscious-body. We can see the habit body play out in something like muscle memory, where my
body moves more or less automatically, without conscious deliberation from my “mind.” After
repetition the practice starts to become customary for me, almost automatic, as if my body is
manipulating itself without any personal involvement from me (i.e. it is anonymous). We often
think of physical habits in terms of special technique, like riding a bike or playing a musical
instrument. But in fact these habits can be far more general, like knowing how to walk or sitting
with a certain posture when reading at a desk. Even partaking of the Sacrament of the Eucharist
is asedimented physical habit in this way, from the procession to the other movements de
rigueur, like bowing and performing the Sign of the Cross, to the physical act of consuming the
host. Meditation, yoga, and prayer are much the same—all of these spiritual and religious acts
have physical correlates on the level of embodiment. In other words there is a physical feeling
associated with being involved in these acts. After I perform these activities a certain number of
times, their habitual repetition starts to affect my body in such a way that my experience of the
body takes on a different physical “feed.” Almost paradoxically this change is often one that
comes down to reduced conscious awareness of some physical practice, like subconsciously
sitting and standing at the right times during a church service. As my mental awareness of the
practice is diminished, my physical awareness picks up the slack. The enactment or manipulation
of the practice is turned over more fully to my organismal side. The point is that the
phenomenological subject’s mental and physical habits sediment themselves onto the consciousbody over the course of time.
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But this is not at all equivalent with the phenomenon of conversion according to the
“classical” model exemplified by St. Paul. In that case it is not that Paul loses conscious
awareness of some physical practice that starts to become rote, but instead that he experiences an
interruption of his habit. His physical practices, namely the persecution of Christians, are
interrupted by the apparition of Jesus Christ, who interrogates Paul (at that time Saul). Thus
instead of establishing a habit the sudden conversion case is defined by the disruption of a habit.
But in fact, all conversions result from some sort of disruption of the subject’s prior habit body.
Even the case of the gradual or unconscious conversion is one which is marked by substantial
change in the habit of the subject; it is just that this change was so gradual that the subject was
not attentive to its occurring as it unfolded in present time.
This all ties into conversion because it shows (again) how my mental life and my physical
being cannot be easily disentangled from each other. Since I have never experienced without my
body, it is impossible for me to imagine how unembodied experience could be possible at all.
Even a so-called “disembodied” experience is sensible to me insofar as I have the sensation that
my body is alien or Other to myself. I can only have this experience in virtue of the fact that I
remain nevertheless “in” my body, otherwise I would have no basis to make the judgment that I
was allegedly “out” of it. This example shows what in fact applies in all cases of experience: my
experience of my body presupposes my experience of “inner” mental life, just as my experience
of inner mental life presupposes bodily experience.
There are other ways in which conversion is mediated through the body. Via this passive
and latent constitution of the habit body, the phenomenological subject and his body are situated
in both the spatiotemporal present as well as the non-present, or perhaps, the psychophysical

198

retention of the unfulfilled present. This reveals the fact that a conversion is made possible not
only by temporality and my experience thereof, but also by spatiality and my experience thereof.
Merleau-Ponty indicates that the body is vitally involved in the constitution of my
experience in space. He writes:
[T]he life of consciousness—epistemic life, the life of desire, or perceptual life—is underpinned by
an “intentional arc” that projects around us our past, our future, our human milieu, our physical
situation, our ideological situation, and our moral situation, or rather, that ensures that we are
situated within all of these relationships. This intentional arc creates the unity of the senses, the
unity of the senses with intelligence, and the unity of sensitivity and motricity.18

The claim is that it is not only intellectual consciousness that is capable of relating via
intentionality toward objects; to the contrary, this operation belongs also to the body. This
intentionality is neither cognitive nor Cartesian. The body’s intentionality derives from its motor
potential, the actualization of which realizes external space for me. In short it is the power of the
body that grounds its intentionality. As Merleau-Ponty puts it, “there would be no such thing as
space for me if I did not have a body.”19 Space, in other words, is phenomenological. This does
not mean that space is merely a mind-independent construct, however. Rather, the idea is that
space is known to me in such a way that reflects my embodiment across the three dimensions of
space. Clearly this manner in which space appears to me is different in kind from the bare
mathematics of space, which are perhaps known by my intellect but also interpreted in applied
form in my lived experience. In short, the way in which I can know space is radically different
from the way in which an unembodied intelligence could conceive of the same.
It should be pointed out, though, that the hypothetical unembodied intelligence is the bare
minimum when it comes to conceiving of space, despite the fact that its understanding of space
would be radically different from my own. While claiming that a mind is required for an idea
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sounds tautological, this is often the subject of consternation. It is certainly the case that a mind
is required in order for a thought to exist, so it follows that the conception of space requires
consciousness. This is emphatically not the same as the claim that space in-itself, if there is such
a thing, requires consciousness in order to exist. As we have seen, if there is such a space-initself, then by definition we can know nothing of it. The point is that space as an idea is not the
same as space as such. It is useful to compare Merleau-Ponty’s view to that of Kant:
Space is not something objective and real, nor a substance, nor an accident, nor a relation; instead,
it is subjective and ideal, and originates from the mind’s nature in accord with a stable law as a
scheme, as it were, for coordinating everything sensed externally.20

Merleau-Ponty would agree in principle with most of this. But crucially he has to add that it is
specifically via the body that the mind is afforded with the “stable law” that permits coordinated
external sensation. While space can be construed in terms of pure mathematics, the math rests on
a foundation established by consciousness on both the intellectual as well as material levels. The
mathematics in virtue of which space is construed is still true a priori, but until consciousness
enumerates all of the axioms that would in cooperation with one another establish a system of
rules, math as “undiscovered” is “known” by no one. It is after conscious synthesis that the entire
domain of mathematized space is uncovered, and it is via my embodied consciousness that I
know what space feels like. My knowledge of space is not just propositional, in other words. My
consciousness knows space in such a way that reflects that I am conscious in space, through my
body.
The idea here, in short, is that the body is space, it “inhabits” and “assumes” space in
such a way that it establishes the very basis of the phenomenon for consciousness. Without
space, after all, there would be no experience. Merleau-Ponty uses the term “body schema” to
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refer to this “practical system” comprised of “bodily space and external space.”21 It is by way of
the body schema, as my space, that I can have an understanding of external space. On a material
level, my knowledge of the latter is derivative from the former, from my conscious embodiment.
Thus while it can be easy to interpret these words too strongly, one should not
misunderstand Merleau-Ponty to suggest that space is just a mind-dependent construct.
Consciousness cannot fabricate space without there being some appearance or phenomenon
before consciousness that itself establishes the idea. So the present thesis, that space requires
consciousness, has to be supplemented with a second thesis, that space also requires the world. It
is through the body that consciousness knows the world.
Kant points out that the concept cannot just be empirical, however. Space informs my
outer experience in such a way that space cannot itself be something I derive from experience.
Kant writes:
Space is not an empirical concept which has been derived from outer experiences. For in order that
certain sensations be referred to something outside me (that is, to something in another region of
space from that in which I find myself), and similarly in order that I may be able to represent them
as outside and alongside one another, and accordingly as not only different but as in different places,
the representation of space must already underlie them. Therefore, the representation of space
cannot be obtained through experience from the relations of outer appearance; this outer experience
is itself possible at all only through that representation.22

Here he points out that the concept of space is not extrapolated from experience, since
experience clearly already requires the representation of space in order to be sensible in the first
place. Instead, the concept structures the experience itself. If it was any other way, then I would
not be able to have the experience of space.
If my experience presupposes the experience of space, then my ability to experience
conversion relies in part upon my body’s engagement with space. There are two different ways in
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which my body’s engagement with space changes in significant ways as the result of spiritual or
religious conversion. First there is the embodied-phenomenon of my own body within space, and
second there is the embodied-phenomenon of “outer” space (meaning space external to my own
body).
Conversion affects the way that the conscious-body, the body-phenomenon, is present to
me. With my Cartesian-influenced understanding of my “self” as both mind and body any
significant change of mind brings about a reordered perception of my body. If a religious change
precipitates a change in my personal identity, this change most likely but not necessarily entails a
difference in the way in which I interpret my own body as well as its ultimate significance. This
can also be seen in the theological concept of the “sanctity” of the body. In some cases of
conversion the body is perceived in a new way as a result of the change in spiritual identity. In
some of these cases, especially in Christianity, the body is professed to be a sacred physical
counterpart to the intellectual soul. Often times this doctrine is related to moral teachings
concerning chastity, but a new understanding of the corpus sancti can also institute changes in
dietary habits, exercise habits, and so on.
This does not necessarily mean that the body will develop into something that I come to
prize or value. To the contrary it can start to become something that I regret, lament, despise,
deny, etc. This understanding may be one of positive or negative appraisal, something via which
the soul can reach some higher plane of Being, or, conversely, something in spite of which the
soul will strive to reach the same. Thus it is apparent that instead the relevant general
requirement is that when there occurs a phenomenological conversion, it also, by strict necessity,
brings about a change in the conscious-body’s understanding of itself, albeit to varying degrees
of awareness.
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If the conversion is not one of identity, but rather one which pertains to role, then there
still results a difference in the phenomenon of personal embodiment. If my role has changed then
the functionality of my body has changed. My body has taken on some new important purpose
that plays a part in the very constitution and definition of myself, even if not on the level of
fundamental “identity.” For example if I was always a Catholic but only very recently became a
Eucharistic Minister, then my underlying identity, as a Catholic, has not changed, but one of my
roles has—I am not the facilitator of a Catholic sacrament to my peers. By our criteria this has to
count as sort of conversion. This conversion or change in role brings about a series of subtle
changes in my perception of my body, including the directional practices I abide by during a
Mass, i.e. where I stand in the sanctuary, as well as the precise movements that my body
performs as I administer communion, sometimes dividing a singular host by halves or even by
fourths, i.e., the way in which I perform the repeated motion of repeating with my mouth certain
sacramental words, repeatedly placing a host in the hand of he or she who receives communion,
as well as the way in which I understand my own physical presence in the liturgical space,
namely, as a minister of the sacrament.
In all of these situations there is a correspondence between my purely conceptual
understanding of my self and my conscious-body, in other words, my embodied self. Often times
these two, exemplified in the appearance of inner consciousness and the appearance of the
conscious-body, are difficult to separate.
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Ch. 6. Saint Paul: A Phenomenological Case Study

The Conversion of St. Paul: Free Will, Judgment, and the Body

In this chapter I will phenomenologically analyze the famous case of the conversion of Saint
Paul. Here my objective is not to produce an eidetic explanation of Paul’s empirical case, but
rather, to present a phenomenological reading of the most influential conversion anecdote of all
time.
According to my synthetic phenomenological model of conversion, Paul undergoes his
conversion when he experiences a radical change in identity that is mediated by a transcendent
perceptual event. But what exactly does it mean for his conversion to be mediated—or otherwise
“involved” with—this event? There are at least two different ways to attempt an answer to this
question.
The first explanation essentially holds that Paul’s conversion is equivalent with the event,
meaning that his conversion is entirely passive. According to this view, Paul is converted in and
by the transcendent event. Paul does “do” anything. He is converted “by God” as if he is a
passive recipient, a “lightning rod” through whom the divine conducts a radical and
instantaneous transformation. This is the “standard” or “traditional” model of Paul as passive
convert. This interpretation epitomizes the view of some eminent commentators, the likes of
which include St. Thomas Aquinas, who writes, “Paul, suddenly when he was in the midst of sin,
his heart was perfectly moved by God.”1 There are weaker versions of this explanation, such as
the one we saw in the first chapter as characterized by Rambo, who defines the Pauline
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conversion as one which involves a “passive respondent to outside force.”2 Rambo grasps the
need to incorporate Paul’s response into his conversion sequence, which is arguably further than
St. Thomas is willing to go, but he ultimately characterizes the respondent as passive, which is
utterly incongruous. What does it mean for someone to respond passively? Is this equivalent to
responding out of instinct or automatic response? “Passively responding” could benefit from
further analysis, but at least at first glance this account of Paul is inadequate. The idea that Paul
is just a passive respondent downplays and arguably undermines the extent to which his
conversion is so profound and meaningful.
Ultimately, while neither of these accounts make for unreasonable ways to analyze Paul’s
example, there is another, different way of examining his case. This second, alternative
explanation suggests that Paul’s conversion is set in motion by the transcendent event but is not
entirely reducible to the event’s occurrence. This view also holds that Paul is more than a mere
“passive” respondent to a transcendent or supernatural event. While the view of Aquinas bolsters
the significance of divine omnipotence and grace, it arguably undermines the extent to which
Paul is free. Without Paul’s freedom there is no conversion at all. If Paul is forced by God’s grace
to convert—with no possibility to do otherwise—then on a phenomenological level, he is no
different from a medical patient who is “converted” through subjection to electroshock therapy.
The forced and manipulated alteration of his consciousness is difficult to reconcile with the idea
that he has attained a new identity. The forced alteration of consciousness is a case in which the
subject responds to an imperious assertion from without; the subject is named or identified, but
from the outside. This is not conversion. While identity is not something that is constituted on a
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basis that is entirely conscious or aware, it is not extrinsic to the subject, either. Existential
identity must emanate from existence itself, not from something that transcends existence.
Without a doubt we can be sure that St. Thomas realizes this, but he mandates along
typically Aristotelian lines that God “moves” Paul’s free will. It is certainly unclear whether
Thomas thinks that Paul could have rejected God’s grace in this case, even though the Council of
Trent established that grace can be rejected by the will. Looking at Paul’s case in this way
imparts much theological significance and allays certain metaphysical questions regarding the
causal source of his conversion, but from the phenomenological perspective it only offers an
incomplete analysis of Paul because it does not take up his consciousness firsthand.3 Setting
matters of faith and theology aside, strictly speaking it may or may not be the case that God
“moves” the will of Paul, but even if God does, phenomenology can assert as much only if this
divine movement is “given” or appears.
So is it true—does Paul in fact convert through something that follows from the
transcendent phenomenon, such that his “actual” conversion occurs not in the instant of his
transcendent experience but rather in the way in which he responds to the event? According to
this interpretation Paul’s conversion would be actuated or incited by the spectacle he encounters
via his sense, but not itself equivalent with or reducible that sensory “spectacle”—or whatever
divine force is the supposed cause thereof.4 In a way this is arguably similar to the account of
Aquinas, wherein God is the efficient and final cause of Paul’s conversion, with the proviso that
the “principle of principles” precludes us from grasping outside of Paul’s conscious experience

Indeed the experience is ultimately theologically significant in itself, although it is not being
analyzed here for such a reason.
4
Here I deliberately use Guy Debord’s term “spectacle.” Culture is arguably preoccupied with
the image of Paul on the ground on the road.
3
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in search of objective “causes.” Thus the metaphysical claim concerning the ultimate causality of
the judgmental act is reduced to a “mere” belief. The corollary of this is that any supposed
“cause” is just a belief evinced in an act of consciousness—in other words, a mere perception.
Certainly, Paul determines that the transcendent event that he witnesses is the manifestation of
divine grace, but according to the phenomenological perceptive that is a perception, an
appearance. So at least for now this opinion regarding the cause of the belief is to be bracketed,
despite the fact that it is often the case that the Pauline conversion story is recounted with a
definite focus on precisely this aspect of the account, namely, the way in which it purportedly
occurs involuntarily, as if for a passive subject whose transformation is the wholesale effect of
some outside impetus. Now, to be sure, to eliminate the transcendent phenomena at the
beginning of the story would constitute a violent redaction of the tale, so I do not mean to
suggest that it bears no importance to the overall picture. This is not at all the case. Rather, it is
that the “divine interaction” in Paul’s story can be reduced to sensory events that feature
centrally in Paul’s story but do not themselves constitute anything remotely proximate to an
authentic existential conversion. In short, when we examine Paul’s phenomenology, we find that
the sensuous correlates of his conversion entail a rather minor role in the grand scheme of things.
Make no mistake, it has to be granted that the transcendent phenomenon conspicuously
imparts the potency of divine power. Paul’s very will is overpowered by the appearance of “a
light from the sky … [that] flashed around him.”5 God’s will, in other words, trumps that of the
convert. Paul even uses passive language to describe the epistemological side of the experience:
“… I want you to know, brothers, that the gospel preached by me is not of human origin. For I
did not receive it from a human being, nor was I taught it, but it came through a revelation of
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Jesus Christ.”6 But at the same time, there is another sort of violent redaction that is committed
by depicting Paul’s conversion in such a way that it is the result of divine force alone and not
also Paul’s own free will. The Aristotelian account of the efficient cause behind Paul’s
conversion is all well and good, but Paul’s conversion is misinterpreted if the result of God’s
grace is Paul’s choosing to believe is passed over. Paul does choose to convert, after all, even if
divine intervention pushes him into the scenario where he must make his choice. The issue is that
if Paul’s possibility of rejecting grace is not admitted, then neither nor his choice nor his
conversion are really free. But if my interpretation of his example is reasonable, then his famous
conversion is passive only in a limited sense, while it is quite active in other respects. I will
demonstrate this by showing how Paul’s partly “passive” conversion is impossible without
multiple “active” judgments on his part. If I can show that this is true in all cases and not just
Paul’s, then I can reasonably conclude that the active vs. passive conversion schema constitutes a
false dichotomy. Conversions always involve volition.7
It is certainly true that Paul does not seek out his transcendent roadside event on the way
to Damascus. Having been a regular aggressor toward Christians a conversion to Christianity is
not something in which Paul is interested; conversion is not something for which he is “looking.”
To the contrary Paul says that he is “called. . . through his grace.”8 This call is interpreted by Paul
in such a way that it is understood to be what is, in the natural attitude, referred to as an “outer”
appearance. This means that the phenomenon results from “outside” of the subject himself. But

Gal. 1:11-12 NABRE
Even the unconscious conversion is one that involves volition on some level. For example,
even if an adult cannot remember ever being not religious, and therefore cannot identify any
conversion in his or her past, the adult’s previous practices were volitional.
8
Gal. 1:15-16 NABRE
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to the extent that this identification is an interpretation that Paul makes, it is not really “manifest”
until a judgment is made on Paul’s part.
Paul makes further judgments throughout the course of his conversion. When he
eventually stands up from the ground, he can “see nothing.” While it must be admitted that the
“matter” of this act, as Husserl puts it, does not follow from a judgment that Paul makes (i.e. the
sensuous visual appearance); it is nevertheless apparent that the verbal or even mental expression
of his blindness entails a judgment, in this case just the statement of the obvious, that he is
“seeing nothing.” Judgments such as these are extraneous to the fact of Paul’s blindness. In other
words Paul’s judging that he is blind does not make it so—his words do not have this power.
Sensory deprivation, even unexpected, is not enough in itself to precipitate a change in identity.
Thus it is as Paul is led in blindness to his destination that the most important and meaningful
judgment of all takes place. It is via this judgment that Paul is actually converted, at least in a
phenomenological sense.9
It is undeniable that Paul “sees” something, and then “hears” something, and makes at
least a few judgments pertaining to these appearances, but the real conversion, his conversion
proper, resides in the radical result of these “outer” appearances, which is Paul’s judgment to
become Christian. This is why his conversion is in fact achieved not in his reception of the
transcendent event, but in his answering to the “call” that the event constitutes. His answer is of
course the result of a series of profound judgments that he makes regarding his identity. The
transcendent event can also and should also be framed as part of the phenomenological re-

By “phenomenological sense” I mean the sense in which the experience involves appearances
that are “given” to consciousness. These appearances can come from within or without but an
appearance that seems to emanate from an external source cannot itself manifest a conversion
without a corresponding belief in the ego.
9
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positioning of Paul, to the extent that the sensuous and transcendent appearance does play a role
in the conversion, despite the fact that it does not (and cannot) play the sole role in a conversion.
Along the same lines one could fairly call the transcendent phenomenon a conditioning event; it
sets the scene for what is to follow via judgment.
It must be admitted, however that not only are Paul’s conversion judgments existential
and volitional in nature, but they are also thoroughly rational and intellectual. When Paul is
directly presented with an appearance that he judges to contradict what he had previously held to
be the truth, this is so groundbreaking for him that he is compelled to revise his beliefs. Paul
judges his sensuously-given to be direct experience of the divine, and he deems it only rational to
reconsider what he had previously held to be true. He is presented, after all, with what appears to
be external, “material” counter-evidence to his previous religious worldview.10 It is not that naive
belief in the “external world” is necessarily a rational judgment, but instead that concrete
phenomenal evidence compels Paul to alter his beliefs—it would be irrational for Paul to
continue along in his old ways of believing.
These judgments are Paul’s own, the product of his own volition and liberty. So while
Paul’s conversion is commonly construed to be a sort of personal subjective crisis caused by an
external force, on the phenomenological level the crisis in fact comes from within, not from
without; Paul is not a forced convert. The critical event disrupts Paul’s perception of himself to
such a degree that he no longer conceives of himself as a separate individual but to the contrary
as a member of a universal affiliation. This too is a judgment. Like Descartes, he begins to
question everything he previously took to be true, the result of which is the careful
reconsideration of all of his prior judgments.
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These judgments are what comprise the sustained self-inquiry of Paul. They result from
the transcendent event and they culminate in, and constitute, Paul’s complete existential
transformation. In other words, Paul’s experience of consciousness, his awareness of his own
body, and his engagement with the world all change as a result not of his encounter with the
transcendent, but more properly with his judgments regarding that encounter. While it is true that
it is the transcendent event that, as Badiou suggests, produces a “tear” or rupture in the very
fabric of Paul’s subjectivity, Paul, as phenomenological subject, is the executor of this subjective
tear.
Paul’s conversion thus restructures the frameworks and limits of his own consciousness.
This radical existential shift comprises for him a complete phenomenological reorientation.11
While attempts have recently been made to analyze Paul’s conversion using the methods of
psychiatry and neurology, ultimately the most “scientific” account of Paul’s story, at least in a
Husserlian sense, is that which focuses on the first-person perspective with respect to the
experience. The root cause or inspiration behind the experience, whether it is metaphysical or
neurological or otherwise, is irrelevant.12 This is because no matter the ultimate cause (if any) of
Paul’s mental states, the conscious determinations of these mental states, i.e. the judgments, are
the true vehicle for his conversion.
But the reason why these judgments are too often overlooked is in light of the undeniable
effect that the transcendent event produces upon Paul. Even if Paul does not convert on the mere
basis of the sensory event, he cannot convert without it. Thus our attention should be called back

As we have seen, not everything in my lived experience is the object of conscious awareness.
To the contrary much of my life eludes the focus of my attention.
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to where we began, with the catalyzing sensuous phenomenon that inaugurates Paul’s episode—
the Damascus incident.

The Conversion of St. Paul: A Phenomenology of Light and Voice

While Paul is often called a “passive” convert, I have suggested that his conversion is actually
constituted by a series of judgments that he makes regarding his own identity (in crisis) and thus
his true conversion should not be deemed to be equivalent with or reducible to the supernatural
phenomenal events that he experiences. It is true that his conversion begins with a “passive”
positioning of his subjectivity. It is the “external” event that conditions his existence in this
moment. Indeed at the time of the transcendent event his subjectivity is defined as “passive” in
relation to an adventitious impetus; if we isolate this single instant, we can see Paul (as Saul) as
just someone to whom the event “happens.”
As I have argued, the real change in Paul materializes through his reaction to what
happens to him on the road to Damascus. He quickly transcends the passive conditioning of the
event via the judgments that he makes concerning the transcendent event. His subjectivity
thuswise exercises its sovereignty over the contents of its experience—as transcendental ego. It
is this ego’s judgments that themselves enact the conversion proper, which involves, as I have
shown, not only intellectual and/or spiritual changes, but also changes to embodiment as
experienced.
But just as any account of Paul’s conversion that ignores or downplays his judgment is
arguably inadequate, so, too, is any account of Paul that ignores the sensuous correlates of his
experience. Here I have treated the former first because my argument is that it is more primary
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and essential, but my phenomenological study would be incomplete if it were to focus solely on
the experience of conversion judgments and did not include an analysis of the “outer” sense
experiences involved in the conversion. It would be a grave oversight to ignore the fact that the
transcendent phenomenon makes the conversion possible, despite the fact that it is judgment that
makes it actual.13
Let us begin with Paul’s first-person consciousness and from there proceed toward the
specific sensuous phenomena that are relevant to his case. From this viewpoint conversion is a
first-person experience that is tied to a definite and determinate event, occurring in real time, in
what appears for Paul to be the present or “now” moment of his conscious stream. As Paul is
walking along his way to his destination his ordinary mundane experience is suspended by an
extraordinary sensory event. This event is disruptive in nature, its disruption enacted via the
temporary debilitation of Paul’s sensory experience. Thus it is the interruption of Paul’s
ordinarily experienced and anticipated “outer sense” that makes possible (but does not itself
execute) the complete reordering of Paul’s identity.
As we have seen it is the judgment that executes the conversion proper, but these
judgments cannot be made without the occurrence of the phenomenon from which Paul first
concludes that his previous ways were wrong. The existential judgments follow from what
begins with the judgment that the sensuous phenomenon is the provenance of (the Christian)
God. All of Paul’s conversion judgments can be traced to this single sensuous moment.14 But the
significance of this is that Paul’s conversion is both intellectual and sensuous; its rational
dimension is opened up by the sensorial. Here I will more closely examine this sensorial

In other words it is judgment that actualizes what is only the potential for conversion.
It is this sensuous moment that, theologically speaking, demonstrates the potency of divine
grace.
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“moment” using the methods of transcendental phenomenology. I will focus on the two modes in
which the event is sensuously given to Paul: via his vision and his hearing.
Let us begin with Paul’s visual experience of the phenomenon of light: “a light from the
sky suddenly flashed around him.”15 It is especially significant that it is via the appearance of
light that Paul’s conversion is initiated. Light is a curious phenomenon as it is at once both that
which makes possible the phenomenon of sight while it is also a possible object of sight—at least
in a limited sense, since I cannot see light in the same way that I can see trees or my desk. In the
natural attitude I may operate under the pretense that I see light, but in the phenomenological
attitude “seeing” light is in fact heavily qualified. In short, I do not see light in the way that I see
objects. My experience of light is different from that of ordinary objects because even in the
natural attitude I understand that my experience of light is not of light in itself, of light qua
material object. Light is something that I see in that it is part of what I see, but I cannot (even in
the natural attitude) see light itself. In the natural attitude, light seems to “fill” the air without
being materially present to me.
It is apparent that my perception of light is different in kind from material perception. But
sometimes phenomena that are related to light can be confusing for analysis. We cannot let these
initially confounding examples undermine what is a reasonable analysis. It is imperative, for
example, that we do not confuse brightness, such as the brightness of the sun or the screen of an
electronic device, with the (direct) perception of light. Light has to be reflected; it requires an
object in order to be perceived. Like color, my perception of it cannot be removed from the
objective phenomenal world.
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Projected light can also be confusing. I encounter projected light all the time, like the
light that emanates from the lamp in a room that is already well-lit. I can see this light as cast
against the wall. But in other cases, especially those where my environment is poorly lit,
projected light can appear as if it is an object. Consider for example the bright output of a
spotlight against a dark night sky. In this example do I not see light directly? In short, no—in this
case light is discernible for me only in virtue of the fact that it is cast across the sky as a sort of
background object. Thus it is a background in a visual sense and not a physical sense, although
physical properties of the “empty” sky do affect my perception of light, such as the particles in
the air that account for the red appearance of a setting sun. Thus these exceptional cases of light
perception can be explained in the same terms as background light. It is worthwhile to state the
obvious here and point out that we do not perceive light in the way that we perceive material
objects since, after all, light is not material. This is confirmed by my sense of touch, although I
am not capable of physically encountering every material object, at least if a physical encounter
requires a discernible sensation on my part, since I can “touch” microscopic particles that will
appear to me through the assisted vision of a lens, and yet I cannot feel them when I touch them.
It is apparent even to so-called “common sense” that light is not a thing, not a material
entity—and yet I still see it. What exactly do I see if light has no material status? In the natural
scientific attitude it is understood that light, as energy, cannot be directly perceived, not only by
virtue of its physical properties but also my own physiological constitution.16 While light does
not have mass, its objective “existence” is grounded in its perpetual motion. Light is always

Sometimes it is suggested that energy cannot be perceived at all, but this argument is a gross
distortion of something manifestly true in the phenomenological attitude, namely, that with my
eyes, brain, and central nervous system I am not capable of seeing light as “what it is,” energy. I
am to the contrary seeing the effects of the energy.
16
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moving. It moves in waves and while I can feel the effects of these waves, I do not regard the
massless object directly (I cannot do so). While I can feel the effects of some but not all of the
various wavelengths of light that surpass the capabilities of my vision, even the wavelengths that
I can “see” are interpreted as such by the brain. Outside of this interpretive milieu the light itself
has no color. The color of the world is confined to the limits of consciousness and perhaps
instruments for detection, which obviously cannot “experience” the color in sensuous fashion,
despite the fact that they may be able to “identity” the color on the basis of measured
wavelength.
In the phenomenological attitude, things change. Despite the fact that I do not experience
light as an object in itself, light is still a phenomenon that I recognize and face on a daily basis.
While I may not technically see light in itself, at least according to the natural and theoretical
attitudes, light often appears to me in a primary way. Phenomenologically speaking, I do see
light and I can direct my intentionality toward its manifestation(s). I see light coming out of the
fixtures in the room, I see the light of my computer screen as I type these words, I see the light
shining through the slanted blinds of the west window. A physicist can tell me that I do not really
see light itself in these scenarios, but my experience confirms otherwise. I know, after all, when I
do not see light like this.
But light is also something much more preponderant than what is involved in these
allegedly “direct” cases. Light is something that I often see without looking at it directly, like the
way in which a room illuminated in ordinary daylight just appears to me as a room of objects and
things, and not as a room of light. It is the light that makes it possible for me to see anything at
all. Like the case of the light that I see coming from a lamp or window, this light requires my
intentionality in order to stick out from what is otherwise only a latent and partially given
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phenomenon. Husserl has a term for this sort of partial presentation. The phenomenal experience
of light falls under the category of what Husserl calls “apperception.” Although his
phenomenological findings need no confirmation from the natural scientific attitude, it is worth
nothing that his account is corroborated by the explanations of optics given by scientific
researchers.
Apperceptions are rather different from ordinary, “direct” perceptions in that they are not
directly given as are ordinary material objects. But this is not to say that an apperception is
interpretive; Husserl intimates that it is not inferential, not a “thinking act.”17 Thus an
apperception takes on a rather unique status caught between the two modes of perception—it is
neither perceived nor reasoned.
So what is apperception? An apperception is a part of a perception that is indirectly given
but nevertheless grasped in an immediate manner. Husserl writes of apperceptions that they are:
. . .intentional lived-experiences that are conscious of something as perceived, [but this something
as perceived] is not self-given in these lived-experiences (not completely): and they are called
apperceptions to the extent that they have this trait, even if in this case they also consciously intend
what in truth is self-given in them. Apperceptions transcend their immediate content. . .18

The first thing to note is that apperceptions entail intentionality. While intentionality is often
confused with conscious awareness, this is a misconception that likely results from confusion
with the word “intent.” Intentionality as a concept in transcendental phenomenology actually
refers as we have seen to the “aboutness” of an experience. Not all experiences have
intentionality; sensations, for example, are not intentional. They can be made intentional via
phenomenological reflection, but until then, the sensation is only the “material” correlate of a
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possible mental act. This is the distinction that plays out in the difference between being in pain
and thinking about the pain.
Second it is significant that the apperception is essentially the perception of something
that is not immediately perceived. This sounds abstract but with a concrete example we can see
how straightforward the notion of apperception actually is. I will elaborate upon an example
given by Moran: I sit indoors as I write this, in a room with both shape and size. As I face in one
direction, I perceive the limit of the interior space in front of me—the wall. Even though I cannot
see the wall behind me, I grasp that it is there. This does not require any sort of cognition from
me; while I am inside of the building my sense of being inside of not only a room but also a
larger structure is latent in my consciousness despite the fact that it is neither an inference nor
something that is given directly to sense.
In this particular example I have most likely seen the back wall of the building
previously, but this prior experience is not necessary for apperception. Consider how I can look
from a close distance at a material object. The object appears to me in its “profile” view,
according to the specific “adumbration” of its presentation. This adumbration is essentially the
perspective of the phenomenal object, but it applies more so to the object than to the perceiver.
The fact that I can only regard this object in adumbrated form while I nevertheless can intuit its
other possible adumbrations is the product of my apperception. Despite the fact that I have never
seen the other or “back” side of this object, I grasp that it is there. Again, I do not have to think
about it in order for the object to have the other side, nor do I directly see that side—it is just
“there.”
Light is a bit more complicated of an example than the back side of a material object, but
the mode of its phenomenal appearance is just the same: it is apperceived. Curiously, Husserl
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does not discuss the apperception of light much at all in his writing, which is surprising for such
a fundamental and ubiquitous apperception, without which visual perception would be
impossible.19 As vision occupies a primary place in outer sensation, as I have argued, its requisite
basis in the apperception of light is a surprising oversight on Husserl’s part.
It is light that at once both makes it possible for us to see at the same time that it is only
partially given itself, which accounts for its apperceptive status. Light is not perceived as a
distinct object in itself but is instead part of a perceptual “schema.” The apperception of light is
an example of what Husserl has in mind when he indicates that “it is in relation to
“circumstances” that the thing is what it is.”20 Husserl points out that an object can remain the
same while the lighting changes, which he calls a change in the “sensuous schema.”21 This
schema is apperceived since light really only appears to my vision as “cast.” Its givenness is
therefore indirect; I do not experience it as a singular presentation, in the way that I can see a
book or an animal.
At the same time that light is more difficult to see than material objects, it is that which
makes it possible to see material objects in the first place, just as the back side of an object
makes possible its appearance as a multi-dimension shape that takes up space. Take, for example,
the way in which I am able to see the output of a flashlight in the dark, but not in daylight. In the
case of daylight light is already cast upon the extent of my environment, such that I cannot see
any “additional” light that is added onto it, at least insofar as the light is of the same
polychromatic wavelength as the background sunlight. In the natural attitude, physicists can
explain the phenomenon of vision in terms of the reflective qualities of an external object’s

The most sustained discussion of the phenomenology of light is probably in Ideas II.
Husserl, Ideas II, 44 <41>.
21
Ibid.
19
20

219

molecules. As we have seen the “color” of an object is the brain’s identification of the
wavelength of light that the object reflects. But crucially this requires a source of light in the first
place in order for reflection to occur at all. This is why it is impossible to see a material object in
complete darkness; there is no light, which is necessary in order to see. In pitch darkness, the red
ball has no color at all. While it is true as we saw in the natural attitude that we do not directly
see light appear to us, it is manifest via apperception that it is a phenomenological condition of
the experience of vision; it is evident in experience that without light we would have no vision at
all.
The visual component of the phenomenal field is especially significant in that it is more
“present” than the other sensuous dimensions of experience. Consider just how primary the
status of sight really is; at least when I am awake, more often than not I am seeing something.
This does not mean that I am noticing anything in particular. Furthermore, I am likely paying
more attention to vision (although perhaps not a lot more) than any of the other senses, which are
either essentially hibernating, as is my olfaction when I do not seem to smell anything in
particular, or marked by empty content, exemplified by the situation wherein I “hear silence.”
The silence almost paradoxically “sounds” a certain way to me as sensuous phenomenon. Vision
is, at least ordinarily, different in kind from other sensory situations like these. 22 Unless I am in
deep and dreamless sleep, then my vision is either passively or actively occupied.

There is even a need to analyze the appearance of blindness, just as it is necessary to analyze
all other sorts of non-objective visual objects, from hallucinations to vivid dreams to pure
imagination. There are fascinating insights to be found in the phenomenology of blindness.
Someone who is profoundly blind from birth sees not “blackness” but “nothing.” Only someone
who has at one point seen is capable of identifying “blackness.” For those who can see, it is next
to impossible to phenomenologically different the vision of “blackness” from “nothing.” Many
people who are not profoundly blind are capable of what is called “light perception.”
22
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Because vision is so primary and fundamental to the constitution of experience, when
Paul is temporarily blinded by a bright light, his blindness is itself a seeing—it is determined by
its circumstances. It has to be a seeing to the extent that Paul is capable of identifying it as
blindness in the first place. This is a familiar experience that many people have had at some point
or another; I have experienced my own visual field in a “washed out” mode wherein all I see is
bright white, or, if I squint my eyes, what appears instead to be a dark and red “wall.” Either of
these visions can result from having looked directly at a bright light source. Even if I close my
eyes right now, I am at once both not seeing, or seeing nothing, and also seeing something,
namely a black field or map that comprises my entire visual field.
As we can see in these examples, sight is a continuously occurring phenomenon for me.
Even when I am not noticing things or focusing on anything in particular, I still have the
experience of seeing. My sight is more continuous than perhaps any other faculty of sense. I am
almost always “seeing” to some degree, whereas it is far from obvious that the same is true for
my other external senses.
The apparent primacy of sight is likely related to the provenance of the numerous
epistemological tropes that employ visual metaphors in order to link the intellectual to the visual.
This analogy is epitomized by the question “do you see what I mean?” as asked to someone
regarding a matter that involves only words and has no visual basis whatsoever. Indeed
intellectual understanding is often characterized using visual metaphors. In Plato’s dialogues
Socrates often asks his interlocutor whether he “sees” whether something is the case or not.23
Phenomenology inherits this idiomatic schema. Indeed this is occasionally suggested to be a
limitation of phenomenology; as Don Ihde puts it, this is the “intense visualism” manifest in
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phenomenology, a favoritism that is traceable at least to Heraclitus and the Greeks.24 But this
arguable bias is confirmed by the nature of our experience, which, with certain clinical
exceptions, tends to privilege the phenomenon of sight. My experience of vision is persistent and
nearly omnipresent compared to the other modes of outer sensation.
The primacy of vision reinforces the sensuous primacy of Paul’s conversion—it is given
to him in the most fundamental of ways. The visual component of Paul’s conversion evinces the
fact that his transformation occurs, if not on the basis of some external thing that has properties
of its own, on the basis of external perception, of the presentation of some “given” that in the
natural attitude would be considered to be really “outside” of the subject. To this end it is fair to
characterize the conversion of Paul as at least partially “passive” to the extent that the original
catalyst for the transformative shift is something that is (at least understood to be if not actually)
external to the subject. In effect, even if Paul’s conversion is the result of a neurological event
like an epileptic seizure, it is Paul’s interpretation of the seizure that trumps everything else. In
other words, even if Paul was experiencing an epileptic episode, he thought he saw Christ. It is
notable that even the sensuous correlate of the conversion entails a judgment, in this case an
identification. Paul sees a bright light, and he decides that it is the light of Christ.25 Here the
judgment pertains to what is an apperception since, as I have shown, light cannot be directly
perceived but only apperceived. Despite the fact that this apperception is by definition indirect, it
is potent enough to temporarily strip Paul of his sense of sight. Paul attributes this intense and
disruptive apperception to the work of God.

Ihde, Phenomenologies of Sound, 21, 51.
This should not be understood to imply that it is not “really” the voice of Christ. It may or may
not be the voice of Christ and Paul’s decision regarding whether it is or not ultimately has no
bearing on that matter.
24
25
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Paul also judges that he hears the voice of Christ, thus this is the other sensuous catalyst
for his conversion. If there is any faculty of sense that rivals the primacy of vision, it is hearing.
Even when I hear “nothing,” I am still hearing, just as with vision when I see nothing, I am still
seeing. It is less clear that when I taste nothing I am still tasting, or that when I smell nothing, I
am smelling. While darkness/blackness and silence (rather paradoxically) have determinate
appearances before sense, it is far from obvious that “nothing” has a taste or a smell. These
senses do not operate so noticeably “in the background” as does my vision and hearing. It is
almost as if the taste or smell of nothing would require a judgment in order to ascend to the level
of presence, whereas the sight or sound of nothing is something that is more immediately given
(and therefore more immediately noticed). While it is true that when I taste something I do not
need to make a judgment in order to experience the taste, in the case of the absence of flavor I
typically need to determine that I taste nothing. The same is not true for my sight and hearing,
each of which is essentially pre-judgmental or pre-reflective in nature. I may not notice that there
is no sound, but I am hearing the lack of sound in a different, more direct manner than what I
experience when I am tasting or smell nothing. Without a doubt I do not have to make a
judgment in order to taste or smell something, but the “presence of absence” is more sensuously
felt by me in the case of my seeing and hearing. I am more likely to notice seeing nothing than I
am to notice hearing nothing, but each dimension of sense is more continuously present to my
consciousness compared to other modes of sensation like taste and smell.
All of this is to say that the fact that Paul’s conversion is mediated by one of the more
primary domains of sensuous experience is not insignificant. Paul is addressed in the most direct
and effective manner possible—after all, seeing is believing. Indeed in Paul’s particular case it is
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not the “sound of nothing” that accompanies his conversion but instead a determinate sound that
is identified as a voice. In Acts the author recounts that:
He fell to the ground and heard a voice saying to him, “Saul, Saul, why are you persecuting me?”
He said, “Who are you, sir?” The reply came, “I am Jesus, whom you are persecuting. Now get up
and go into the city and you will be told what you must do.”26

Let us begin with the perceived origin of the voice. This must be distinguished from the so-called
“actual” origin of the voice, which cannot be guaranteed on phenomenological grounds. That
said, while it is true that the origin of the appearance cannot be known with absolute certainty,
Paul does make a judgment regarding the provenance of this voice that he hears. Taking at face
value the veracity of the scripture, Paul judges the voice to come from without, from some
external source. Even if this judgment were to be considered “true” in the natural attitude, likely
via the corroboration of other eyewitnesses (indeed such accounts are in the scriptural sources), it
is nevertheless not necessarily the case that Paul’s auditory experience is of something present
“in the flesh.” It should be noted that the scripture indicates that Paul hears a voice, not that he
hears someone. The difference between the two is enormous; the sound of a voice can appear as
if it is unembodied and phantasmic, whereas the sound of someone is material and concrete.
Despite the fact that Paul has been temporarily blinded, and despite the fact that scripture says
that he hears a voice (and not someone), at first Paul is not sure what he hears, as we can tell by
the fact that he asks the voice to identify itself. It is only after the voice answers his question that
Paul judges that he hears someone.
It is still possible that Paul makes this judgment in natural error, but it cannot be
considered a phenomenological error. It is true that people with schizophrenia hear internal
voices all of the time; it is obvious that a voice that appears to correspond to some real individual
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may not necessarily correspond to material “reality” in such a manner. The real
phenomenological issue to examine is whether Paul’s hearing is in this case presentation or
presentification.
If the voice is a presentation to Paul, then it is fully present, immediate, and direct. It is a
givenness “in the flesh.” This is the type of voice that Paul hears when he speaks to one of his
fellow travelers, or any other “real” person. We cannot yet be sure that Paul does not hear the
voice in a way like this.
If the voice is a presentification, then its givenness is partial. The difference between this
type of mental experience and presentation comes down to representation and mental status, for
Husserl conceptualized via the noematic distinction between the different types of acts. It is the
contrast between the noema of a heard voice compared to the noema of an imagined or
remembered voice. The latter sort of noema is limited to my own inner sense, whereas the former
appears as sensuously fulfilled. Differentiating inner speech from external speech is typically
rather straightforward. Don Ihde calls this the difference between “inner” and “outer” sound.27
As Ihde points out, there are exceptions to this difference in lived experience.
Hallucinations can often appear as sounds instead of sights. Ihde suggests that these
hallucinations are the synthesis of sound that is directly perceived, and sound that is imagined. In
such a case an inner sound would appear to me as if it was an outer sound. This is why such a
sound would seem to me to be so real; it would be given “in the flesh.” I have mentioned the
clinical attempts to explain Paul’s conversion using neurology. If an epileptic episode does
indeed account for Paul’s experience, then we can assume that the visual and auditory
phenomena are presentations via the effective synthesis of inner and outer sense. This is directly
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analogous to the research experiments in which electric stimulation is used to produce a
“feeling.”
But let us assume that Paul is “neurotypical” and has not in this case synthesized inner
and outer auditory sense. Can we then determine what type of givenness is present to him when
he hears the voice? It is possible to resolve this question on the basis of the intersubjective
verification provided in the scriptural sources. “The men who were traveling with him stood
speechless, for they heard the voice but could see no one.”28 It has been the object of much
scholarly consternation that this account in Acts 9 is ostensibly contradicted by what is written in
Acts 22: “My companions saw the light but did not hear the voice of the one who spoke to me.”29
Longnecker has argued that this is simply the result of different meanings behind the verb “hear.”
This polysemy is evident in English as well as the original Greek. To “hear” can mean to be
aware of a sound, but it can also mean to understand the meaning of a sound. Longnecker
maintains that only Paul understands what is being said, while others hear the voice but not the
message. This is akin to hearing a voice speaking a language that you do not know. I can tell that
it is a voice that I hear, but I do not grasp or understand what it is saying.
If others witness some of the same events that are experienced by Paul, then what is given
to Paul is presentation. It is impossible, after all, for me to think about a memory with someone
else in the same way that I can “make a memory” by doing something with another subject.
Merely talking about a memory is not the same as intersubjectively sharing in the sensuous
thinking act. My presentifications are limited in their givenness; they are confined to the limits of
my own consciousness. So it cannot be the case that Paul’s sight and hearing are presentifications
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to the extent that others experience the same (or at least similar, if less intense) phenomena as he
does.
Can we be sure that this event is not the result of folie à deux? This is a well-documented
but thoroughly perplexing phenomenon that notably was removed from the most recent, fifth
edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. Essentially the
phenomenon is of shared psychosis. Could Paul’s fellow travelers have shared in his psychosis?
This is of course possible but even if it is indeed the case, we can revert back to the insight that
in some clinical cases there is a synthesis of inner and outer sense. In such cases phenomenology
and its focus on first person lived experience compel us to classify the “irreal” phenomena as
presentations. It may resemble a presentification to some third party, but that violates the limits
of phenomenological perspective.
It is apparent that it is only Paul who has a totally synthesized experience on the road to
Damascus, evinced by the fact that his sight and hearing are complementary phenomena. Even if
others see the light, it does not blind them; even if others hear the voice, they do not understand
it. Only Paul seems to experience the event in its fullness, in its completion. It goes without
saying that the event is for Paul, not for his cohorts. Since the event is for Paul, only he can fully
interact with it, epitomized in the judgments he makes about what he senses.
As we have seen, this is where the real phenomenological significance of Paul’s case is
revealed—that he is a passive convert who experiences what appears to be a divine revelation
(via outer sense, his vision and hearing) but in fact cannot be certified to be any more than a
cluster of associated phenomena confined to his own consciousness and grouped together via a
judgment on his part. By phenomenological definition a conversion, insofar as it is an
experience, cannot directly result from an external cause without some judgment on the part of
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the subject. All of the intense and turbulent phenomena that are associated with his conversion
reinforce the notion that the conversion is ultimately self-contained in Paul’s own “mind.” The
voice that he hears may have some external referent, and the blinding light that strips him of his
vision might be produced by Jesus, but it is also quite possible that the voice and blinding light
are entirely the fabrication of his own consciousness. While other scriptural accounts indicate
that Paul’s peers also hear the sound of the voice, in the end it is of little consequence whether
the phenomenon is shared or individual since our purpose is not to corroborate the existence of
some external cause for the the appearance(s). That said, it is the true value of the epileptic
interpretation of Paul that it can offer an explanation of the material events correlated with the
conscious phenomena, thereby definitively subtracting from the case the obligation to rationalize
the metaphysical, theological assumptions inherent therein. The material explanation offered by
psychiatric medicine is, in other words, a welcome supplement to the phenomenological
analysis, but it is not in and of itself sufficient for explaining anything of import regarding Paul’s
conversion. It should be noted that in the last analysis it is still very possible that Paul really does
see and hear Jesus at the same time that major abnormal processes occur in his brain. Thus even
definitive “proof” that Paul was epileptic would only go so far. Since the speculative
metaphysical issues may never be resolved it is best to look to phenomenology and focus on
what is actually given to consciousness, with the question of “real” or not bracketed off to the
side.
While my focus has been on the visual and auditory correlates of Paul’s conversion, I
should note that it is not just a sound or sight (or lack thereof) that is sensuously given to Paul’s
consciousness. His visual and auditory experiences are accompanied by intense emotional
phenomena. I do not need to elaborate at length upon this dimension of Paul’s conversion
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because traditionally Paul’s emotional reaction to the phenomenon has taken on central
importance in the scholarship.
I will point out, however, that focusing exclusively on Paul’s emotional reaction can be
dangerous, in part for reasons deriving from bias. When commentators have focused on Paul’s
emotional response to his conversion, they have tended to downplay his rationality. To be
emotional is to be out of control, so the story goes. The result of this misguided interpretation is
that Paul’s conversion is understood to be passive rather than active. But again the real upshot of
my findings is the insight that Paul’s alleged passivity is really not so passive at all. It is often
common practice to refer to Paul as if he is a recipient or vessel or even object onto which a
conversion is essentially forced, and to portray his story in such a way does make some sense to
certain ends, as in to characterize the potency of God’s power, as we saw in the writing of
Thomas Aquinas. But in truth, the “passive” reading of Paul in fact belittles the real magnitude of
the story.
Despite the fact that Paul’s conversion is typically modeled as if passive, in fact his
conversion is not the result of passive synthesis. While Paul experiences on a firsthand basis
events that he interprets to be transcendent and supernatural, the transcendence of the events is
entirely the result of an active synthesis performed on the part of his ego. It is the judgment that
Paul makes regarding the phenomenon that solidifies his experience as one of conversion.

The Conversion of St. Paul: The Body-Convert

I have argued that in prioritizing Paul’s judgmental involvement in his own conversion we do not
want to completely pass over the phenomenological significance of the fact that Paul’s
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conversion experience is something that is (in part) sensuously mediated for him, something that
he lives through, something that “feels” a certain way for him. In the last section we looked at
how the experiences “feel” a certain way to Paul via his vision and his hearing. But these
sensuous dimensions to his conversion are of course channeled via Paul’s body. While his
conversion cannot be reduced to physical events or causes, any sufficient analysis of his
experience should take note of how sensuous experience and physical “feedback” correlate with
the rich complexities of Paul’s “inner” experience, his conscious life.
The physical side of Paul’s existence figures centrally in his written reinterpretation, or
revaluation, of his own past. This past is recounted in Paul’s autobiography, as expressed in the
Letter to the Philippians:
For we are the circumcision, we who worship through the Spirit of God, who boast in Christ Jesus
and do not put our confidence in flesh, although I myself have grounds for confidence even in the
flesh. If anyone else thinks he can be confident in flesh, all the more can I. Circumcised on the
eighth day, of the race of Israel, of the tribe of Benjamin, a Hebrew of Hebrew parentage, in
observance of the law a Pharisee, in zeal I persecuted the church, in righteousness based on the law
I was blameless. But whatever gains I had, these I have come to consider a loss because of Christ.
More than that, I even consider everything as a loss because of the supreme good of knowing Christ
Jesus my Lord. For his sake I have accepted the loss of all things and I consider them so much
rubbish, that I may gain Christ and be found in him, not having any righteousness of my own based
on the law but that which comes through faith in Christ, the righteousness from God, depending on
faith to know him and the power of his resurrection and sharing of his sufferings by being
conformed to his death, if somehow I may attain the resurrection from the dead.30

In this excerpt we can see Paul describe his transition from identifying first and foremost in
terms of his physical nature, his “flesh,” to a self-perception the noema of which is primarily
supra-physical, founded on the “Spirit of God.” To a degree this appears, at least at first glance,
to entail the ascetic denial of embodiment and physicality. It is well-known that there are
scriptural passages in which Paul makes critical or negative remarks concerning the body.31 But
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in this particular case an interpretation such as this would actually stretch and distort the real
meaning of Paul’s remarks. Here, where Paul denies the “confidence in the flesh,” he is first and
foremost addressing the contentious status of mandatory Gentile circumcisions in the early
Christian church. In the early church it was first necessary to become a Jew before coming a
Christian, meaning that cultural practices like circumcision were required for entrance into the
Christian faith. This is the context of Paul’s remarks. He is not denying that he is “flesh” but
instead stipulating that incidental physical differences are insignificant before Christ, whose
believers combine to form a unity comprised out of difference. As we will see, Paul uses the
body to explain this relation.
The body’s centrality in human experience is perhaps what motivates Paul to return to it
over and over in his writing. While it cannot be denied that Paul occasionally shuns the natural
body, in such instances he does not use the same term as he uses to refer to the spiritual body.
This latter sense of the body definitely takes on significant theological and ecclesiological
importance in Paul’s writing, typically construed in terms of its mereological significance.
Paul refers to the body as sōma frequently in his writing, often using it as part of a larger
phrase or expression.32 Michelle Voss Roberts notes that the locution “body of Christ” in
particular has at least three discernible, albeit related, meanings.33 These meanings do not pertain
to the body as the object of occasional debasement but instead the spiritual body, which Paul
renders in such a way that it effectively amounts to what I will refer to as a phenomenological
heuristic. Paul suggests that the spiritual body, in other words, offers subjects a
phenomenological example in which they are encouraged to participate by focusing intentionally
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on what they are already “living out.” In one of the most well-known passages of the entire New
Testament Paul writes:
As a body is one though it has many parts, and all the parts of the body, though many, are one body,
so also Christ. For in one Spirit we were all baptized into one body, whether Jews or Greeks, slaves
or free persons, and we were all given to drink of one Spirit. Now the body is not a single part, but
many. If a foot should say, “Because I am not a hand I do not belong to the body,” it does not for
this reason belong any less to the body. Or if an ear should say, “Because I am not an eye I do not
belong to the body,” it does not for this reason belong any less to the body. If the whole body were
an eye, where would the hearing be? If the whole body were hearing, where would the sense of
smell be? But as it is, God placed the parts, each one of them, in the body as he intended. If they
were all one part, where would the body be? But as it is, there are many parts, yet one body. The
eye cannot say to the hand, “I do not need you,” nor again the head to the feet, “I do not need you.”
Indeed, the parts of the body that seem to be weaker are all the more necessary, and those parts of
the body that we consider less honorable we surround with greater honor, and our less presentable
parts are treated with greater propriety, whereas our more presentable parts do not need this. But
God has so constructed the body as to give greater honor to a part that is without it, so that there
may be no division in the body, but that the parts may have the same concern for one another. If
[one] part suffers, all the parts suffer with it; if one part is honored, all the parts share its joy.34

This analogical passage is phenomenologically fascinating. Here Paul appeals to the unified and
holistic—but also differentiable—phenomenon of embodiment as a means of explaining the
universal Being commented upon at length by Badiou. Paul describes the way in which the body
is a collection of distinct parts. It is experienced in different modes, like the way in which the
ears respond to sound compared to how the eyes facilitate sight, but all of the individual modes
or ways of appearing are ontologically synthesized into the larger, more general structure. It is an
example that can be taken up as one’s own, insofar as one has a body, and through the adoption
of the identification one is afforded a deeper understanding of an abstract metaphysical concept:
that the infinitely singular comprises the universal.
It is wondrous that Paul has ever been considered to be champion of the immaterial soul
at the cost of the ascetic denial of the body (see, for example, Nietzsche’s The Antichrist) when,
in passages such as the one above, he specifically characterizes the body as undivided and uses
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the lack of division to express a theological message. In fact the entire significance of his
analogy between the body and the Christian Being hinges upon the fact that each is undivided
and whole. As Vito Evola suggests, Paul’s notion of body as sōma is derived from the Hebrew
nefeš, which is a “holistic” term that stands for neither soul nor body but both.35 Evola points out
that when Paul discusses the body in a literal and negative sense, as a physical thing, he uses the
Koine term sarx, which is close to “flesh” which we see Paul undermine in the excerpt above,
and the connotation of negativity is novel on Paul’s part. It refers to the part that is “not wanting
to accept Christ.” This is not at all the body that Paul describes when he depicts the image of the
Body of Christ, etc. At least when it comes to his notion of identity, the body as sōma is not
marginalized but in fact brought to the front and center. The body is a central Pauline concept,
not only for its heuristic use in conceiving of and imagining universal Christian identity, but also
for the role that it plays in the constitution of personal identity, including, importantly, the past.
For Paul, while the flesh passes away it is the convert as Body of Christ who endures.
The ephemeral significance of mere “flesh” pales in comparison to the significance of the eternal
soul. This is itself exemplified through Paul’s stance that the particulars of circumcision, or the
lack thereof, are ultimately of theological insignificance. The body, in effect, is just a temporary
thing that is paired with consciousness, which is far more definitive, essential, and persistent,
specifically because it is in virtue not of the flesh-body (sarx) but of consciousness (here qua
soul or “spirit body”) that the individual is made into, as Badiou puts it, a universal subject.
In the case of Paul and other Christian converts, this reordering of the subject into a
universal form brings about a corresponding “conversion of the body.” Materially this
conversion entails no “real” or “substantial” change to the organismal dimension of the body;
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there is no metaphysical or material transmutation of the subject that occurs with conversion.
Instead the change in the body is perceptual and phenomenological—the body changes in the
way that it appears for its subject. Despite the fact that there is no necessary material change to
the body, we should be wary of reducing the embodied conversion to a simply psychological
shift. It is not just a matter of gestalt. To the contrary the phenomenological reorientation of
embodiment is a substantial transformation. If it entails like gestalt the reinterpretation of
configuration or pattern, it differs in the essential significance of the reinterpretation. While the
body is “only” reinterpreted via conversion, this reinterpretation plays a role in the constitution
of the body itself. This is precisely the sort of redefinition that we observe in the case of
Christian converts who almost paradoxically encounter new embodied selves through their
transformation; the body becomes a sacred object that requires specific practices (from
circumcision in the early Church to simple chrismatic anointing to something as routine as the
performance of the Sign of the Cross.) This sacred body does not and cannot reconstitute itself
without the volition of the subject. The subject’s volition is manifest in a judgment (or, more
likely, a set of judgments). Thus the conversion of the body is just as much the result of a
judgment as is the general “intellectual” or ‘spiritual” conversion.

Conclusions Concerning Active and Passive Conversions

Earlier I included in my synthetic model of conversion a distinction between the “active” and
“passive” varieties of conversion.36 After phenomenological analysis it is apparent that this

It should be noted that here I am not using these terms in Husserl’s sense, to refer to active and
passive synthesis.
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distinction is not manifest in experience itself. In other words, there is no phenomenological
evidence that the convert can be a “passive respondent to outside forces,” as Rambo puts it.37 In
short the difference between the two supposed types is not phenomenologically meaningful, at
least in the immediate present. In the natural attitude it is understood that the active and passive
types of conversion differentiate the “source” of the conversion, either from within or from
without. Phenomenologically speaking it cannot be denied that each type of experience has its
own objective correlate corresponding to its acts of consciousness. In other words, there is a
noematic difference between the two types; my experience is such that I can identify the
conversion that I seek out compared to the one which supposedly “happens” to me. But in the
two sorts of conversion there is in fact not a difference in intentionality. In the case of the active
conversion the experience is understood to be pursued, whereas the passive conversion involves
no such deliberateness. It cannot be denied that it is possible to phenomenologically distinguish
the conversion that commences with an intentional act from that which appears to be more
extemporaneous, but in the present, given, “now” moment of consciousness, there is nothing
inherent to the phenomenon that marks it as the product of activity or passivity on my part.
All of this gestures toward the question of whether a truly “involuntary” conversion is
possible (as described in Baird and Meintel). Ultimately the answer to this question depends on
what one means by “involuntary.” In Paul’s case it is undeniable that he chooses to convert—he
is not forced—despite the fact that he makes this decision after encountering a subjectivitydisrupting event that institutes a personal crisis. In Paul’s case this comes in the form of a
“why?” question, which he is incapable of answering, which catalyzes the complete upheaval of
his identity. So did Paul actively seek out his own conversion? No, certainly not. His life was
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entirely oriented toward the persecution of those he would eventually join after his conversion to
Christianity. But did Paul consent to his conversion? Yes. The conversion was not his own idea
or suggestion, but when he is, as Baird puts it, invited to re-identify, he accepts the opportunity.
To the extent that Paul accepts the invitation, his conversion is not entirely a passive occurrence.
The best way to distinguish this type of conversion is in Badiou’s terms: Paul is a passive subject
whose life is upset by a subject-shattering event. But in another way, it is also an active
conversion for Paul. Paul is the recipient of revelation, but the theological significance of his
story is undermined if Paul does not make a specific choice when faced with revelation. It is
important that we realize that the specific decision that Paul makes, that he accepts the call to
which he is subject, constitutes an entirely non-passive dimension of his conversion. In short,
this decision is a judgment on Paul’s part, which is important when it comes to analyzing the
supposed passivity of the conversion of Paul as well as others. A judgment is not, after all, a
passive occurrence.
It is apparent that the idea that Paul does not ultimately actively execute his conversion is
thoroughly problematic on a phenomenological level. Even Badiou points this out: it is partly
Paul’s response to the event that facilitates his subjective transformation. Paul needs the
revelation to be given to him in order to convert, but he does not convert at all without assenting
to it. If a conversion does not require some sort of judgment on the part of the subject and can be
enacted from without (or outside of the subject), then the sort of changes that result from
abominable pseudo-scientific methods of the past, like electroshock therapy or lobotomization,
would count as “conversions.” It would also be difficult to phenomenologically distinguish the
case of the “forced” conversion, like the kind enforced by the Spanish against the indigenous
peoples of Florida, in which case the supposed judgment was not freely enacted, and therefore
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was not really a judgment at all. This does not seem right. My phenomenological model for
conversion is intended to account for the “passive” conversion that is adventitious, extraneous,
and most of all thoroughly unexpected, but it cannot accommodate the idea of a conversion that
is devoid of judgment. Thus the idea of an entirely passive conversion is incoherent—a
conversion is always active on the level of judgment. Paul did not plan to convert but ultimately
the conversion does not occur at all without some fundamental and basic assertion on the part of
his subjectivity. So the phenomenological subject must be actively involved in a conversion, at
least on some level, not only in the case of conversions that are deliberately pursued, but also
those are fortuitous for the subject.
It has to be noted, however, that this is not equivalent with nor does it entail that
unconscious conversion is (or is not) a possible experience. One should wonder whether it is
possible to convert as Paul does, on the basis of a passive impetus, even making a judgment
regarding the event, but without being conscious of the resultant or constituent “conversion.” In
the last chapter I posed this very question. Certainly, this is not the type of conversion that Paul
experiences, as I have shown. Yet it is at least conceivable that an event could initiate a
conversion without the subject’s knowledge thereof. So the question is whether or not it is
possible to convert as the result of an experience without having recognized that the conversion
has occurred. This is tantamount to the case in which someone is substantially affected by a life
event that is not until much later—or perhaps never at all——realized. There are many childhood
events that could have this sort of effect on one’s existential identity. It comes down to whether
or not it is possible for an event to profoundly change someone without their recognition. The
controversial but well-known psychoanalytic assumption is that this is not only possible but
common.
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This is indeed a possible experience so long as it begins with a judgment, albeit not
necessarily one the gravity and/or significance of which is realized by the subject. According to
Husserl the process of sedimentation requires a judgment to inaugurate the process. According to
Husserl’s model of sedimentation, what is at first “on the surface level” of one’s conscious
awareness recedes into the depths of one’s mind, the ego’s “underground.”38 He writes that the
meaning manifest in a given act of judgment:
… then sinks ever further into the background and at the same time becomes ever more indistinct;
the degree of its prominence gradually lessens until it finally disappears from the field of immediate
consciousness, is “forgotten.” It is henceforth incorporated into the passive background, into the
“unconscious,” which is not a dead nothingness but a limiting mode of consciousness and
accordingly can affect us anew like another passivity in the form of whims, free-floating ideas, and
so on.39

Something that does not result from a judgment cannot be sedimented “into” or “onto” the ego.
This judgment requires an act of the will, and the act of the will requires conscious awareness.
But the judgment is in this case does not regard whether or not a conversion has occurred, in
which case the conversion would be conscious. To the contrary this conversion is one comprised
of many more or less unimportant and insignificant judgments which when considered on their
own are of relatively little consequence but which, in their (passive) synthesis, combine to make
something profound. It is also manifest that the object of the judgment differs markedly in these
two cases; in the case of the conscious conversion the relevant judgment regards my self and my
existence, whereas for the unconscious conversion the judgment does not regard my self and
existence, although ultimately it will prove to have some effect on those areas.
This is the key to solving the enigmatic case of the seemingly paradoxical “unconscious
conversion.” Indeed this is how Scobie’s theory of unconscious conversion, an apparent
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oxymoron, can be resolved—while the overall transformation is not (at first) recognized by the
converting subject, individual judgments are the constituent parts that comprise and therefore
make possible the conversion. Thus the conversion itself is not an intentional object, at least so
long as one assumes by “conversion” to refer to the more general change, but the individual
conscious moments that are sedimented into the layers of the ego are conscious. The
unconscious conversion is not, in other words, entirely unconscious. No such conversion can
exist.
Using Scobie’s definition, the unconscious convert is the person who cannot remember
being non-religious in the past, at least not subsequent to the adoption of some sense of personal
identity, even if rudimentary and developing. Here it is presupposed that the person’s present
religion is the only religion that he or she has ever had, and the point is that this person’s sense of
identity has always been tied to religious belief and/or practice. This identity likely dates back to
adolescence, or perhaps even earlier. If I adopt the phenomenological attitude and via free
variation examine this point of view from the first-person perspective, a couple of significant
insights emerge.
First, I note that my belief that I have always been a member of my religion, that I lack
any memory of a “conversion” event via which I became or took on my new religious identity,
does not entail that I have no recollection of my religious practices, which themselves
necessarily involve judgments. To the contrary I have many memories of significant religious
events, but none of them appear to me as my singular “conversion event.” Instead I recall these
past events as if they are indeed important events, but not necessarily transformative in and of
themselves. I reflect upon these events as if they are akin to different chapters of my own
biography, each of which is important and plays a role in making me who I am, but none of
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which stand out on their own as the precise moment of my “conversion.” These events involve
judgments of various sorts, from matters of metaphysical truth (e.g. Christ rose from the dead) to
those pertaining to personal identity (e.g I am a Christian).
This is how someone is able to participate habitually in religious practices without
necessarily feeling that there is some determinate moment before and after which one was
religious in the relevant way. The relevance of this type of conversion is not limited to the
religious and spiritual contexts; one must wonder whether the vast majority of psychological
conversions, the primary category, are enacted on a basis similar to the one I have here
described.
This brings me to the second insight. I observe that the unconscious conversion can only
be called unconscious by virtue of the fact that it presupposes a very specific and narrow
conception of the phenomenon of conversion. The standard unconscious model (i.e. Scobie)
takes for granted the sort of conversion that is mediated by a singular event. It is assumed that
conversion is sudden and that it is known. There are many types of conversions, as I have shown,
that are not sudden but are not necessarily unconscious, and the necessary decision to convert
cannot be conflated with the necessary consciousness of the occurrence of a “conversion.” Actual
lived experience shows us how it is possible that many conversions could occur without the
subject thinking of himself as a “convert.”
Maybe the vast majority of conversions are unconscious, but not necessarily in the way
Scobie means, since the habitual practices are the object of consciousness at least some of the
time (or were in the past.) The same could be true for the so-called passive conversion.
Ultimately all conversions could be called passive if by passive we refer to the fact that a series
of contingent events precedes a conversion. Cases like that of St. Paul are easily identified as
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“passive” since the chance event that precipitates conversion is sudden and more or less
determinate. The contingency of these events derives from what we take to be “free” choices.40
But in the last analysis, to the extent that “free” choices drive the progression of
contingent events in our lives, the opposite is true; it is not that all conversions should be called
passive, but to the contrary, that all conversions should be called active, if by “active” we refer to
the fact that the judgments and practices (which themselves can be reduced to judgments) that
eventually combine and can together comprise what we call “conversion” necessarily require
free choice. This choice, freely made, has to be actively made.

If the progression of events is not contingent but to the contrary follows a necessary course,
then we are not free. This line of thinking is exemplified in the early Christian heresy of
apokatastasis.
40
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Ch. 7. Conclusion: An Eidetic Reduction of Conversion

The Fundamentality of Conversion

In this chapter I will review the eidetic features of the conversion experience, and I will attempt
to show that conversion is a fundamental structure of consciousness, a universal phenomenon
that we are predisposed to encounter by virtue of the way our experience is structured. This calls
into question the claims of some empirical researchers, for example, Snow, who claims that “the
convert is a social type.” Snow’s idea is that there are certain sociological properties that
characterize this type, and they ultimately serve to distinguish this type from other types. In a
sociological context, Snow is probably right. But I would like to suggest that there is nothing
phenomenologically distinct or unique about the subject who converts, meaning that there is
nothing that a priori distinguishes this person from any other, even if the occurrence of a
conversion ultimately constitutes such a differentiation a posteriori (and therefore reinforces
Snow’s empirical theory within its own appropriate, non-phenomenological context—a context
which is ultimately less scientific than the phenomenological approach at the level of constitutive
consciousness).1
I would like to stress that according to my own phenomenological theory the
transformation that occurs for this subject should not be understood to be necessarily radical,
intense, or even complete, since, as we have seen, the transformation can be of such a nature that

Husserl states, “[W]hat is cognizable by one Ego must, of essential necessity, by cognizable by
any Ego.” Husserl, Ideas I §48, 108 <90>.
1
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the converting subject is not even aware of it, thanks in large part to the sedimentation of
knowledge constituent to the conversion itself.
My hypothesis that conversion is a fundamental aspect of human experience should not
be interpreted as an attempt at a direct “denial” or refutation of Snow’s theory, nor any of the
other well-known accounts of conversion (e.g. acculturation, syncretism, etc.)2 It is not that these
other theories are necessarily “wrong” given their own disciplinary parameters, but instead, their
issue is that they do not scientifically assess conversion for what it is: a first-person “lived”
experience.3 This is not to say that my own phenomenological approach to the issue is not in part
inspired by a general sense of conversion that has been inspired by the work of these others.
Indeed this was the entire purpose of the first chapter. It will be seen, for example, that my
phenomenological account of conversion is utterly incomplete without incorporating the shared
horizon of the lifeworld.
Instead of a denial or refutation of these other theories, my purpose here is to show that
conversion can ultimately be reduced to a priori phenomenological properties that define the
experience in a more essential way than other empirical theories.4 For example, Snow does not
explain the social nature of conversion in phenomenological terms. Thus, in offering this thesis I
am contesting the common interpretation that conversion can be exhaustively and scientifically
reduced using the methods of psychology.5 To the contrary I will first analyze the noema of
conversion, which is some “religious or spiritual object” but not (necessarily) the conversion
itself. In the second section, I show that while conversion always requires a noesis of judgment,

Baer, “History and Religious Conversion,” 25–47.
“Scientifically” in Husserl’s sense.
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this judgment can regard a religious object as noema, or it can take up as its noema a noesis
regarding that religious object. Here I also demonstrate that via the sedimentation of knowledge,
sometimes the conversion phenomenon is not a singular, determinate act but instead the end
result of a sequence of discrete judgments, the eventual (final) synthesis of which constitutes a
conversion experience. In the third section I describe what I call the “secondary noeses” of
conversion, which are noeses that regard similar noemas as the converting act par excellence, the
judgment, but are themselves supplemental to the conversion itself. But despite this fact I also
show how sometimes these secondary acts are themselves necessary in order to bring about or
fulfill the sense of the judging noesis that institutes the conversion. In the fourth section I show
how the constitution of the conversion phenomenon is intermingled with the constitution of the
shared horizons of the world at various levels.6 In this section I also explain how conversion
relates to different aspects of the world, including the “spiritual world,” the “homeworld,” and
the “lifeworld.” In the fifth section I address the extent to which the Other is a necessary feature
of the conversion experience. In the sixth section I show how the eidetic structure of the
conversion phenomenon involves physical, embodied phenomenological correlates. In the
seventh and final section I demonstrate that the conversion phenomenon always occurs on a
temporally indeterminate basis. This temporal indeterminacy is a consequence of the dynamic,
flowing nature of my streaming consciousness and the way in which it is subject to sedimented
meanings.

I will demonstrate that the convert is not a social type at all but is, to the contrary, a possibility
even for the radically isolated consciousness. It might even be the case that solitary consciousness
accompanies conversion more often than socialized consciousness. That said, conversion is almost
always experienced in the social dimension.
6
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As my final conclusion I argue that after examining these various aspects of conversion it
is apparent that the phenomenon is not just something that we spontaneously experience from
time to time but in fact is actually something grounded in phenomenological subjectivity itself
insofar as the existential modifications entailed by conversion are part and parcel of the
interpretive, self-constitutive nature of consciousness. The conversion phenomenon, I argue, is
embedded in the very conditions of consciousness on a basic and fundamental level.

An Eidetic Reduction of the Conversion Phenomenon

Having already shown that the fundamental essence of my experience is unified temporal
consciousness, I can now examine the phenomenological structure according to which unified
consciousness actually experiences conversion. Essentially what we should expect to see is the
analytic elimination of the various different “categories” of conversion according to the human
sciences, replaced with a far more general—but far more fundamental—account of conversion
on the phenomenological level.
Without unified consciousness and the inner consciousness of time, we would not
experience subjectivity as we presently enjoy it, as complex but unified beings whose existence
straddles a temporal continuum the objectification of which makes possible not only sustained
beliefs in various propositions but also conscious phenomena like recollection. Without time
consciousness there could be no experience of conversion—there could be no experience of any
kind at all. Since consciousness itself constitutes time for me, all of the experiences that
consciousness has are situated within its temporal frame. This sedimentation within time is not
static; it necessarily entails not only the present moment but also the “Before” and the “past
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Now.”7 Husserl identifies this as the relation a priori (an “eidetic law”) between intentionality
and “temporal succession.” In addition to this fundamental temporal constitution, genesis and
synthesis structure the experience of consciousness and intentionality and therefore structure the
experience of conversion, including the unconscious and passive varieties.
Ultimately what this means, assuming that we can account phenomenologically for prereflective consciousness, or at least, that we should consider pre-reflective experience to be
consciousness. This conclusion is relevant to the present phenomenology of conversion to the
extent that I have argued that conversions can occur, empirically, without the awareness of the
subject. In taking this position I have endorsed the supposedly controversial Scobie definition of
conversion, but only because I have found that the “unconscious” conversion is in fact
phenomenologically grounded. But ultimately pre-reflective experience is not sufficient on its
own to bring about a conversion. While pre-reflective experience can help explain how a
significant existential event like a conversion can occur outside the limits of the subject’s direct,
reflective awareness (in short, because I am not always reflecting), this cannot actually give us
enough to explain what brings about conversion.
In order to answer this question, we will need to conduct a full phenomenological
analysis of the experience of conversion, starting with the application of the époche and
culminating in the eidetic reduction whereby the empirical experience of conversion is reordered
according to its invariant features. Thus, the result will be an account of the essential structure of
conversion.

7
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I. The Noema of Conversion

When we consider conversion in the imaginative sphere, we find that conversion is bound by
several essential requirements. These essential requirements are the eidetic features of
conversion. The first requirement pertains to the noema of the conversion phenomenon; thus, it
regards the intentional object of the act of consciousness. Insofar as we have seen that the subject
is not necessarily aware of his own conversion, it cannot be the case that the intentional object of
the conversion experience is necessarily the conversion itself. Nor is it the case that the noema or
intentional object of conversion is existential transformation, for the same reason that it cannot
be the conversion; I have demonstrated that unconscious conversion is an authentic phenomenon,
which means that the noematic object of the conversion cannot necessarily be the counterpart to
the noesis that fulfills the sense of the conversion proper. I will pursue this matter in the next
section. For now let us note that the noema of the conversion phenomenon is a religious,
spiritual, or philosophical object. Here ‘object’ refers to the intentional object of the converting
act, and not an object in external, empirical sense. Furthermore, in a strict sense, this religious,
spiritual, or philosophical object is a judgment, which we will explore on the noetic side (as the
act of judging) in the following section.
We can discern that the noema of conversion must be a judgment with this approximate
significance or meaning-context (namely, religious, spiritual, or philosophical) because the
possible object of the conversion has to be an object with existential significance for the subject,
meaning, an object that has some possibility to bring about the modification of the identity or
role of the empirical self (or empirical ego).
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An example of such an object in the religious sense is the figure of Christ, which, when
paired with the appropriate noesis, such as one of accepting belief, establishes that the subject is
someone who is subject to (and accepts) Christ’s saving. Here Christ serves as a noematic
correlate that, with its corresponding (variable) noesis, bears existential significance to the extent
that it is what helps bring about the change in the converting subject on the side of the noesis.
There are countless examples of possible religious intentional objects (noemas) of conversion,
including: reincarnation, eternal life, sin, forgiveness, mercy, punishment, and so on. Obviously,
the religious object should not be limited to any one religion or system of religions. That said, as
we have seen, conversion is a phenomenon that is typically associated with a small handful of
religions. This does not mean, however, that conversion is phenomenologically impossible
outside of the limits of these religions.
Consider the case of the spiritual or philosophical conversion. Each of these transcends
the limits of religious practice. Perhaps it is even possible that there is such a thing as a practical
conversion, like the existential change that one experiences when becoming a father or a mother
for the first time.8 Surely a significant life event such as this sometimes entails a shift in one’s
self-understanding such that one’s very identity or role is no longer the same as before. Should
we just consider this a spiritual conversion, or even a philosophical conversion? It would depend
on how we define spirituality, and whether the transformation into a father or a mother entails
having beliefs that we could classify as “philosophical” in nature. I would suggest that to the
extent that any conversion entails an existential transformation, every conversion can be
considered to be philosophical on at least some level.

I also wonder whether significant career changes might count as conversions. For example
when one becomes a soldier, or a lawyer, or a professor, is this a conversion?
8
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But if we consider just the spiritual and philosophical conversions, and set aside the
theoretically “practical” conversion, we find that the two are similar but there are a couple
important distinctions among them. I take it that this is true even if, as I suggested, every
religious and spiritual conversion is also technically a philosophical conversion. For example, the
spiritual conversion and the philosophical conversion differ drastically in their teleology; the
former is concerned with explaining a specific (metaphysical) aspect of the human being,
whereas the latter is far broader. I cannot suggest that either of these does not bring about a
necessary change in the self or consciousness, but the nature of this change is not at all identical
in the two cases. Furthermore the spiritual conversion does not have the same standards of
approach as does the philosophical conversion, to the extent that the former (which will still
require a judgment noesis, as I will show in the next section) is likely to include practices like
meditation, prayer, physical exercise, and rituals, the latter takes up a different approach typified
by the tools of logic and argumentation. But perhaps this is not true of all cases, as it is possible
that one is drawn to any particular philosophy, whatever it may be, as a result of a feeling instead
of a rational position. As I will elaborate in the next section, even the feeling will necessarily
involve some judgment.
It is imperative that we note that the noematic correlate of conversion is not necessarily
some object that I regard as if “external.” In fact for any of these three types of intentional
objects of conversion, the noema of conversion is potentially the phenomenological subject
herself. A case such as this is emblematic of a “conscious” conversion.9 In other words it will
never be the case that the so-called “unconscious” convert (as envisioned by Scobie) experiences

Recall that the unconscious conversion is the one that occurs without the subject being aware of
it, whereas the passive conversion (which can be conscious or unconscious) is the one that is not
actively sought out. Saint Paul is an example of a conscious but passive conversion.
9
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a conversion the noema of which is herself. It is important to note that even when the noema of
conversion is the subject herself, this subject is ultimately phenomenologically reducible to an
object of religious or spiritual significance. In fact most religious conversions, at least those
which are actively pursued, will include some act the noema of which is the very subject herself.
As I have already suggested, we will see that the noema as religious object is a possible
intentional object of any number of different noeses that can contribute to a conversion
experience. In all of these cases it will ultimately be necessary that an act of judgment regards
either an “originary” noema (which could in this case resemble the “saturated phenomenon” of
Marion or the “grace” of Christianity), or it regards a different, non-judgmental noesis
specifically as noema—in short, reflection. Put differently the distinction is between the case
wherein there is a noesis that corresponds to some empirical object (where “empirical” could
refer to an ecstatic vision of something no one else sees), and the alternative case where the
noesis corresponds to a perceptual act specifically as such. For example, it is possible that the
subject perceives via vision a sacred apparition. The perceiving of this apparition is a noesis, the
noema or object of which is the apparition itself qua “object” perceived. For example, a Marian
apparition appears to a subject; the subject sees the Virgin Mary, so she is the first noematic
object of the act. To be clear this object need not be a traditional “religious” object; the sparkling
dish in Böhme’s famous vision of 1600 would work just the same. But either of these cases could
produce a conversion in one of two ways, and these two ways map onto the distinction I offer
above. On the one hand the subject may judge the object itself in such a way that bears
existential significance (without reflecting on the noesis), or the subject may judge the
perceiving of the object. I should add that here the object can be ordinary, like comprehending a
work of Scripture, or it can be extraordinary, like beholding an otherworldly apparition. But it
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should be noted that it is the latter, reflective case that is arguably the more “self-aware” variety
of conversion, specifically to the extent that the convert judges his own experiencing instead of
something in the so-called “external” world of the natural attitude.
But it is important to note that a noema that concerns some religious or spiritual object is
not necessarily a noema that is part of a conversion experience, because not every religious and
spiritual object bears intrinsic existential significance, or even lends itself to such an application.
For example, if the intentional object of a monotheistic subject’s (negative) noesis is some object
pertaining to polytheism, (neither) this noema (nor the corresponding noesis) is not sufficient to
make for an existential transformation, that is, a shift in identity or role. Perhaps the monotheistic
subject was not aware that polytheistic religions exist, and when she finds out, she denies the
truth of such religions. Clearly this does not constitute a conversion since there is no existential
change for the subject. Indeed there are countless religious and spiritual noemata that are part of
daily practice and ritual and have no bearing on the experience of conversion. That is not to say,
however, that a religious or spiritual object that is encountered on a routine basis cannot ever
make for the spontaneous and extraordinary manifestation of conversion.
In short it follows from these considerations that a conversion experience has to involve
some noematic correlate that bears existential significance for the converting subject, despite the
fact that we cannot go so far as to maintain that existential transformation is itself a necessary
noema of conversion. As I have specified, this noema can still be reduced to a judgment. It is this
judgment that does the constitutive work behind the existential transformation. Put differently,
the judgment brings about the transformation. That said, if this is true then the subject himself or
herself is also a necessary noema at some phase of the conversion experience, which, as I have
indicated, can be a process instead of an instantaneous event. But again I have to emphasize that
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this transformed subjectivity is not necessarily something of which the converting subject is
aware. Now, though, it is necessary to justify this position on a phenomenological basis.
Consider first of all the contrasting case of the conscious conversion. As I will demonstrate in the
next section, this conversion requires an act of judging. Here I have indicated that this judgment
as noema has to regard a “religious or spiritual object.” But the final caveat to this point is that
the religious or spiritual object can be the subject himself or herself. It is apparent that in the
case of the conscious conversion, the subject will at some point of the conversion make the
resolution or judgment to convert. This judgment corresponds to the subject’s very existence. But
it is also true that the unconscious convert will at some point make a judgment the object of
which is the self. Thus it is crucial to note that the distinction comes down to the fact that, in the
case of the unconscious conversion, the converting subject does not realize that the judgment
made, which pertains to the self, bears existential significance. This is the way in which someone
can convert in a gradual and subtle manner, but also the way in which someone who grows up
with a particular religious or spiritual worldview might convert without even realizing it. This
individual is making the requisite judgments in order to convert, and is doing so as a matter of
choice, but he or she does not grasp the upshot of the judgments. The fact that in these cases we
are dealing with a plethora of judgments that occurs over a longer duration of time probably has
something to do with the fact that the subject does not discern the consequence or upshot of the
myriad judgments that she makes in route to her conversion. Presently let us turn to the noeses
that correspond to the conversion noema in order to characterize the experience of conversion
more completely.
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II. Judging: The Noesis of Conversion

The next eidetic feature of conversion regards the nature and scope of its noesis, or rather,
noeses. Every conversion will require a “converting act” as noesis, but the knowledge that this
act constitutes is sometimes sedimented in the pure ego, sometimes along with what I am
terming “secondary noeses of conversion,” with the result that the convert is not always aware
that an existential transformation has taken place. It is also important to note that the noesis of
conversion can be an empty or filled intention; it is not necessary that every conversion noesis
will intuit something fulfilled.
As for the converting act, it will always require an act (or set of acts) of judging that
either itself constitutes a conversion experience or constitutes a conversion experience via the
fulfilling sense of a “secondary” noesis of conversion. Here I will characterize this primary
noesis of conversion and explore several important phenomenological distinctions that regard it,
and then I will describe several of the other possible noeses of the conversion act (“secondary
noeses”) in order to characterize judgment more completely as the “converting act” itself. I will
show that these secondary noeses are themselves possible objects of the act of judgment,
decision, and will. I will not address the temporal limits of these noeses, although they certainly
are significant, because I will take them up in one of the following sections concerning the
temporal horizon of the conversion phenomenon.
Ultimately on the noetic side of conversion everything centers upon the judging act itself,
which is the most necessary aspect of the conversion phenomenon, not to mention one of the
most fundamental and ubiquitous noeses of all conscious experience. It could fairly be said that it
would be impossible for us to imagine a conscious life remotely like ours without the inclusion
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and influence of judgment. But it is impossible for a conversion, defined as an existential
transformation, to occur without a judging act because such a transformation, which is
tantamount to a change in my own unique essence, can only be brought about as a change in my
understanding of self-meaning, via a deliberate, attentive determination on my own part. It
follows that any change that occurs for me on such a basis that does not require a judgment is not
an instance of a change in self-meaning, i.e., conversion.
But what exactly is a judgment, a category that prima facie seems rather broad? In the
Fifth Logical Investigation Husserl describes judgment thus: “When we make a judgment, an act
of complete predication, something seems to us either to be or not to be, e.g., that S is P.”10 In
other words a judgment is a statement that it is the case that something is a certain way. In short,
judging is positing. Remember that in the context of conversion that judgment need not regard
the occurrence of the conversion itself, but instead must only pertain to the “situation” (as
Husserl puts it) or circumstances that bring about the conversion. The judgment(s) made must
then correspond to some set of affairs that bear existential significance for the subject, which is
an entirely relative matter. What is existentially significant for one subject is not necessarily
significant for another. That said, we can still carry out the phenomenological reduction of the
phenomenon. Here I reduce existential significance to the potential for change brought about by
a judgment that has some impact on a subject’s identity (self) or role (obligation with respect to
action).
Of course the LI is a very early text and Husserl will later revise some of the views that
he articulates therein. In Formal and Transcendental Logic Husserl conceives of judgment of the
“scientific” sort, which is a judgment that aims to cognize the truth in contrast to the “identical”
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judgment which is not marked by such an objective and only operates on the basis of “distinct
evidence” that is not necessarily true.11 We will see that Husserl will retain this distinction his
later phenomenology, although upon closer analysis the distinction occasionally breaks down on
a phenomenological basis.
Before we take up a critical interpretation of the distinctions relevant to judgment, let us
note that in the late-period Experience and Judgment, Husserl calls judgment a specific “mode of
ego-decision,” which he alternatively characterizes as “active position-taking.”12 Position taking
involves the acceptance of some claim as true; to take a position on some issue is to hold a belief,
or, as Dahlstrom puts it in his translation of Ideas I, to take a “stance. But more generally,
position taking (Stellungnehmen) can also be reflective; it can be the ego’s orientation or stance
with respect to the various activities of the ego, from feeling to believing to thinking to even
judging itself.13
Husserl’s explanation of the nature of judgment is arguably rather unclear in Formal and
Transcendental Logic and Experience and Judgment, which presupposes some of the main ideas
as the former, earlier text, albeit using different phrasing. I say this because one might imagine that
what Husserl means to suggest is that judging is always position taking. In a strictly logical sense
I suppose that this is true, but it is misleading because Husserl in fact differentiates certain or
apodictic judgments (or stances) from those which are not made with certainty. We find that he
uses the phrase “position taking” in a broader and a narrower sense, where the latter refers to cases
where a judgment is made when in doubt, or when one has to deliberate before judging due to the
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nature of the given evidence, or difficulties with interpreting it.14 We could fairly say that
essentially there are different “grades” of position taking, where the gradation corresponds to the
degree to which the position taking is certain or apodictic.
It is apparent that I need to resolve whether conversion might involve the stricter sense of
judging qua position taking, where one is truly judging something because it is not obvious
whether he is making the correct judgment due to the fact that he is in doubt regarding the evidence
that is given, or the broader sense of judging (position taking) that pertains to any judgment
whatsoever, including that which is certain, or even potentially both.
One final, important distinction that Husserl offers regarding judgment concerns the
epistemological quality of different types of judgments. Some judgments are made “in the mode
of certainty,” which Husserl distinguishes from a second type of judgment, the “modalized”
judgment, which is precisely the judgment that does not have the “original form of simple
certitude.”15 With the former type of judgment we are concerned primarily with “categorical
judgment” that regards some “uncontested” object. An example of this type of judgment is
epitomized by the judgment that a geometric shape I perceive is an isosceles triangle. Here my
judgment is grounded by the essential and formal features of a certain category of shape, and I
make the determination that the object I regard belongs to that category. This does not mean that
it is impossible that I misjudge the triangle as a scalene triangle (because I do not know the
essential and formal features of the isosceles triangle, or because I cannot see it clearly, as if it is
an exceptionally poor scan of an original copy), but to the contrary, that if I do (correctly) judge
the triangle for what it is, then that judgment is made with certainty.
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But often the judgments that I make are not afforded this degree of certainty. Thus in the
other type of judgment, the “modalized” judgment, I am making judgments that “must be
understood as modes of decision.”16 This would apply only to “predicative” judgments, as in any
statement that S is P.17 These are the types of judgments that Lampert will focus on in his book
on decisions: those that are not defined by modalized certainty.18 These are “decisions” proper as
far as Husserl is concerned. These decisions are not just those that lack the ideal amount of
evidence in order to make a certain judgment, but also the type of decisions that are “openended,” like the decision to try to lose weight, which is such that I am not judging the quality or
even essence of something, although that does not mean that I do not base my decision on my
perception of my own body. In other words, it is not necessarily the case that a modalized
judgment is made without any corresponding evidence. I suggest that it is useful to think of this
type of judgment not only as a judgment, but as a resolution or a choice.
Let us contrast this type of judgment with the first, apodictic variety of judgment that we
discussed. It does not sound quite right to state that I “decide” something is a certain type of
triangle when certain objective qualities simply inhere in a certain shape (assuming I have the
required evidence to judge it correctly, and that I am able to meaningfully interpret that evidence
for what it is). Nor does it sound right to state that I am “taking a position” on the nature of that
triangle, to the extent that nothing about the situation is really “up for interpretation” assuming
that my perception of the geometric figure is such that the perceptual evidence given to me is
reasonably clear and unambiguous. It would be rather grand and inappropriate to declare to those
who are around me that a triangle that is obviously isosceles is in fact isosceles; I simply do not
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need to take a position on something that can be viewed to be rather obvious. But it does sound
reasonable to say that I decided or “took the position” that the hazy figure I saw on the horizon
was a light pole when in fact it later turned out, as I drew closer and had better perceptual
evidence, that it was a bare tree that only appeared to be a light pole from far away.
When Husserl introduces the modalized judgment, it is different from the apodictic
judgment insofar as it is the former is a judgment that deals with an empty or anticipated
presentation. In short, this type of judgment is not a simple classification of some “thing”
according to formal properties a priori. This modalized sort of judgment, whether it is active or
passive, regards an object my perception of which is interrupted or “broken,” where broken does
not mean malfunctioning, but rather, incomplete. Husserl points out that most of the objects that
we encounter in judgment are conditioned by anticipations that operate “on the basis of passive
expectations.”19 Rarely do we encounter objects of sense in the complete mode that we encounter
geometric figures. The phenomenon of the world is such that I often only perceive objects
incomplete, with adumbration and apperceived qualities. When our concern is with the
phenomenon of conversion the judgments that are involved therein belong to this second
modalized class. There is no religious, spiritual, or philosophical object that I can regard en toto;
my judgment of these objects will never be one made with mathematical certainty. While the
judgment qua converting act may be regarded as if it is made with certainty, e.g. “I am certain
that my judgment of the object x is a certain judgment,” where the object is Christ, the “middle
way,” or Marxism, the certainty that pertains to these judgments is more of a testament to my
feeling and confidence in my judgment, rather than a quality or state that inheres in the
indubitably veridical nature of my judgment, again with mathematical certainty as the clearest
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comparison.20 We have already seen that Husserl also provides doubt and conjecture as examples
of modalized judgments that by definition do not subsist on a basis of certitude.21
Essentially the question that now arises concerns whether the judging that is involved in a
conversion is judging that is made with certainty or not. Clearly this is an issue for determining
the eidetic noesis of the conversion experience. I suggest that in the phenomenological attitude it
is readily apparent that it is in fact possible for the conversion experience to result from either of
these classes of judging acts. I say this because on the one hand it is apparent that the evidence that
the converting subject judges can be given in such a way that it is perceived to be incontrovertible.
I think that this is the way in which we should classify the conversion story of Saint Paul.
According to the Acts of the Apostles Paul asks whose voice he hears as he falls to the ground.22
Perhaps we should admit that at this phase of his conversion, Paul could be trying to judge
something that is not given with certainty, otherwise he might not ask the question. But crucially,
once Paul receives his answer, he does not regard the object of his experience with doubt or even
much deliberation; Paul is certain about what he thinks he heard.
But this does not demonstrate that every conversion has to occur in this manner. Let us
imagine the case of the subject who attributes the cause of some remarkably fortuitous occurrence
to the providence of God. Perhaps this subject is at first utterly at a loss to figure out how he could
be so lucky as to have whatever it is happen to him. Eventually since he lacks any other explanation
that he deems to be reasonable, he judges that it must have been God who was responsible for the
event, and he converts on the basis of this judgment. In sum must a conversion occur on the basis
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of a certain judgment? No, but it does not follow from this that a conversion never occurs on the
basis of a certain judgment.
While Husserl maintains that every judgment that is made actually requires a decision
necessarily, some writers have attempted to disentangle the two acts from each other.23 I should
point out that I do think that it is countersensical to imagine a judgment that does not involve the
deciding of the ego, if what we mean by ‘deciding’ is willing a belief. But it seems to me that
some of these writers have pointed out something valid when they point out differences on the
basis of Husserl’s own conceptualization. For example Lampert proposes that one of the
differences between the two acts is that “a judgment can be instantaneous, but a decision is
genetic.”24 In other words, a decision is never instantaneous. According to Husserl’s
phenomenology, to say that a decision is “genetic” is to suggest that it pertains to constitution
rather than the “static” level of final constituted products of sense.25 Of course I have also
indicated that every judgment is a decision, though, so it might sound as if I am offering a
contradictory model here. To the contrary there is no contradiction; without the genetic,
constitutive work of unfolding decisions, we would not be able to make judgments.
I would also like to treat the question of whether a judgment is in itself sufficient for a
conversion to occur, or it requires something outside of itself. Lampert argues that the conversion
event could be a type of decision, but he notes that some writers (Evangelicals, in particular)
have argued that merely deciding is insufficient for salvation, as they maintain that the grace of
God is a necessary condition for an authentic conversion.26
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I suggest that an intermediate position between Lampert and the Evangelical writers is
most reasonable. On the one hand, not every conversion must require “grace” of the sort
intended by these Evangelical writers, or even other Christian writers.27 For these writers grace
is, in short, undeserved favor. It is favor that is undeserved due to the supposedly sinful nature of
humanity. Here on the basis of my phenomenological approach I cannot presuppose this sort of
grace. In the phenomenological attitude it is not manifest that this type of grace is an eidetic
feature of the conversion phenomenon; I have already shown that conversion to Christianity
cannot be the only type of conversion.
However, if we consider grace more generally as some sort of “claim” that comes from
what is understood, in the natural attitude, to be “beyond” the converting subject, then it seems
that grace is required.28 After all conversion cannot occur in a solipsistic vacuum. If one were
limited only to the resources within himself or herself, then the sort of judgments that take on
existential significance for the subject would never arise in the first place. Indeed such judgments
would be impossible. Shortly I will demonstrate that this sort of “grace” is necessary, but only

Thomas Aquinas offers a fairly complete account of grace according to the Christian
Scriptures. Summa Theologica, Ia IIae, q. 110, arts 1-4.
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While I do not have the space to explore this issue, with a recently renewed scientific interest
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notable writer to explore such a hypothesis in The Doors of Perception. Ultimately even if it is
possible that such psychotropic substances can help bring about conversion, the substance itself
cannot be sufficient for the conversion process to occur, otherwise, we would be looking at the
sort of “forced” conversion the authenticity and validity of which I contest. The converting
subject will still require all of the necessary aspects of conversion that I delineate here. In short,
psychedelic use does not constitute a shortcut to conversion. It might play a role in conversion
for some individuals, but the matter is really not so different from visiting a fantastic cathedral or
beholding a wonder of the natural world, either of which could help bring about a conversion. In
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manifest in the appearance of the world and the Other. The “grace” of the Christian God, or any
other god, cannot be necessary for conversion to occur, but the grace of the world and the other
are strictly requisite. Thus the Evangelical critics to whom Lampert refers cannot be right.
On the other hand, I do not take it that Lampert’s view, namely, that a conversion can be
reduced to a type of decision, is quite right either—at least not without some qualification. If an
open-ended decision cannot be instantaneous due to the way in which it requires the
consequences of its execution to be necessarily indeterminate and virtual with respect to future
possible outcomes as they result not only from the singular decision but all of the decisions that
follow it, then conversion cannot in every case be reducible to an open-ended decision—if
anything I suggest that the existential transformation involved in conversion is actually more
concerned with the present and even the past rather than the future, even if it is ultimately true
that a conversion will have some bearing on the course of the subject’s future.
If I am right that conversion is primarily concerned with that which has already occurred
rather than what will occur in the future, then we should regard the convert’s sense of time as
linear since that which has occurred is the only course of events that has, for me, in this actual
world, led up to the present moment. After all the past is all set and done; what has occurred has
occurred, and that is what has brought me to the present.
While certain conversions may involve beliefs about what should be done in the future,
such as acting a certain way in accordance with certain precepts, or even holding beliefs about
events that are predicted to occur in the future, such as the second coming of the Messiah, not
every conversion, which is “only” an existential transformation, will entail a shift in the way in
which one regards the future, even if sometimes this does occur. Perhaps it sounds radical to
assert that conversion entails no such necessary shift. But consider the fact that we have said that
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a convert can move from one subset of Christianity to another, for example, from
Episcopalianism to Catholicism. I do not take it that such a conversion occurs on the basis of a
decision that regards the future as a complex, multi-branched set of possible outcomes, nor am I
convinced that such a conversion even involves any shift at all in the way in which one perceives
the future. It is probably warranted to question the extent to which such a shift should even count
as a conversion since it does not seem like much of an existential transformation when compared
to other more extreme sorts of conversions, but in the last analysis this matter is entirely up to the
convert. If his new religion is significant with respect to the manner of his own selfunderstanding—and I maintain that in the phenomenological attitude it is manifest that most
religious conversions, even that which operates internal to a specific faith system like
Christianity, Islam, and so on, this is precisely what occurs—then a conversion has occurred. “I
was an Episcopalian, but now I am a Catholic.” I see no issue with viewing a case such as this as
one which bears existential significance for the converting subject.
I think that it is apparent that sometimes conversions are instantaneous, at least in terms
of the manner of their givenness to the converting subject, even if it must be admitted that this is
not true in all cases. Consider how it does not seem that a conversion theory such as this can
really explain the paradigmatic case of Saint Paul. Does Paul judge that he hears the voice of
God in such a way that the givenness or appearance of the corresponding evidence (in virtue of
which the judgment is made) is defined by its open-endedness, or is it a judgment that is made on
a simpler basis? Is Paul’s conversion more like the decision to get up early the next day, or more
like the decision that takes for granted that the future is complicated, defined by innumerable
possible outcomes? Lampert likes to refer to the latter as more of a “project”—I wonder whether
we should regard Paul’s case as a project, or something more basic.
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All of that said, nevertheless I think that we must further qualify the apparently
“instantaneous” variety of the conversion experience since the judgment(s) involved therein, as
enacted by a historicized subject, are still subject to all of the temporal aspects of consciousness,
from retention and recollection, to sedimentation, to the various secondary noeses that I will
address in the next section.
Lampert criticizes the idea that conversion could be so swift (“quick and clean”) as
“irresponsible” although he then points out that it may be problematic to challenge the worth of
such a thing. This cannot be right if decisions cannot be instantaneous. Conversions, I suggest,
can occur on an instantaneous basis. Look at the story of Saint Paul, for example. The objection
to this would be that Saint Paul’s conversion is not actually an instantaneous judgment but a
decision that occurs over an extended duration. The problem with this rebuttal is that it is not
corroborated by the scriptural sources that furnish us with the narrative. These sources could be
accurate or inaccurate but altering the details of the anecdote seems to be a misstep.
But there is another problem with the idea that conversion is a decision. If it is true that a
decision is necessarily open-ended with respect to the future, then I do not see how this can be
made congruent with conversion as it is actually experienced. Who experiences a conversion
with the expectation that he will soon enough convert again? This is an extreme counter, and I
recognize that Lampert probably would see no issue with this, that his real point is that the
decision to convert is one that is futurally indeterminate, from which it logically follows that
maybe the convert will relapse his faith or even convert yet again. But my point is this: is it not
the case that what defines a conversion is the present moment of the “now”? As I have already
stipulated numerous times, this does not mean that the subject realizes that the conversion occurs
at some specific moment. Conversion can be a gradual process, and it can be unconscious. When
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I indicate that conversion occurs in the present moment of the “now,” I refer to the judging act.
The judging act belongs to the present, not the future, the yet-to-come. What I contest in
opposition to the phenomenological decision theory of conversion is that it holds that the
reduction of the givenness of the decision qua phenomenon uncovers the fact that the eidos of
the decision is that it appears precisely as branched, futurally indeterminate, virtual, and openended. When we examine the judgment involved in the conversion experience, we find that the
appearance of the judging act does not always abide by this characterization.
Furthermore I ask: are conversions not assumed with a sense of finality, even if they are
ultimately subject to being superseded by some future event? Conversions involve taking more
or less “firm” positions (firm as in lasting), which is necessary for the event to have any
existential significance instead of just being some passing fad. Perhaps Lampert would argue that
the subject who decides is not necessarily aware of the open-ended futural noema of his act. I
would respond that it ultimately does not matter whether or not the subject is aware of these
matters regarding his act, since the distinction between the judgment and the decision comes
down to, as Lampert himself puts it, the way in which a decision’s value is determined by the act
of deciding and not its content.29 With my account of judgment as noesis of conversion, the
content of the act does afford the act with its value, since I have indicated that it is only a specific
type of judgment, namely, that which bears existential significance for the subject, that is capable
of bringing about a conversion. To be sure the judging itself is still important but, as Lampert
notes, decisionism can ultimately be rather arbitrary, and that simply will not do with this
particular case since the content of the judgment needs to look a certain way in order for the
conversion to occur.
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For now that settles the question of whether it is a judgment or a decision that is
eidetically necessary for conversion. Next, I would like to address the judging noesis of
conversion from another angle; we cannot gloss over Husserl’s description of judgmental
position-taking as “active,” which is intended to convey the sense in which his view, according
to which our judgments regard our perceptions and “situations,” contrasts with that of Brentano,
for whom judgments are solely propositional.30 This will become important for my own
argument. For now we should note that this account of active position-taking does not contradict
what we have already established regarding the nature of the “passive conversion,” which I have
defined as a conversion that the subject does not pursue, but nevertheless entails constitutive
judgments, which are themselves necessarily “pursued” insofar as they are made.
Crucially Husserl’s model of judgment is one that holds that judgments entail, in every
instance, acts of will. In Husserl’s most sustained discussion of judgment, Formal and
Transcendental Logic, this is especially clear. There he writes, that “judging […] is
acting.”31And instead of being confined to a removed, ideal logical sphere, these judgments qua
positions regard individual, “real” objects and have a “relation to a real universe, a “world” or a
world-province” (Husserl’s italics).32 This will be important later on, when we delineate the
worldly horizon of the conversion phenomenon.
But if every judgment entails an act of willing, another important problem arises. Is it
judgment or will that is eidetically necessary for conversion? If judgment can be reduced to an
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act of willing, is it not the case that it is an act of will that is essential for conversion to occur,
and not just a judgment, which is but one sort of volition. In fact this is a misguided line of
reasoning. In the Logical Investigations Husserl characterizes willing as “non-objectifying” and
points out that it thus requires some intellectual act as its ground.33 This does not mean that an
act of willing does not correspond to a noema as object; the difference is that a non-objectifying
act does not itself add to the referential relation to the object, but instead only influences the very
presentation of the object. Husserl must make this move in order to establish the fact that a
simple act of willing cannot itself “make” the object. Every act will still necessarily involve an
objectifying act, however.
To the extent that there are all different sorts of acts of will, only some of which involve
judgments, we cannot in good faith reduce a judgment to willing. Every conversion will
necessarily include a judgment (or set of judgments), and so every conversion will necessarily
include an act (or acts) of willing, but not every act of willing is an act of judgment. As Husserl
points out in the LI, every act of the will requires some basis in a founding presentation.34 This
founding presentation need not be a judgment; it can be a perception or feeling. It is via feeling
in particular that the resulting act of will involves a sense of the value or worth of whatever it is
toward which the ego wills. Thus it is apparent that willing itself cannot be reduced to judgment.
Presumably, it may seem rather counter-intuitive to reduce all conversions to judgment,
especially in light of the fact that I have already suggested that not every conversion is the object
of conscious awareness on the part of the convert. And indeed, it is undeniable that many
conversions will include other noeses, some of which are directly perceived, others of which are
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apperceived. But one might be wondering why other intellective acts like thoughts and beliefs
are not sufficient for bringing about a conversion. The problem with these acts, which can appear
as secondary noeses but cannot themselves constitute a conversion, is that they do not
necessarily require a shift in the active position-taking of the ego. In other words, I can have a
thought about some religious object, but it may be a thought that has occurred to me in the past.
Perhaps it is even a thought that I have more or less consistently retained for quite some time.
This thought does not necessarily bring about a change in who I am, and if it does, it is because I
have judged the thought. In fact the noesis of judging is the only noesis that is itself sufficient for
a conversion. Thus it is the only necessary and essential feature of conversion at the noetic level,
therefore it is the only noesis that constitutes an eidetic aspect of the conversion phenomenon.
The noesis of judgment in conversion takes some sort of rational and/or logical position
on a religious or spiritual object (as noema). It is important to note that this judgment could be
affirmative (S is P) or negative (S is not P). For example one could judge that Christ is his savior,
or he could judge that Christ is not. In either case it is apparent that the judgment has to mark a
departure from some previously held belief (or lack of belief). Thus if a conversion is to result
from the judgment “Christ is savior” then it has to occur on the basis of the fact that the subject
previously held either no belief regarding Christ as savior, or the belief that Christ was not
savior. In either case the conversion is manifest in the epistemic change on the part of the
subject.
But phenomenologically speaking, there are several important distinctions to make
regarding types of judgments, with most of these distinctions coming down to differences in the
very constitution of the judgments.35 One such distinction is determinative versus relational
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judging.36 The essential difference between the two regards the nature of the object judged;
determinative judgment is “internal explication” (also known as internal determination) whereas
relational judgment involves “external contemplation” (sometimes referred to as relative
determination). Husserl stresses that it is only in the latter case that “objects are actually put into
relation with one another in a thematic way.” But Husserl also admits that on a formal (not
genetic) basis the difference between these two types of judgments collapses, and many
“internal” judgments should be taken as relational, insofar as the difference between the isjudgment and the has-judgment breaks down when a judgment includes more than two
substantives (i.e. subjects).37 The second substantive is, according to Husserl, a “relative object.”
In short, taken a certain way, many inner determinations are technically relational. Conversion as
I have here defined it is always a “putting-in-relation” (as Husserl calls it), but if a judgment (qua
converting act) is regarded as genetic, then the distinction is preserved.
The question, then, comes down to the number of substantives involved in a judgment
qua conversion act, wherein, if there are two or more substantives, the result is that the
conversion judgment is not just an inner determination, but a judgment of relation. I have already
indicated that the noema of a conversion experience is some religious or spiritual object. But I
have also admitted that this religious or spiritual object can be the convert’s very self. In such a
case are we dealing with an is-judgment or an has-judgment? Husserl concedes that
determinations and relations can occur in either type, depending on the circumstance. But the
specific circumstance that we are dealing with is one in which there is one substantive on the
“subject side” and, insofar as we are talking about an existential judgment (regarding identity or
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role), a second substantive on the “predicate side.” For example, when one resolves “I am (now)
a Christian,” we are dealing with a case of double substantives. Thus the judgment is not just
“internal”—it is thoroughly relational. This is because the second substantive, ‘a Christian’ is a
relative object.
The second important distinction for our present purpose concerns the difference between
the universal judgment and the non-universal judgment.38 In the case of the former my judgment
is such that my judgment makes reference to a universal and, crucially, this universal reference is
the object of thematization. In a judgment like this, my apprehension of the generality of the
object is itself a “productive activity.” As Husserl puts it, this means that “new objectivities are
actively constituted which can then enter into judgments as cores—cores which are no longer,
like those which we have considered up to now, individual cores, but general cores, belonging to
some level of generality or other.” The question, then, is whether conversion is necessarily
limited to either of these varieties of judgment, namely, the thematically universal, or the
negative case wherein I do not render as thematic the universal reference.39 It seems that the
conversion phenomenon can occur on the basis of either of these types of judgments. In some
cases the conversion object is judged specifically as representative of some universal (e.g. God),
epitomized in Saint Paul’s realization that the voice and the light belong to God. But it also
seems that in other cases conversion can be far more “unique.” For example, many individuals
have grasped some important existential insight on the basis of something as random and
particular as catching sight of a flash of light (e.g. the conversion of Philip K. Dick). At first
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glance it would appear that the religious conversion is more likely to involve a judgment that
entails thematic universal reference, whereas this is less likely of a requirement for the spiritual
conversion. It seems that the philosophical conversion could occur in either category.
As our final consideration regarding the noesis of judgment, it is now clear why judgment
is essentially so problematic. The fact of the matter is that the world and everything “in” it are such
that we are often not able to make judgments with certainty. Indeed it is significant that judgment
has even been called a “problem.”40 The problem comes down to the extent to which the necessary
presupposition of a judgment is a “pregiven object.” This is what Husserl explores in his writing
on transcendental logic. The question is: from what origin does predicative judgment emanate?41
This origin is, by definition, pre-predicative. If this origin, which is the pregiven world of objects,
is pre-predicative, then it is the object of “passive doxa.”42 What this means is that every
conversion has some necessary basis in passivity on the “object” side, with the result that any given
conversion whatsoever is never the sole product of judgment eo ipso, but a judgment that can only
originate from the “backdrop” that is the phenomenon of the world.43 This is a phenomenon that
is passively constituted for me. I will elaborate on this aspect of conversion later in this chapter.

III. The “Secondary” Noeses of Conversion

Next, I must describe several of the other possible noeses of the conversion act in order to
characterize more completely the “converting act” itself. This offers a more complete
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characterization to the extent that, as I argued in the prior section, some judging noeses of
conversion will achieve their fulfilling sense with a secondary noesis either as forebear to the
noesis of judgment, i.e. as one of its causes, or as noematic correlate of the noesis itself. While
judgment is the only noesis that is in itself necessary and sufficient, the phenomenon of
conversion is such that sometimes the judging act actually requires a complementary noesis in
order for the judging act to be furnished with its aboutness.
All of these noeses are capable of regarding the existentially significant religious object,
whether it be an empirically “external” object or the “subject” that is the self, occurring either
concomitantly with or sequentially to the judging noesis, but they are themselves also, as we will
see, possible noematic objects of the act of judgment.44
No matter how these “secondary” noeses should appear, they are never capable of
constituting the conversion on their own. Significantly, however, insofar as it is the judging act
that is constitutive for the conversion, it can never be the case that a conversion happens for a
subject as a result of an act of judgment followed by whatever secondary noesis. There would be
no such problem for the scenario wherein the secondary noeses precede the judging noesis, in
which case the secondary noesis (or noeses) may actually causally bring about the judging
noesis, or even serve as object of the act of judgment.
The former case can be called an “originary” or “founding” noesis of conversion. While
every conversion will necessarily require a judgment noesis at some point, the originary noesis
of a conversion (as cause) can be a volition, affect, perception, belief, or thought. Traditionally it
has been held that many converts will convert solely on the basis of some sort of judgment (e.g.

In other words these “secondary” noeses can either occur alongside the judging noesis, or in
addition to it.
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RCIA). These subjects will take their conversion on purely judicative terms. But for others,
conversion is something that starts with a noesis the noematic correlate of which is a religious
object that is not rational in nature, but instead one which results from something more akin to a
feeling or emotion. Some converts feel as if they are “called” to convert, and while I would still
suggest that these converts ultimately must make a judgment in order for the conversion to occur,
their conversions do not at all begin with judgments. Still others begin their conversions as a
simple act of will or volition that is not necessarily rationally approached, such as the choice to
convert in order to appease a spouse.45 In other cases a conversion can be precipitated as a result
of a perception, like the vision of an apparition or mystical object. Even in the traditional case,
epitomized above in the case of RCIA, the convert is judging some religious object that is
constituted at least in part on the basis of thoughts and beliefs.
As for the latter case I describe above, namely, that wherein a secondary noesis itself
serves as intentional correlate of the judgment (i.e. the “thing” the judgment is about, like the
judgment I make about a belief I have in Christ), in the previous section I provided the example
of the conversion that results from reflection, which is what occurs when the judging noesis
regards another noesis instead of something on the noematic “side.” As Husserl puts it this is the
distinction between an “immanental” noema and the “actual object” noema.46 Technically every
noema is, in the phenomenological attitude, immanental. But as I have shown, I do not convert in
the phenomenological attitude. When I convert, empirically and in the natural attitude, I can

It may be objected that this should be considered a forced and therefore inauthentic
conversion. Based on the analysis I have presented here, if the conversion is forced, that is, the
volition of another but not the subject herself, then it is not a really a “conversion” at all. I
suggest that a conversion like this is authentic so long as the convert freely makes the decision to
convert in order to please some other person.
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regard as the object of my mental act some “actual” object, e.g. Christ, or I can regard as object
my own mental act, e.g. my belief about Christ.
It is critical that we note that almost always a conversion occurs as a result of a
combination of two or more of these noeses. Husserl indicates that:
[T]he full noema consists of a complex of noematic moments, that in <that complex> the specific
sense-moment only fashions one kind of necessary core-stratum in which further moments are
essentially founded which, therefore, would likewise be designated as sense-moments, but in an
extended meaning.47

For example what might start as a feeling about some religious object could eventually yield to
some volition regarding that same object, which in turn yields a resulting judgment. It is even
possible that the most potent conversions, such as that of Saint Paul, will encompass all of these
noeses, although certainly not simultaneously. Ultimately, however, it is the judgment noesis that
is eidetically necessary for conversion, and it is the only noesis of conversion that is on its own
sufficient. As we have already said it must be granted that the judging noesis need not take up as
noema a judgment that pertains to a religious, spiritual, or philosophical object, but instead can
take up as object a volition, affect, perception, reflection, belief, or thought that corresponds to
this “conversion object.”
The noesis of volition in conversion is a desire or willing regarding some religious or
spiritual object. The difference between a noesis of judgment and a noesis of volition is that the
latter is not (experienced as) rational, whereas the former is. While it can at first glance be
difficult to differentiate these two noeses, in fact the most straightforward way to distinguish
these two noetic categories is in terms of “judging that” versus “wanting that.” For example
someone who converts to some version of Christianity and therefore judges something akin to
“Christ is my savior” should be distinguished from some other person who wills “I want to be
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united with Christ.” But as we have seen, very noesis of volition, as non-objectifying, actually
entails an objectifying noesis enacted by judgment (or feeling). Consider how, in the example,
the desire for unification with Christ presupposes some judgment about Christ. For example, the
implicit judgment might be something to the effect of “Christ is someone with whom I should
desire to be united.” It should be noted that the affect noesis might be paired with a judgment
noesis that negatively assesses the “more primitive” affect; in such a case obviously no
conversion would occur, since the judging act would trump the affective act.
The noesis of affect in conversion is epitomized in the occurrence of a feeling, or even
emotion. For example, it is possible for one to “feel” that Christ is her savior. But insofar as
conversion requires an existential change, the “mere” feeling on its own is not sufficient for
conversion; the feeling has to be accompanied by an analogous judgment noesis that bestows
existential significance upon the feeling. Consider, for example, how an atheist can “feel” a
certain way about Christ while she sits in a worship space, but without some judgment regarding
that feeling, the feeling is not on its own enough to make for a change in existential identity or
role.
Lastly, I will treat together the noeses of perception, reflection, belief, and thought. First,
the perceiving sometimes associated with conversion correlates with the seeing or hearing of
some existentially significant “object,” whether it be supernatural or worldly. For example if I
see someone on the side of the road, asking for money and for help, this can be part of a
conversion. Thus I typically face this noema as if it is an “actual object.” Second, the reflecting
associated at times with conversion, which I have already briefly treated, typically correlates
with something immanent to consciousness. I can reflect on a judgment that I made, or
something I desired, and so on. It is less clear that I can reflect, however, on what I presume in
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the natural attitude to be an actual object. For starters, Husserl characterizes reflection in such a
way that it is intentionality that turns toward itself. But second, what might in the vernacular be
called the “reflection” of some object, for example, reflection on the nature of God’s
omniscience, is closer to contemplation, and therefore, thought or even belief. Thought and belief
are the final two noeses of conversion that I will discuss here. The thinking or believing inherent
in these noeses corresponds to a concept or idea as thought or believed. It is critical to note that
with any of these secondary noeses of conversion, the sense and therefore horizon of the
secondary noesis need not be something religious, spiritual, or philosophical. It is the judging
noeses that belongs to these domains of existential significance. For example, if we think back to
the example I gave of an encounter with someone who is in need of help, it is apparent that there
is nothing necessarily religious, spiritual, or philosophical about my seeing of this person. It is
the judgment that I make about my seeing of this person that takes on religious, spiritual, or
philosophical significance, which is to say, existential significance.
There are a few final concerns regarding all of the noeses of conversion, judging in
addition to the secondary noeses I have here covered. While conversion itself (eo ipso) need not
be the intentional object (noema) of the conversion experience, it will never be the case that a
conversion occurs for the subject without a corresponding “attentive form of intentionality” on
the noetic side.48 As I have argued, this attentive form of intentionality will always be included in
a judging act (or, more often, set or series of acts), but as we have seen, it could include other
forms of attentive noeses, from affect to reflection to perception. Indeed, as I argued, it might
even require those other noeses for itself, either causally or noematically.
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Furthermore it follows from everything I have already indicated that the noesis of
conversion is not (necessarily) some specific, singular act that institutes the “completion” or
fulfillment of the conversion, as if the convert is passing through some determinate threshold
before which he was not converted, after which he was converted. Here the problem is not the
fact that the judging noesis may be accompanied in some fashion by secondary noeses—to the
contrary I have actually suggested that in all of these cases it is the judging act that produces the
conversion-meaning, even though sometimes the act cannot occur without some initiation or
even a noema of one of the secondary noeses here identified. The real issue is that there is some
concern that the conversion itself (as existential change), precisely insofar as it may not be
realized by the subject, is not necessarily a change that occurs on the basis of some single,
determinate act of consciousness. Indeed if conversion is the result of a judgment, then it seems
counter-intuitive to suggest that a conversion could occur unaware to the converting subject. But
we can confirm this surprising conclusion by differentiating the fulfillment of the conversion
from the act that brings its fulfillment about. While the judging act is necessary to bring about
the fulfillment of conversion, it is not the case that this fulfillment is immediate. Indeed this
fulfillment is often the result of the retention of meaning. In such cases the conversion results
from the sedimentation of the convert’s judgments upon the convert’s self. Essentially this is the
“bridge” between the judging/judgment and the ego. In Experience and Judgment Husserl
explains this bridging sedimentation thusly: “[it is] the continuous transformation of what has
been originally acquired and has become a habitual possession and thus something nonoriginal.”49 The idea is that the course of my experience is eventually imprinted upon my very
ego. Husserl calls this alteration in my habituality “non-original” because of the fact that these
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imprints upon me are not immediately “present” like other objects of sense. For example
consider the difference between living a fantastic, life-changing experience, and the ultimate
consequence of that experience upon your existential identity. The latter can certainly take on a
profound impact upon who I “am,” but that impact is not present to me in the manner of the
original, “founding” experience.
Of course, in the present case, we are considering the way in which an experience that is
not identified as fantastic or life-changing can become sedimented and ultimately change one’s
life, which means that something the impact of which was not realized can ultimately take on a
significant existential impact. I can see how this might be viewed as dubious; how can something
that I do not recognize ultimately play a role in the constitution of such an important change in
my identity? Husserl can resolve this concern for us. Sedimentation belongs to passive synthesis,
such that once some experience starts to “disappear from the field of immediate consciousness”
it vanishes “into the ‘unconscious,’ which is not a dead nothingness but a limiting mode of
consciousness and accordingly can affect us anew like another passivity in the form of whims,
free-floating ideas, and so on” (my italics).50 It is the power of these sedimented bits of
knowledge to “affect us anew” that furnishes us with the explanation that we need to make sense
of how something can make such a profound impact on the subject over the course of time,
without the subject immediately (or ever) realizing that impact. Whether I abandon or retain
some relevant conversion experience, the sedimentation of that experience can ultimately take on
an influence on my overall outlook that surpasses what was given to me in the original,
immediate experience.
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In the last analysis what is revealed via the noema and noeses of conversion is the fact
that conversion is grounded in phenomenological subjectivity itself. To the extent that the noema
of conversion is some judgment regarding an existentially significant “object,” the noesis of
which is capable of producing in the subject an existential change, where such changes are often
the result of the sedimentation of meanings (namely the meanings of religious objects of all
sorts) over the course of time, it is apparent that conversion is not always radical and intense. We
are tempted in the natural attitude to regard only conversions such as these, namely, those which
are radical and/or intense, as conversions. Similarly, we shy away from calling these more
gradual changes a change in “identity.” But if we consider the fact that the conversion
experience, like all experience, would not be possible if not for a temporal basis and without
active position-taking, we can see that conversion is a very natural “side effect” of consciousness
as we experience it, specifically, as a streaming flow defined in part by our choices. This flow is
manifest in my unified sense of experience over the duration of time (thanks to retention and
protention) which has meaning on the basis of the synthesis carried out by myself, as the ‘I’ in
the ego pole, or the transcendental (i.e., intentional) ego. The interpretive nature of consciousness
is such that consciousness is “writing” its own history over the course of its experience. I will
elaborate on the temporal horizon of conversion later in this chapter.

IV. The Worldly Horizon of Conversion

The fourth eidetic feature of conversion concerns the nature of the phenomenological horizon.
The constitution of the conversion phenomenon is integrated with the constitution of the shared
horizon of world at various levels Without the world there could be no conversion because
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consciousness is such that it constitutes for me a world that serves as essential counterpart to my
embodied experience.
It is important to qualify what this means in phenomenological terms, because it is also
true that the conversion experience could technically survive the destruction of the world, and it
is true that a radically isolated subject can convert. Simply put, when I state that the conversion
experience requires the world, this is meant phenomenologically. We will see precisely what this
means soon enough. But we already know that this entails that my present remarks regarding the
world should not be taken to mean that the world necessarily exists in a physical or material
sense.51
As we know, consciousness for Husserl centers on the mechanics of intentionality. The
world thus relates directly to this intentionality insofar as it grounds innumerable objectifying
acts. In its broadest sense the world is in short the totality of all possible intending, which in
Ideas I Husserl refers to as the “horizon of horizons.”52 As horizon of all horizons the world
plays a role in the establishment of the “experienceableness” of the physical thing (which is not
necessarily capable of being seen but instead a thing that is potentially experienceable.)53 In
other words the physical thing is not necessarily a material thing but such a thing as that which is
speculated to “exist” according to the science of physics. These things can be experienced in any
number of different ways beyond the limits of touch. For example sound is a physical thing,
despite the fact that it is not material and cannot be touched (although at certain frequencies it
can certainly be felt). It is of course true that conversion is not a physical thing, but in many
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cases its occurrence will involve a noesis the object of which is some physical thing out in the
world, which ultimately corresponds to a judgment made that bears transformative existential
significance for the convert.
But the world is also something the very appearance of which is statically constituted.
This is why Husserl also calls the world the “correlate […] of experiencing consciousness.”54 In
Ideas I one of his main points regarding this issue is that without the correlative world my
“factual experience” and “experimental consciousness” would not have anything to be “about.”
The concern that Husserl has for the world in this text is mostly logical and ideal in nature; one
of his most important points is that the statements that I make would have no reference without
the world.55 My statements, in order for them to mean anything, require the world as correlate. In
short in the first volume of Ideas Husserl is mostly working to ground in consciousness the
relation of scientific claims to the world.
In Ideas II he takes a rather different approach to the world. There he distinguishes
material nature from animal nature from the spiritual world. It is certainly significant that
Husserl only chooses to use the term “world” in this particular text to describe the spiritual
world, even though his discussion of animal nature mostly focuses humans, albeit as “natural
objects,” which for him refers to the human or animal soul that is “connected” with the body.56
The spiritual world and therefore the spirit itself transcends this sense of soul for Husserl. This
sense of spirit is neither natural-scientific nor “psychophysical.”57 Husserl understands that here
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he enters the domain of metaphysics and he does not shy away from using the term.58 In Ideas II
he shows that all of our experience of the material world is ultimately grounded by the work of
the spirit. While he preliminarily regards this spirit in a solipsistic way, he also notes (even
before doing so) that the spirit is not an isolated figure but is to the contrary inextricably linked
to the world.59 In fact it is not just one spirit that is linked to the world in such a manner, but
every spirit. In Ideas II Husserl elaborates on the nature of this correlation between subject (qua
spirit) and world, noting that “I am what I am (and each other person is what he is) as subject of
a surrounding world.”60 But he takes this idea even further when he indicates that the spiritual
world is a world that is intersubjectively constituted by Others, which I will address in the next
section.61
Conversion is fundamentally linked to the spiritual world insofar as, as I have shown,
conversion is an experience that involves some transformation of existential significance.
Existential significance is not anything that we will find in physical nature, which amounts to
“bare life” itself; instead, it is something that belongs to the human spirit, for whom “existence”
is a concern in the first place. Nature knows of no such thing. While non-spiritual “things” like
material objects or even the body as physical correlate or “animal nature” can certainly take on
existential significance, the significance itself is meaning for the spirit and none other. In other
words nature can bear existential significance for humanity, but never can it bear such
significance without our involvement.
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As Husserl puts it in Ideas II, the spirit, phenomenologically construed, is the “subject of
intentionality.”62 It is because the spiritual subject is the intentional subject that conversion
occurs only for the spirit, because conversion can only occur on the basis of the activity of the
intentional subject.63 We have seen that this intentionality specifically centers around certain
judgments that regard the significance of the convert.
This is even more significant because this highlights the fact that even if there are secular
sorts of conversion that involve no “religious” or “spiritual” content, ultimately every conversion
is a conversion of the spirit. That said, it is important that we do not subject this spirit to
metaphysical assumptions that are not grounded in a science of consciousness. While it would be
appropriate to use terms like ‘mind’ or even ‘soul’ to refer to this spirit, we have to limit
ourselves to the analysis of this Geist only insofar as it appears—as subject of intentionality.
Since conversion is something for the spirit, we must analyze briefly this spiritual
“world” in which conversion occurs. First, Husserl identifies the essential law of the spiritual
world as motivation.64 Motivations play a crucial role in the constitution of our lives in the
world. There are actually several different types of motivations according to Husserl: the use of
reason, association and habit, association and experience, each of which he carefully
distinguishes from “natural causality.”
When reason is our motive it drives the course of our judgments and dictates the
parameters of justification and verification. Husserl distinguishes two different types of reason in
Ideas II: active reason and relative reason.65 The former is what I use when my ego is “motivated
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by insight.” When I employ active rationality there are no breaks or disruptions in my line of
thought; my thought is coextensive with this type of rationality, where I am identifying
“connections of requirement.” Similar to Descartes, Husserl does not take it that I can err when I
use this rationality; if something is logically necessary, then there is nothing to debate. As my
active rationality is active only in the moment that it is taken up, it is restricted in use. Indeed
since active rationality requires constant usage, it is only intermittently involved in my life.
Relative rationality does not deal with logically necessary connections but merely the
relations between things. It, by contrast, is not necessarily consistently employed, and it is in
virtue of this fact as well as its subject matter (relative relations) that accounts for it being much
more prone to mistakes and errors. When I use relative rationality, I am faced with a “confused
unity” that I do not regard with instantaneous logical insight. Since relative rationality is not
subject to the same activity requirements as its counterpart, it resembles much more of a mindset
or a mood than it does a noesis grounded in pure logic.
It seems to me that the conversion experience derives primarily from judgments that are
made via relative rationality. While I cannot indubitably demonstrate that it is impossible for a
conversion to follow from judgment(s) that have been made only in the mode of active
rationality, it seems likely that this sort of conversion, if it is possible, occurs only on a very rare
basis. Consider for example what a conversion in active rationality would look like: a series of
deductions and calculations the result of which is some certain conclusion. While this mode of
rationality is useful when we deal with problems in the logic or mathematics classroom, we do
not live most of our lives using this type of reason. Far more important for us in a practical sense
is the use of relative reason, which Husserl alternatively characterizes as the pursuit of some
value the source of which is genuine, and we can see how this would complement quite nicely
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our phenomenological model of conversion. This account of relative rationality also serves as
another limiting factor in virtue of which we can exclude the forced conversion as inauthentic;
the value that is pursued does not have a genuine source within the subject himself.
Before we move on to the homeworld it is critical that we take note of the fact that
Husserl incorporates affect in his discussion of reason as motivation, not only in terms of how
judgment is motivated by affect, but also how affect is motivated by judgment. In some cases,
such as when I become distracted by an instinct or a drive, I am subject to irrationality. In a case
like this my judgment is motivated by affect, negatively so. The experience of conversion is
driven by judgments that may be rational, or irrational.
The lifeworld and homeworld are part of Husserl’s attempt to incorporate the context of
culture, history, and society in his phenomenology, and as such they emerge in his later works
like the Crisis. Out of the two the homeworld, as its title implies, is the more specific concept.66
Each of these concepts is essentially an analytic elaboration of the more general idea of the world
that Husserl presents in Ideas I, as “horizon of horizons.” But he eventually comes to
characterize this meta-horizon according to intersubjective criteria in his later thought.
The homeworld is the world of familiarity for me.67 For me it constitutes what seems to
be normal or typical, but not in any ethical sense.68 It is the sum of the horizons that are specific
to me and are derived from the localization of my consciousness in some specific time and place.
The homeworld is a unity of meaning and sense comprised by worldly things’ pregivenness.69
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But we should push Husserl to conceive of the homeworld in even more precise terms, including
my race, my class, and my gender, all of which play a profound role in the operation of my
conscious life. Without a doubt the homeworld qua familiar but passive referential context for
consciousness bears an obvious influence on the constitution of my consciousness, which does
not originate ex nihilo but is always already founded in a homeworld, which is relative on a
cultural, historical, and social basis. Essentially this homeworld is a more specific “horizon of
horizons” that is relative to my own life on the basis of certain definitive variables that play a
role in the life of my consciousness. Thus this homeworld accounts for many of the meanings
and assumptions that I make as I go about my life. Furthermore my homeworld is specific to me,
as my “home” is not the same as the home for Others, but something that is my own “home” of
consciousness (in other words not a literal a literal dwelling place). We can consider the lifeworld
to be a reduction of the homeworld taken in terms of its general essence; the homeworld is just
the lifeworld of some particular subject. The lifeworld is essentially the broader conception of
the homeworld in general, for anyone, anywhere.
The homeworld, and by extension lifeworld, are relevant for the phenomenological
analysis of the conversion experience because it structures the conversion possibilities for the
subject. This comes down to the distinction between the homeworld and its antithesis, the
alienworld. It may be the case that I am more likely to convert to a religion, spiritual worldview,
or philosophy that is already familiar to me within the outer limits of my homeworld. For
example if I am a citizen of Europe or the United States, Christianity is probably more culturally
familiar to me than Sikhism, whether I am a Christian or not, although this is certainly not true
for a Sikh living in Europe or the US. In virtue of this increased familiarity with some ideas, and
less familiarity with others, I am more likely to pursue conversions that are “available” to me
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within my larger homeworld, and less likely to pursue those that rest outside of it. To be sure it is
certainly possible that someone can convert to a religion or spiritual worldview or even
philosophy that surpasses the old limits of his homeworld, but this would require in advance the
reorientation of the homeworld in order for the new existential framework to be an “option” for
the converting subject. Indeed, when this happens the homeworld is rearranged for the subject
with new meanings embedded in it as ground. Because conversion possibilities within my own
homeworld are already embedded in my consciousness, I deduce that I am more prone to pursue
these possibilities that are in closer proximity to myself.
But it is also the case that any conversion whatsoever plays a role in the reconstitution of
the homeworld. Even if a religion like Christianity, which is already familiar to me given the
homeworld I inhabit, is not my own religion, were I to convert to it, then my sum of horizons
would shift. Thus we can see how the requisite existential transformation upon which I have
already elaborated at length plays a role in the structuration of the very horizon (of horizons)
within which my experience takes place.
In closing we should note that it is not quite the case that consciousness is itself derived
from the world, as if the world is logically or causally prior to consciousness (in a
phenomenological sense). In fact the two require each other in a mutually constitutive relation.
Husserl writes that, “The concepts of ego and surrounding world are related to one another
inseparably.”70 In Husserl’s later phenomenology it is undeniable that the world is constituted by
the ego, where constitution entails the appearance of the world as a phenomenon, and not the
material existence of the world in a mind-independent sense. It is the world that serves as the
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“universal ground of belief pregiven for every experience of individual objects.71 Objects in the
world are always already there for me, and all of my mental acts presuppose the existence of
these objects. They “stimulate and set going” all of my mental processes, from which they are
given structure and “legitimacy.”72 But furthermore we have to consider this world as, first, a
spiritual phenomenon that does not necessitate very much with respect to the veracity of the
claims my religion, spiritual worldview, or philosophy makes with respect to “material” nature or
reality, and second, as a culturally, historically, and socially embedded phenomenon.
I have stated that without the world there can be no conversion. It is important to address
the extent to which this is not a contradiction of a famous passage in Ideas I wherein Husserl
describes the “annihilation of the world.”73 There Husserl writes:
The existence of a world is the correlate of certain multiplicities of experience distinguished by
certain essential formulations. But it cannot be seen that actual experiences can flow only in such
concatenated forms; nothing like that can be seen purely on the basis of the essence of perception
taken universally, and of the essences of other collaborating kinds of experiential intuition.74

How are we to reconcile these remarks with what I have said here? First it should be noted that the
larger context for these remarks Husserl makes in Ideas I regard the “material countersense” of an
idea that there could be a world outside of our own.75 Husserl concludes that it is problematic to
speculate that a real world exists outside of our own because there is no actual ego to which this
world appears, with the real point being that what is experienceable for any single ego must “of
essential necessity be cognizable by any Ego.”76 But a world outside of our own is not experience,
so this cannot be right. Second, to return to the original issue with the supposed annihilation of the
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world, Husserl’s precise claim is that if the “world of physical things” were annihilated, then this
would not “touch” the existence of consciousness. One might wonder how he can say such a thing
when I have presented the world as I have, as a thoroughly necessary correlate of intentional
consciousness. Ultimately, we can resolve the tension by reminding ourselves that we cannot
presuppose the real, external, material existence of the intentional objects that are present to my
consciousness. Husserl insists that pure consciousness is entirely self-contained, such that the
annihilation of the allegedly material world presents no problem for the existence of consciousness
eo ipso. But beyond this there is the fact that even if it is true that consciousness itself could survive
an incident such as the annihilation of consciousness, that does not mean that this consciousness
would have access to the experience of conversion, which seems to require the world as correlate
in order to furnish for itself the necessary subject matter to pertain to the constitutive judgments
that comprise it.

V. Conversion and the Other

The fifth eidetic feature of conversion relates back to the fourth, the world. I suggest that, as we
saw with the world, it would be impossible for the conversion experience to occur without the
givenness of the Other. While Husserl will typically use the term Other to refer to the other ego,
here I refer to the Other in two senses, the Other as (the) transcendental ego (of the Other), and
the Other as social institution, as non-self. It is critical that we note that each of these senses of
Otherness are defined by the fact that they pertain to things that I understand to my transcendent
to my self. If my experience were limited to my self, without these transcendent correlates on the
“outside,” then I would not have much of a life; my consciousness would be limited to the
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reflection of its own internal states, and these states would be rather “bald” and plain without any
involvement with that which is external to my self. Indeed both of these senses of Other are
required in order for a conversion experience to occur, primarily because without the Other there
would be no world phenomenon, without which judgments of existential significance could not
be made.
The first necessity is the intersubjective constitution of the world as enacted by other
transcendental egos. We already say Husserl make this point when he characterized the spiritual
world in Ideas II. The fact that conversion requires Other transcendental egos is a testament to
the fact that the world phenomenon is the product of intersubjective constitution. Strictly
speaking, however, the constitution of the world is the product not just of my own transcendental
ego, but any number of transcendental egos qua “community of monads.”77 Husserl alternatively
refers to this community structure as “transcendental intersubjectivity,” noting that the world is
the accomplishment of this transcendental intersubjectivity.78 It is the achievement of this
community to make possible “a world of men and things,” without which conversion could not
occur. Husserl describes this interrelation of monads an “intentional communion” which he
characterizes as “essentially unique connectedness.”79 The crucial qualification, however, is that
these other monads are constituted by my own consciousness. Critically, these others are
constituted “in me” precisely “as monads, existing for themselves.”80 Thus while it is true that
the world phenomenon is the product of intersubjective constitution, it is also true that the Other
is constituted by me, with a givenness such that I take it that this Other is also an ego, like me.
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The second necessity is that the Other is required in the sense of social institutions,
without which conversion would not be possible. I am identifying social institutions as Other to
the extent that Husserl includes culture in his conception of “other experience.”81 This social
institution may be a religion, a spiritual worldview, or a philosophy, but more generally, this
social institution could be a language, or set of cultural practices. I realize that this condition
stipulates that there can be no such thing as a private, personal conversion that surpasses the
limits of individual reference and meaning. But upon closer analysis we can tell that this must be
true, insofar as sans the Other qua social institution, we would lack the requisite linguistic and
cultural domains in order for a conversion to take place. Insofar as I have reduced the conversion
phenomenon to essentially require judgment noeses, a conversion without the social institution
of language could never take place.
Ultimately my self-experience would not at all be the same without other experience.82 I
can see how many aspects of my self are ultimately entangled with the outer world. It follows
that ultimately what I consider to be my “self” is influenced by, and informed by, that which is
not actually within the limits of my selfhood. For example, would it make sense to talk of
personality, as a way that we interact with other egos, without these other egos? Would it be
possible for something like religion or a formal philosophy to exist at all without the constitution
of the Other? Perhaps the most concerning problem would concern the origin of language itself.
Without the Other, would language be possible at all? And without language, would conversion
make any sense? For all of these reasons I take it to be clear that my experience of my self, and
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therefore my experience of the conversion phenomenon, requires on a fundamental level the
Other.

VI. The Essential Embodiment of the Converting Subject

The sixth eidetic feature of the conversion experience concerns the essential embodiment
involved therein. I have already shown that every conversion experience will require judgment,
but here I will demonstrate that these judgments could not be made not only without world and
the Other, but also embodiment. In fact, without embodiment, I would not be able to experience
the world as environment. Furthermore, it is through bodily mediation that certain sensations that
factor in the conversion experience are constituted.
In Ideas II Husserl characterizes the body as “organ of the will” and “seat of free
movement.”83 What Husserl means is that the body is something that is, despite its material or
physical nature, intrinsically linked to my will. In this respect it differs from other “objects.” In
contrast to other objects, I have an “immediate and spontaneous” relationship with the object that
is my body. This is why Husserl also refers to the body as “willing body.”84 With these words he
refers to the fact that I enjoy a primary relation between my self and my body; when I want to
move some part of my body, I simply will it in a direct and immediate fashion.85 It is this sense
of the body, specifically as Leib rather than Körper, that is tantamount to the very center of all
my life experience. The reason for this is that the body is “the medium of all perception; it is the
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organ of perception and is necessarily involved in all perception.”86 It follows that without the
body, there is no perception of an external world. We can link this conception of the moving
body, and of the sensing body as locus of all perception, to the conversion experience.
As we saw in the fifth chapter, there are several important respects in which embodied
perception plays a role in conversion. First there is the critical role that my body plays in the
constitution of consciousness. My consciousness is embodied consciousness, which means that
my experience of outer as well as inner perception is influenced by my status as an embodied
subject. I cannot imagine the experience of consciousness without the embodied basis that I
presently enjoy. One implication of this is that I cannot imagine the experience of conversion
without a body. It follows from this that the annihilation of my body would prevent me from
experiencing a conversion—or at least, a conversion that remotely resembles the type that I can
encounter in this embodied life of mine.
How does this relate to the judgments made by the converting subject? Recall that we
have stated that the judgment(s) made by the converting subject are ones which have some
bearing on the existential status of the convert. But since judgments are enacted by
consciousness, and since consciousness is necessarily embodied, embodiment is an essential
feature of the possibility of human judgment. This may seem counter-intuitive to the extent that I
am fully capable of making judgments that do not regard physical or material issues. For
example, these are the sort of judgments that I make when I employ “active rationality.” I have
shown, however, that it is not clear how a conversion could occur solely on the basis of the use
of active rationality. To the contrary conversion typically involves the use of relative rationality.
Second, and more importantly, just because the object of a judgment is non-material “thing,” it
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does not follow from this that the judgment itself, as noesis, would be possible if my
consciousness were not partly constituted on the basis of my physical organism. Using Husserl’s
terminology, we can see how the body serves as a “hyletic” foundation for the determinative
form that consciousness brings to the table. Certain biophysical conditions correlate with my
experience of consciousness; while we cannot (in the phenomenological attitude) make
ungrounded claims regarding the ontic status of my biophysical organism, we should also note
that the way in which I live as such an organism is radically different in kind from any claim that
I make about the existence of mind-independent material or physical objects in an external
world. My body is not this type of object—it is mind-dependent.
Existential significance is always constituted in part along with the embodiment of the
subject. In short who I “am” is not just a conceptual belief but to the contrary a belief that
involves non-conceptual correlates such as my physical being. The relationship between mind
and body is mutually constitutive; my sense of who I am entails a certain orientation with respect
to the body. Husserl says, “[A] human being’s total consciousness is in a certain sense, by means
of its hyletic substrate, bound to the Body.”87 I do not regard myself simply as an abstract,
immaterial ego; as Marcel puts it, I am my body. My experience of consciousness is such that my
very subjectivity is a unity that is comprised of body as well as mind. Thus, for the converting
subject it is the case that every conversion experience entails not only a conversion of the mind
or soul but also a conversion of the body. Perhaps the clearest example of this can be found in the
case of Saint Paul, for whom bodily issues occupy a major concern subsequent to his conversion
experience. We already saw Paul contend with practical body issues like circumcision. But Paul’s
position on the matter of circumcision is actually only part of the much larger concern that Paul
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has with the body; specifically, after his conversion he thinks of himself as one with the Body of
Christ. In other words, his physical self-understanding is restructured in such a way that he no
longer approaches his own embodiment with the same schematization as before. Perhaps it
would be instructive to include a more mundane example of this sort of “conversion of the body”
that I maintain is involved in every conversion experience, including those which subsist outside
of the limits of organized religion. Consider for example the way in which someone who
“converts” to Marxism. This person does not just change their political and economic beliefs; he
or she comes to view their body, and be a body, in a different manner. This convert certainly
looks at his personal identity in a new way, specifically on the basis of class struggle. But part of
this class struggle comes down to the exploitation of labor, which requires the body; without the
body there is no labor, including even labor that involves no strenuous physical exertion. After
all as I write out these remarks I am laboring. I need my hands, my eyes, my brain, and so on. If
every conversion involves existential transformation, and every conversion is a conversion of the
body, then existential transformation involves a change in the very constitution of embodied
consciousness.
But we have to note that when this conversion of the body occurs, it is the product of
interpretation on the part of the ego. In other words, this conversion of embodiment requires no
necessary physical or material change to the subject (although it is certainly the case that such
changes are possible). Instead, the reorientation of the body is the product, again, of judgment.
Second, we must address the sense in which the body is involved in the constitution of
various sensations that accompany the conversion experience. We have already seen that often
but not always conversion will involve certain embodied sensations, whether it is something that
is seen, heard, or felt. Because a conversion experience, culminating in a judgment, is often
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brought about by some instituting secondary noesis, whether it is a flash of bright light, a voice
that is heard, or some sort of feeling, we can conclude that often it is the case that conversion
begins with an embodied sensation. But in fact our final conclusion should be even more
extreme; since, as we have seen, conversion requires the world, and since my experience in the
world requires my embodiment, ultimately it is true that every conversion “begins” with the
body, even in cases where some pre-judgmental noesis precedes the conversion proper.
Lastly, to the extent that the body is “seat of free movement,” without my body I could
not experience the world in the same way. It is my body that permits me to move about the world
and experience all that it has to offer. Thus it is apparent that without a body not only would it be
impossible for me to have perceptions of the external world, but without a body I could not move
about that same world. Therefore I would never be able to convert without being embodied.
But just as I could not convert without a body, I could never convert without temporality,
which I will treat in the next section as the nature of its horizon is one of the eidetic features of
all experience, including the conversion experience.

VII. The Temporal Horizon of Conversion

Elaborating on the nature of existential transformation itself, we find that it occurs on the basis of
the unity of the pure ego and it requires the identity of this ego over time, manifest in time
consciousness. In short this means that experience requires time, and conversion, as an
experience, requires time in a general sense as well as a narrower sense. To the extent that
conversion involves an existential transformation, this transformation requires a succession of
temporal moments in order for said transformation to occur; to transform takes time. But we find
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that the amount of time is wholly variable; as for the specific temporality within which the
conversion occurs, it is the seventh eidetic feature of conversion that it involves no definite or
determinate temporal limits at the level of the horizon.
A conversion can be the final result of a lifetime, or it can be a rapid and brief occurrence.
The most important implication of this is that the distinction between the process-conversion and
event-conversion fundamentally collapses within the stream of conscious time.
Phenomenologically speaking, the process conversion is just a specific type of extended event
that occurs over a longer duration of time.88 It is the ego that constitutes this phenomenological
time, the flow of which makes conversion a possible experience. This is furthermore
compounded by the fact that conversion is a phenomenon that transcends a single conscious
instant; as transformation, it requires a wider temporal context in order for the transformative
change to be traceable.
This phenomenological time does not appear to me as differentiated—this is precisely
why it is characterized as a stream or flow, every aspect of which is comprised of
undifferentiated constituent parts, unlike a single drop (or even molecule) of water. Thus, in the
phenomenological attitude, there is no “material” difference between the event conversion and
the process conversion. In the phenomenological attitude the difference between the two is
entirely relative considered in light of my reflection upon the onset of time. In other words, any
supposed difference in the two appearances is merely the product of my own judgment regarding
the matter.

Even delimiting the phenomenological duration of an “event” proves to be difficult. There are
certain situations for which I can set some specific threshold as the temporal boundary between
an event and a process, but my selection of such a figure would be wholly arbitrary.
88
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There is another important temporal feature of conversion in essence. It concerns the
temporal noema of the future, what Jay Lampert refers to as a “futural noema.”89 We have
already reviewed another aspect of Lampert’s decision theory of conversion, even as it regards
the way in which the converting subject contends with his or her future, but here I would like to
take up another angle of Lampert’s theory. Following his account of the way in which any given
decision “projects” into multiple timelines in the future, I maintain that this defines some
conversions but not all; I suggest that sometimes conversion actually closes off and narrows the
scope of possibilities in the future. In other words, conversion is not always an open-ended event.
I will attempt to prove this shortly.
First let us sketch another portion of Lampert’s argument. He focuses on decisions as
evocative phenomena; in short, the way in which they are given is such that they disclose
something about the future. To disclose something about the future is to disclose something
about the nature of temporality, at least, temporality as we experience it. According to Lampert
the central disclosure regarding temporality is that the consequences of a decision are
indeterminate. This relates to time insofar as this contrasts with the ordinary assumption in the
natural attitude that time is something that is linear, which is actually only the case for a “simple”
decision vis-à-vis an “open-ended” decision. If Lampert is right, insofar as most of the decisions
that are consequential for the meaning of our lives are open-ended rather than simple, then time
is a web or series of branches, not a straight line. Time looks like such a web insofar as any given
decision has an indeterminate effect or outcome. But furthermore any given decision is subject to
the effects that subsequent decisions will bear. The end result is a web of possible future
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outcomes, all of which are interrelated and “virtual,” which is to say, projected and not (yet)
actual.
So for our current inquiry the first question is whether the conversion experience is
futurally virtual or indeterminate, which is to say, open-ended or not. I grant that I have indicated
already that a conversion cannot be reduced to a decision (in lieu of a judgment) but we should
remind ourselves that I also indicated that every judgment does require a decision in the sense of
willing.
To be fair, the only case in which I can see a conversion of this nature (namely, one that
opens up future possibilities instead of precluding them) would be a philosophical conversion
wherein one made the judgment that this theory regarding conversion is first, true, likely true, or
at the very least thoroughly reasonable, and second, is something the position-taking of which
bears existential significance for the subject, either consciously or according to sedimentation.
Phrased this way, this sounds like a conversion to a variety of existentialism that centers upon
rhizomatically unfolding future possibilities.
In contrast to this account of conversion, the temporality of which constructs a “future
composed of multiple, virtual time lines,” my sense of conversion is that its temporal effect is
such that, while it does not eliminate outright all multiple future timelines, nevertheless it does
reduce their number. We can see this play out in the present as well as the future. Before the
subject experiences a conversion, it (viz., conversion) was just one possibility out of an
innumerable sum of possibilities. Conversion is something that could potentially occur for me.
But once the conversion occurs and therefore shifts from that which is merely possible or
potential, to that which is actual, at least some of the other, “old” possibilities are no longer
possible, at least not at that specific time and place and for that specific subject, insofar as the
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moment of the act has passed as what was present but is now past. This is also true for the
possibilities of the future, however. When someone converts to some specific religion, spiritual
worldview, or even philosophy, this conversion is guiding the course of their future in such a way
that some possible situations are rendered impossible. By ‘impossible’ I refer to the state of no
longer being part of the causal trajectory that follows from the converting act as “source” or,
better yet, a determinant of the future. For example, if I convert to Christianity this will have an
effect on how my future plays out. The effect need not be drastic or even something about which
I have knowledge. The point is that the conversion itself will drive the course of future events for
me.
I suggest that the temporality of conversion is indeed fascinating, but not according to
how it pertains to the future, but rather, the way in which we see it play out in the present as well
as the past. The temporal indeterminacy of conversion, I argue, is sourced in these two divisions
of time rather than the future. Conversion is temporally indeterminate for several reasons. First,
there is no set number of changes which can be considered phenomenologically sufficient for
conversion, no “tipping point” at which a conversion “occurs” for the subject with empirical
certainty. Since we experience consciousness as a dynamic stream of moments rather than as a
sequence of discrete “dominoes” or conscious snapshots, there is no phenomenologically valid
procedure for isolating in time the supposedly precise moment at which the ego converts.
Without a doubt, in some cases the subject will be aware of this moment. But across all cases we
can be sure that this is not always the case. It could be objected that a judgment, which I have
suggested is eidetically necessary for conversion to occur, occurs at some specific and precise
time. Logically speaking this is true. According to logic alone, the conversion definitively
“occurs” when the relevant judgment is made. But ultimately, I think that his line of thought is
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mistaken, and I think that it is rather misleading to present conversion as something that occurs
as if through a threshold such as I here describe, because in at least some cases, this is not how
conversion plays out. Insofar as this is a phenomenology of conversion, I have to exclude the
particularities of any given conversion experience and focus on what is truly essential. I have
already addressed the extent to which sedimentation plays a crucial role in the constitution of the
subject and therefore any of the judgments that he makes. But there is a second move to make
here. I think that it is likely that at least some conversions occur on the basis of a set of
judgments rather than just one. Perhaps it is tempting to declare that in such cases, it is the final
judgment that brings about the conversion. This cannot be right, though, because that final
judgment required all of the antecedent judgments (or secondary noeses, for that matter) in order
to occur. Thus it makes much more sense to talk of such a conversion as a gradual process with
multiple constitutive aspects, instead of some single instant. That said, I do think that conversion
can be instant like that. The issue, phenomenologically speaking, is that if conversion is
sometimes instant but sometimes not instant, this means that its temporal unfolding is eidetically
indeterminate. It is a fluid process that occurs in flux; there may be great divergence in how time
affects any two given conversions.

The Phenomenological Fundamentality of Conversion

In conclusion I would like to stress that the conversion experience is grounded in
phenomenological subjectivity itself. I know that I have dismissed neuroscientific studies of
religious belief that specifically focus on the human predisposition for religious belief. I
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indicated that I was not able to derive phenomenological conclusions from these studies. That is
still true.
But now I think that I am able to draw a very similar conclusion regarding conversion
(where the conclusion is, informally, that we appear to be “hard-wired” for the experience of
conversion). I suggest that this hard-wiring is phenomenological in a constitutive sense.
Conversion is something that we are prone to experience simply on the status of our being as
transcendental subjects. Maybe it is for that reason something that is not just possible but even
likely or probable for us.
I realize that it may seem odd or even illicit to attempt to use phenomenological methods
to grasp an inductive conclusion regarding the probability of conversion occurring. Ultimately,
though, I maintain that this is true for phenomenological reasons. The eidetic features of
conversion are such that they encompass many of the most fundamental features of
consciousness itself as a totality. The structure of the conversion phenomenon, I suggest, is
embedded in the very conditions of consciousness on a basic and fundamental level. In other
words there is a fundamentally symmetrical relation between consciousness and the conversion
phenomenon.
From its basis in judgment, the world, the Other, and a time that is both futurally
determinate and otherwise indeterminate, we can see how conversion encompasses many of the
most common and essential aspects of consciousness in general. But furthermore we find that
there is a fundamental link between the phenomenon of conversion and the interpretive nature of
self-constitutive consciousness. To say that self-constitutive consciousness if of an interpretive
nature is to suggest that the synthesis that consciousness carries out is comprised of innumerable
interpretive acts that ultimately ground the very progression of consciousness itself.
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Consciousness sustains itself on the basis of its own endeavor to grasp meaning and
retain that meaning over the duration of time. Therefore we can construe conversion as a sort of
experience that corresponds to our sense of existential significance (in terms of identity or role),
as a sort of self-fashioning. The judging acts that a conversion involves are such that the subject
is essentially “making” himself or herself in the course of carrying out these relevant acts. Thus
we should note that the meanings with which consciousness is concerned do not just regard the
truths that are supposedly “out there” in the “external” world, but even more importantly, the
meaning of personal identity, of self-experience, the answer to the perennial question “who am
I?”
Indeed to convert is to undergo a shift or change in the way in which one interprets
oneself, with the rather paradoxical caveat that, thanks to sedimented meaning and knowledge,
this self-interpretation is not always the object of the converting subject’s conscious awareness.
But as we have seen, insofar as the subject must make judgments in order for a conversion to
occur, at least some portion of the conversion process is volitional, which is to say, conscious and
deliberate. No one can coerce the consciousness of the Other to reconstitute itself against its will.
The conversion in the name of the Other is not a conversion at all; while conversion requires the
world and the Other in order to be possible, ultimately every conversion must be the result of
consciousness’s own will.
In closing I cannot help but wonder if there are other aspects of human experience that
are similarly embedded in the phenomenological conditions of our conscious lives. If not, then is
conversion the quintessential experience for the phenomenological subject?
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